Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1974



Ethnic Politics in the USSR
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

The Kádár Years
Charles Gati

Swedish Communism
Daniel Tarschys

Allende: A Summing Up
Paul E. Sigmund

Book Reviews
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Jean L. Laloy
Clifford P. Hackett
Roger E. Kanet
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Problems of Communism

3

MAY-JUNE 1974 VOL. XXIII

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1 The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR
by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

23 The Kádár Mystique
by Charles Gati

36 The Unique Role of the Swedish CP
by Daniel Tarschys

45 Allende in Retrospect
by Paul E. Sigmund

BOOKS

63 Two Views of Stalin
by Harrison E. Salisbury

65 Gulag: A Chronicle of Soviet Extralegal History
by Robert Sharlet

72 Four Ambassadors, Three Decades, Two Questions
by Jean L. Laloy

77 Superpower Relations in the Postwar Era
by Clifford P. Hackett

81 Moscow's Alignments in the Third World
by Roger E. Kanet

85 Poland: The Pangs of Progress
by George Kolankiewicz

Cover: Mamad Ilichiev, chief sheepherder of the Frunze Collective Farm in the Khodzhent Region of Tadzhikistan, speeds to work. A May 1974 photo by A. Kuzyarin for TASS via Sovfoto.

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The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR

By Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

Addressing the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1971, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev proudly affirmed the emergence of a new Soviet socialist nation forged from the ethnic mosaic of the old Russian Empire. "In the years of socialist construction," he declared, "*a new historical community of people*—the Soviet people—arose in our country."[1]

Close examination of Soviet society reveals, however, that this statement reflects more official *desiderata* than reality, for it can be argued that an increasingly assertive ethnic nationalism among the non-Russian minorities of the USSR has emerged as a major conflict area in Soviet domestic politics. Not only has the traditional sense of separate identity on the part of major ethnic groups failed to disappear, but it has begun to transform itself into modern nationalism.[2] This development—unanticipated and contrary to the basic assumptions of Marxism-Leninism—appears to constitute a challenge to the party leadership. Furthermore, in responding to this challenge, the CPSU leaders have yet to formulate policies capable of effectively reversing the trend whereby national polarization of the various Soviet peoples has advanced faster than their common consciousness of a new Soviet nationhood.

The forces of minority nationalism in Russia were recognized by Lenin and other leaders of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, who believed that nationalism was a part of the social superstructure at the capitalist stage of historical development but were confident that it would be replaced by a new "internationalist proletarian consciousness" free of nationalist elements once socialism was achieved. When nations on the periphery of the former Tsarist empire attempted to break away, the Bolsheviks decided to reincorporate them by force rather than allow dissolution of the new Soviet state. The USSR Constitution of 1924, adopted after heated debate between "assimilationists" and "autonomists,"[3] continued to recognize the separate identity of the minorities under a federal formula whch represented a pragmatic compromise for the period of transition pending implementation of reforms necessary to establish the new socialist society. This formula called for a political system "national in form and socialist in content." In practical terms, this meant the establishment of a federal institutional structure in which the more important national groups would be accorded the forms of statehood[4] but their exercise

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[1] See *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio—hereafter, *CDSP*), Vol. 23, No. 14, p. 3. Original emphasis.

[2] "Modern nationalism" refers to nationalism manifested by Soviet-educated national elites, in contrast to attitudes of traditional elites, now largely extinct.

[3] See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964.

[4] The USSR currently contains 15 union republics, 20 antonomous republics, 8 autonomous provinces *(oblasti)*, and 10 national regions *(okrugi)* as territorial units for major national groups. For a listing, see *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, pp. 27-32. Size alone does not guarantee a major ethnic group its own union or autonomous republic: of the 22 national groups numbering a million or more in the 1970 census, three—Germans, Jews and Poles—do not have their own union or autonomous republic, whereas small groups such as the Yakuts or Udmurts do. Other factors, such as compactness of settlement, geographic location (a unit must be located on the

(continued on page 2)

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of real autonomy would be severely circumscribed by the monopoly of power exercised by the sole, unitary CPSU.[5] In the existing historical context, moreover, Great Russian political, social and cultural elements dominated the "socialist" part of the formula from the outset. Ethnic Russians not only constituted a majority of the Soviet population but also enjoyed clear predominance within the CPSU and in the leading social strata.[6] This left little room for an input from the smaller and, in most cases, relatively less developed national groups.

In the years since the establishment of the Soviet state, party policies have indeed wrought major transformations in the economic and social fabric of the country. Powerful integrative forces were released through the process of industrialization and the accompanying expansion of mass education and intensive political socialization. At the same time, however, the retention of a federal administrative framework safeguarded the territorial loci and formal ethnocultural institutions of most minorities, thereby preserving the bases for potential manifestations of national attitudes.

It is this question of attitudes which is crucial today both for the leaders of the CPSU and for students of the national problem in the USSR. Has the construction of a new socialist material base resulted in the predicted growth of "proletarian internationalism" and a corresponding decline in the sense of separate national identity, or has the crystallization of nationalist attitudes among Soviet-reared generations of minority peoples eclipsed nascent "Soviet patriotism"? Is ethnic nationalism only a vestigial attitude among old historic nations such as the Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians, one that will wither away and present no threat to the future unity of the Soviet nation, or is it a new phenomenon which is present even among people who, at the time of the Revolution, had only an inchoate sense of a common culture? If, as will be argued, the latter is the case, then nationalism is on the increase and cannot strictly be classified as a survival of the past (even if it is nurtured by the traditional soil); rather it must be considered an integral feature of the new society and, improbable as it may seem, an outgrowth of the very policies of social mobilization that were designed to eliminate nationalism. If this is the case, what sorts of policies are likely to further or, conversely, to reverse this trend? In attempting to address these complex questions, the following analysis will first examine recent data bearing on the progress of Soviet society toward the goals of equalization and integration, then look at the evidences of contemporary nationalist attitudes and at the "pressure points" where these sentiments manifest themselves in conflict with authorities and policies at the center, and finally assess the responses of the ruling party in the post-Stalin period.

Before proceeding, however, it is important to establish a working definition of nationalism and to indicate the major forms that it has taken in the Soviet context. Without repeating the complex debate over the proper definition of this phenomenon, the author prefers to use the one formulated by Rupert Emerson:

The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation. . . . To advance beyond it, it is necessary to attempt to take the nation apart and to isolate for separate examination the forces and elements which appear to have been the most influential in

---

USSR international border to be a union republic), economic unity, and "a common psychological make-up" are the official conditions for autonomous status. Unlisted, but also important, are political considerations. Geographic dispersion is an important reason for the absence of a Jewish republic. Although a minor administrative unit—the Jewish Autonomous Province, or Yevreyskaya Autonomous Oblast—was established in the far eastern reaches of the USSR (along the Amur River in Khabarovskiy Kray—see accompanying map), the Jews have not been drawn to that locale and have remained dispersed throughout the USSR. The political factor is evident in the case of the Germans and the Crimean Tatars, who had republics prior to World War II, when they were deported *en masse*. Despite their official rehabilitation in the 1960's their autonomous status was not restored, nor were they allowed to return to their original areas of settlement.

[5] Despite the national forms of its organization, the CPSU has never operated on federal principles. As Frol Kozlov told the 22nd Congress in 1961, "It must . . . be made clear that the CPSU is not a federation of parties or party committees. It is a centralized organization." Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow, Eds. *Current Soviet Policies IV: The Documentary Record of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 205. This unitary principle was declared as early as 1919 when the party program demanded strict compliance with central decisions by "all sections of the party, irrespective of their national composition." See TsK RKP (b), *Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bolshevikov) v resolutsiiakh ee sezdov i konferentsii, 1898-1922 gg.* (The Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik] in Resolutions of its Congresses and Conferences, 1898-1922), Moscow, 1923, p. 253.

[6] See Pipes, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-78. Despite the influx of non-Russians into the membership of the CPSU, the weight of Great Russians in the leading bodies of the party and government administration remained disproportionately large. See, for example, Adburakhman Avtorkhanov, "Denationalization of the Soviet Ethnic Minorities," *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Munich), new ser., Vol. 4, No. 1, 1964, pp. 74-99; Seweryn Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1964, pp. 45-52; and Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," *ibid.*, September-October 1967, pp. 16-26.

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MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THE USSR



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Table 1: The Union Republics—Growth and Levels of Development

Republic [a]	1966 Gross Product as % of 1913 GP	Coefficient of Development [b]
Latvia	1800	1.17
Estonia	2500	1.14
RSFSR	700	1.05
Ukraine	4400	1.04
Lithuania	5200	1.02
Belorussia	6400	1.01
Moldavia	9900	.97
Kazakhstan	10100	.88
Georgia	6200	.87
Armenia	11900	.84
Turkmenia	3300	.77
Kirgizia	11700	.76
Azerbaidzhan	2500	.71
Uzbekistan	3200	.71
Tadzhikistan	6400	.69

[a] Ordered according to coefficient of development, the category favored by the Soviet scholar K. Vermishev.

[b] Calculated by the Soviet author as the ratio of the republic's share of total USSR gross domestic product in 1965 to the share of the given republic's population in total Soviet population in the same year.

SOURCE: Adapted from K. Vermishev, "On the Level of Economic Development of the Union Republics," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1970, p. 128.

bringing about the sense of common identity which lies at its roots, the sense of the existence of a singularly important national "we" which is distinguished from all others who make up an alien "they." This is necessarily an overly mechanical process, for nationalism, like other profound emotions such as love and hate, is more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational analysis.[7]

This broad definition highlights the crucial attitudinal dimension, the "we-they" dichotomy. In the Soviet context, further definitional refinement is required if one is to gauge whether or not minority self-assertion has reached the stage of separatism. For this purpose a distinction will be made between "orthodox" and "unorthodox" nationalism, the first involving the pursuit of political, economic and cultural autonomy *within* the system, the second characterized by advocacy of secession and independence *and/or rejection of the system's ideological mold.*

The Results of Progress

Let us turn, then, to a brief survey of recent data bearing on the success or failure of Soviet policies of economic and social mobilization as they relate to the solution of the nationality problem. Has the party been able to equalize the economic and social status of the diverse national groups in the USSR? Have successes in this area been sufficient to shift the focus of the aspirations of members of minority nationalities from the achievement of particularistic goals to the pursuit of a broader common good? Have the social and economic changes introduced since 1917 proven functional or dysfunctional as regards national integration?

When one examines the results of five decades of centrally-determined economic policies aimed at all-Union integration and internationalization, one discovers that national disparities are still significant. The growth pattern of each national area was largely predetermined by its level of development at the outset of the Soviet experiment. European Russia (including the Ukraine), which was the most advanced area and provided the lead-off base for development, remains the "effective national territory" (to use the geographers' term). The economic core of the USSR roughly comprises a triangle based on a line extending from the southwestern Ukraine to the Volga, with its apex somewhere north of Moscow. This area contains a majority of the Soviet population and accounts for over half of the nation's industrial and agricultural production. It also boasts the densest transportation network, as well as a higher return on capital investment and a higher per-capita labor productivity than regions to the south or e[illegible]

[7] *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 102.

[8] See David Hooson, "The Outlook for Regional Development in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* (Seattle), No. 3, September 1972, pp. 535-54.

[9] *Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities*, Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vol. 5, Tables 15-17, pp. CT-24 to CT-26, and Ellen Mickiewicz, Ed., *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data*, New York, Free Press, 1973, Introduction, pp. 1-47. Moldavia constitutes a low-ranking exception on the European end; Kazakhstan, a high-ranking exception on the Asian end.

[10] See V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of [illegible]tions Among the Soviet Republics," in Eric Goldhagen, Ed., [illegible]c *Minorities in the Soviet Union*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 50-120; I. S. Koropeckyj, "Equalization of Regional Developme[illegible]t in Socialist Countries; An Empirical Analysis," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago), No. 21, October 1972, pp. 68-86; and Anne Sheehy, "Some Aspects of Regional Development in Soviet Central Asia," *Slavic Review*, No. 3, September 1972, pp. 557-58.

[11] Discussing the 9th Five-Year Plan, Premier A. N. Kosygin stated: "The plan must be based on a single integrated conception of the country's development over the long-range future, inclu[illegible] the determination of the most important social and political goals." See *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 7.

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Efforts to combine the conflicting goals of rapid economic growth predicated on efficient investment and proportional development on the one hand, and of equalization on the other, have generally worked out in favor of the former. Considerations of strategic and foreign policy, too, have inclined economic policymaking in the same direction. Thus, although official policies have resulted in disproportionately high growth indexes for those republics initially most backward, these areas continue to lag significantly behind the economic core regions in the overall level of development (see Table 1 on p. 4). Measured in terms of income, savings, and trade turnover per capita, the relative level of economic development tends to slope downward, geographically, from northwest to southeast, with the Baltic republics ranked first, the Central Asian regions last, and the Slav and Caucasian republics in the middle[9]—a pattern which reflects little change in the relative standings of the various national groups since 1917.

Of even greater significance is the finding that the tendency toward equalization of regional levels of development observable before World War II and on through the mid-1950's appears to have reversed since 1958.[10] In part this shift in priorities reflects strategic considerations—*i.e.*, the need to develop Eastern Siberia and the Far East in view of the threat from China. In addition, economic priorities have been increasingly determined by the leadership's preoccupation with economic efficiency and integrated growth of an "intensive" nature.[11] Although marginal areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia have become more important economically in the last half-century and boast growing labor surpluses, it is the European core area which remains the optimal area for further economic development. Current priorities, then, would seem to weigh against a resumption of the policies of equalization which worked to close the gap between the richer and the less-developed republics in earlier periods.

A review of some aspects of social development reveals a similar pattern of overall progress but little

Table 2: Weight of Major Nationalities in Soviet Political and Social Structure
(all figures in percent of total category)

National Group	USSR Population 1970 [a]	USSR Supreme Soviet 1970 [b]	USSR Council of Ministers 1966 [b]	CPSU Membership January 1973 [c]	CPSU Central Committee 1972 [d]	CPSU Politburo & Secretariat Dec. 1973 [e]	Students in Higher Education 1970-71 [f]	Science Workers 1971 [g]
Russians	53.3	42.6	72.5	60.9	57.2	56.0	59.6	66.4
Ukrainians	16.9	13.3	20.3	16.0	18.6	16.0	13.6	10.7
Uzbeks	3.8	3.3	0	2.0	1.8	4.0	3.3	1.3
Belorussians	3.7	3.8	1.5	3.5	5.6	12.0	2.8	2.1
Tatars	2.4	1.1	1.5	?	0.5	0	1.9	1.3
Kazakhs	2.2	2.4	0	1.7	2.3	4.0	2.2	0.9
Azerbaidzhani	1.8	3.1	0	1.4	1.3	0	1.9	1.4
Armenians	1.5	2.9	1.5	1.5	2.4	0	1.8	2.2
Georgians	1.2	3.3	0	1.7	1.3	0	1.9	1.9
Moldavians	1.1	1.3	0	0.4	0.8	0	0.7	0.3
Lithuanians	1.1	2.1	0	0.7	0.9	0	1.1	0.9
Jews	0.9	0.3	1.5	?	0.9	4.0	2.3	6.7
Tadzhiks	0.9	2.1	0	0.4	0.8	0	0.6	0.3
Turkmeni	0.6	1.7	0	0.3	0.6	0	0.5	0.2
Kirgiz	0.6	1.5	0	0.3	0.5	0	0.6	0.2
Latvians	0.6	1.8	0	0.4	1.9	4.0	0.5	0.6
Estonians	0.4	1.8	0	0.3	0.9	0	0.4	0.5

[a] From *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 31.
[b] V. V. Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy,* Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1971, p. 437.
[c] *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 14, July 1973, p. 18.
[d] Derived from *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR: vosmoi sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Eighth Convocation), Moscow, Izvestia, 1970, and G. Ustinov, Ed., *Deputaty i zhizn* (Deputies and Life), Moscow, Izvestia, 1971.
[e] As of December 1972 all CPSU CC Secretaries were Great Russians with the exception of P. N. Demichev, who is reported to be of Jewish origin.
[f] *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kultura v SSSR* (Public Education, Science and Culture in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 196. Figures include students in evening and correspondence courses.
[g] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g.,* p. 105. Since 1960, the proportion of Jews, Armenians and Georgians among total Soviet science workers has declined, while that of Russians has increased.

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URBANIZATION AND THE NATIONALITIES
(% of population urbanized) [a]



[a] Listed by size of national group in 1970; in parentheses after figure for the 15 groups having a union republic named after them, urbanization figure for total population of the given republic.

SOURCE: *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g.* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 4, Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 20, 27, 28, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, 1922-1972* (USSR National Economy, 1922-1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 13, 16-18.

real change in the relative standing of national groups in terms of such indicators as urbanization or the proportion of population with secondary or higher education. Even though the 1970 census revealed that the USSR had finally reached a point where a majority (56 percent) of the population was urban, there was a substantial variation in the degree of urbanization among the different nationalities. Only four republics (the Russian Federation, Armenia, Latvia, and Estonia) and only three ethnic groups (Russians, Armenians and Jews) exceeded the USSR average. With the exception of the Russian Federation and Armenia, the proportion of urbanization for all inhabitants of each republic was higher than the proportion for the titular national group (see the accompanying figure).

Although one should qualify the observation by noting that portions of each national group live elsewhere than in their titular republic, such differentials in the degree of urbanization of most nationalities as compared to that of the whole population of their own republics emphasize the fact that urban areas tend to be dominated by nonindigenous national groups, mostly Russians. This fact imparts ethnic overtones to the antagonism over disparities in the quality of urban *vs.* rural life, disparities which seem to grow faster than the rate of rural-urban migration.[12]

This problem has been particularly acute in the southeastern portions of the USSR where a combination of high fertility rates and low skill-levels has created large rural labor surpluses even while there have been shortages of skilled manpower in urban-industrial centers. The rate of migration from the countryside to the cities in Central Asia was only 5 per 1,000 population in 1970, the lowest for any region of the Soviet Union.[13] The deficiency in urban skilled labor has been filled by immigration from other parts of the country, a phenomenon which not only contributes to urban-rural and ethnic conflicts, but also diverts migration from northeastern regions where central planners have tried to direct it.

Turning to mass education, one discovers an enormous expansion of opportunities since the Revolution, student/population ratios now being comparable to or higher than those in the developed Western countries. This development has resulted in a rapid growth of educated indigenous elites; yet, here

[12] See for example, Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[13] See an interview with the well-known Soviet demographer V. Perevedentsev in *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), January 1973, pp. 34-37, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 19, pp. 18-19.

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too, the broad achievements registered have not changed relative cultural rankings (see Table 2). The Georgian, Latvian, Armenian, Estonian and Ukrainian republics continued to lead in student/population rankings as of the 1970-71 academic year. Only five national groups (the Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Russians, and Azerbaidzhani) exceeded the nationwide average of 18.95 post-secondary-school students per 1,000 people in that year. The first four of these, plus the Latvians and Estonians, led in the proportion of members belonging to the scientific elite. As a rule, the Central Asians and Moldavians have ranked at the bottom in such statistical comparisons.[14]

As a recent study of levels of sociocultural development among Soviet minorities concluded, progress toward equalization has been

. . . strongest for the least demanding indicator (incomplete secondary education) and especially for the younger age cohorts. Once one compares the equalization of higher educational attainment and skilled manpower, whether for entire nationalities or for their urban and rural population separately, one observes significant remaining dispersion among nationalities.[15]

Another study aptly summed up the implications of this blend of considerable progress and continued inequality:

Any plan for long-range equality would have to institute radically dissimilar treatment which would involve favoring of the less advanced at the expense of the more advanced. What is crucial to the future is whether the relatively equal treatment over time, a factor promoting integration, is a more powerful determinant of psychological perceptions than the unchanging position in the rank-ordering of republics, a factor which might well breed perceptions of frustration and apathy.[16]

Demographic Issues

Recent demographic trends are likely to intensify rather than alleviate problems and perceptions of inequality. The 1970 census revealed that recently population growth has been most dramatic in the less advanced republics. According to one analyst, the coefficient of reproduction (or net reproduction rate) in Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan is 2.0, the highest in the USSR, indicating doubling of population in these regions in the next 30 years.[17] This has important implications for the rural-urban distribution of manpower (as noted above), for the age composition of the population in the given republics, and for the future of official policies of "internationalization", *i.e.*, efforts to dilute ethnic separateness and increase the sense of a common identity among the diverse peoples of the USSR.

With regard to age composition, the 1970 census indicated that persons under 20 years of age constituted between 52 and 56 percent of the population of the four Central Asian republics and Azerbaidzhan, compared to only 29 to 38 percent of the population in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the three Baltic republics.[18] The census also revealed that the natural increase of local population has come to replace migration as the major source of population growth east and south of the Urals in the last decade,[19] thus dimming the prospects for "internationalizing" the population of the national republics by the migration of other nationality groups, predominantly Russians or other Slavs, into these republics—a policy long pursued by Moscow. Still further, the census showed both a decline in the Great Russian majority's share in the total USSR population (from 54 percent in 1959 to 53 percent) and an upsurge in the share accounted for by the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus (from 10 to 13 percent). Moreover, in all the Central Asian and Caucasus republics—including the highly "internationalized" (*i.e.*, Russified) Kirgizia and Kazakhstan—the titular nationality group increased its share of the republic's population at the expense of the Russians in the period between 1959 and 1970 (see Table 3).

In the area of intermarriage, "internationalization" has also proceeded slowly, except in the cases of

[14] See Tables 18-21 in *Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities*, Vol. 5, pp. CT 27-30.

[15] Brian Silver, "Level of Sociocultural Development Among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis," a paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Sept. 4-8, 1973, p. 24.

[16] Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[17] See Roman Szporluk, "The Nations of the USSR in 1970," *Survey* (London), Vol. 17, No. 4, 1971 p. 68.

[18] *Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities*, Vol. 5, Table 5, p. CT 14. See also Rein Taagepera, "National Differences within Soviet Demographic Trends," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1969, pp. 478-83 and 489.

[19] J. A. Newth, "The 1970 Soviet Census," *Soviet Studies*, October 1972, pp. 200-22. (According to Newth, the share of total population living east of the Urals rose from 27.8 percent in 1897 to 43 percent in 1970.)

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intermarriage between members of different Slavic groups and between Russians and Jews. According to a Soviet ethnographic report in the early 1960's, in the case of marriages between Russians and members of other groups it has been less uncommon for Russian women to marry men of other nationalities than for Russian men to marry women of the local nationality, especially in Central Asia where marriages of the latter type have been almost unknown.[20]

Table 3: Trends in Russification: 1959-70

Republic	Titular nationality as % of population in 1959 (top) and 1970 (bottom)	Great Russians as % of population in 1959 (top) and 1970 (bottom)
RSFSR	83.3	83.3
	82.2	82.2
	Western USSR	
Belorussia	81.1	8.2
	81.1	10.4
Moldavia	65.4	10.2
	64.6	11.6
Ukraine	76.8	16.9
	74.9	19.4
	The Baltic States	
Estonia	74.6	20.1
	68.2	24.7
Latvia	62.0	26.6
	56.8	29.8
Lithuania	79.3	8.5
	80.1	8.6
	The Caucasus	
Armenia	88.0	3.2
	88.6	2.7
Azerbaidzhan	67.5	13.6
	73.8	10.0
Georgia	64.3	10.1
	66.8	8.5
	Central Asia	
Kirgizia	40.5	30.2
	43.8	29.2
Tadzhikistan	53.1	13.3
	56.2	11.9
Turkmenia	60.9	17.3
	65.6	14.5
Uzbekistan	61.1	13.5
	64.7	12.5
	Other	
Kazakhstan	29.8	43.2
	32.4	42.8

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 9, 18-21.

(Recently Soviet sources have published information indicating a higher proportion of national intermarriage in the cities and among educated individuals,[21] perhaps with the hope of encouraging this trend.)

It is also apparent that the consistent party policy of promoting Russian as the *lingua franca* of the USSR and of the new Soviet culture, while successful in superficial terms, has generally not resulted in the anticipated degree of cultural and ethnic assimilation. The 1970 census revealed that some 128.8 million Russians and 13 million non-Russians speak the Russian language as their native tongue, and another 41.9 million non-Russians declare Russian to be their second language. Thus, 76 percent of the total population is now able to communicate in Russian. Nevertheless, 93.9 percent of Soviet citizens continue to regard their respective national languages as their native tongue. In 13 of the union republics, more than 90 percent of the titular national group speak the local language as their native tongue (only in the Ukraine and Belorussia are the figures lower: 86 and 80 percent, respectively). The figure ranges from 60 to 90 percent for the large non-Russian minorities within the Russian Federation; however, only 32.5 percent of the Poles and 17.7 percent of the Jews listed their national language as their primary tongue.[22] Commenting on these phenomena, Rein Taagepera has observed:

. . . the 1970 census results suggest that the Soviet leaders have been quite successful in establishing Russian as lingua franca, *except in Central Asia. But a clear-cut retreat of national languages on the local*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 219, and the unsigned article, "Mixed Marriages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," *Central Asian Review* (London), No. 1, 1963, pp. 5-12.

[21] See *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 24, 1973, tr. in *CDSP* Vol. 25, No. 22, p. 13, and William M. Mandel's paper at the 1972 AAASS Conference in Dallas, which was reported in *New World Review* (New York), January-February 1974, pp. 23-25. According to *Literaturnaia gazeta,* 102 of every 1,000 marriages in the USSR were of mixed nationality as of 1959, while the figure was 144 in Kazakhstan. Mandel reports that the figure was roughly 200 in Tashkent in the same year and that one-third of the mixed marriages involved local women.

[22] For details, see *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 15. Moscow has continued to promote Russian-language schools and instruction in Russian in local-language schools wherever feasible in the national republics. This policy has been hampered not only by shortages of Russian-language teachers and textbooks in many national areas, particularly in the southeastern regions, but also by resistance on the part of parents and local administrators charged with implementation of all-Union legislation. See, for example, V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Allen Kassof, Ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society,* New York, Praeger, 1968.

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and private-life level has taken place only in the European autonomous republics and in the case of the diaspora nations. In all other regions, the fusion process has been slow at best, and a quiet crystallization of national languages is a definite possibility.[23]

A recent study by Brian Silver noted a number of factors that seem to contribute to the retention of linguistic homogeneity, even where bilingualism (*i.e.*, knowledge of Russian as well as of the native language) is high. The existence of a national administrative apparatus, local-language schools, and local cultural facilities in the union republics has been important. Religion has also been a factor inhibiting linguistic assimilation, primarily in Moslem areas, but also to some extent in Catholic and Protestant areas in western regions (Orthodox groups have assimilated linguistically much more readily). Urban residents appear more amenable to linguistic assimilation into Russian, but Silver cautions against the assumption that urbanization and social mobilization necessarily lead on from linguistic assimilation to a loss of ethnic identity. He suggests that mobilization may also enhance the awareness of separate identity on the part of new national elites.[24]

The New Nationalism

What one finds, then, is a modernizing Soviet society in which the party has engaged in extensive mobilization of the population with the stated purpose of equalizing the lot of the diverse nationalities and effecting their ultimate internationalization. However, resistance to linguistic and cultural assimilation has remained strong, with a marked tendency toward the continuation, or even a strengthening, of traditional ethnic allegiance, in the face of assimilatory pressures from Moscow. The failure of government policies to achieve the goal of equality may well have contributed to a resurgence and intensification of national feelings based on perceptions of real or imagined discrimination in development policies and on the urge to press particular demands on the central authorities. The merging of such attitudes with traditional ethnic antagonisms and the desire to preserve distinct cultural heritages seems to be providing the basis for the growth of a qualitatively new form of nationalism.

Among the leaders of republic Communist party organizations to criticize nationalist tendencies during a round of local political meetings in early 1973 were (left) Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, who replaced P. Ye. Shelest as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in April 1972, and Turdakun Usubaliev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirgizia since 1961.

—Photos from TASS and *USSR* magazine via Sovfoto.

That nationalism exists in the Soviet Union and that it is taking on new forms has been tacitly admitted by no less an authority than General Secretary Brezhnev. In a December 1972 speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the party leader admitted that "nationality relations even in a society of mature socialism are a reality that is constantly developing and putting forth new problems and tasks." His concluding remarks on nationality issues were particularly revealing:

Finally, comrades, there are also objective problems in our federal state—such as finding the best paths for the development of the individual nations and nationalities and the most correct combination of the interests of each of them with the common interests of the Soviet people as a whole.[25]

We have seen above that the objective problems of equalizing the levels of development of the individual national minorities remain unresolved. And judging from the intense attention paid to nationalist mani-

[23] "The 1970 Census: Fusion or Crystallization of Nationalities?" *Soviet Studies*, October 1971, pp. 220-21.

[24] "Ethnic Identity Change Among Soviet Nationalities," an unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Political Science), University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1972, pp. 8-9.

[25] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 22, 1972, tr. in CDSP, Vol. 24, No. 51, pp. 6, 9.

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festations in a series of top-level republic party ideological conferences held in the six months following Brezhnev's anniversary address. There is a growing national assertiveness among the country's ethnic minorities which must owe a considerable portion of its impetus to these very unresolved issues. In Soviet press accounts of these meetings, one reads official critiques of a wide range of activities either explicitly or implicitly branded as nationalist—from "survivals" of traditional cultural patterns, economic "localism" and "parochialism akin to nationalism" to "chauvinism," "national narrow-mindedness" and outright "nationalism." [26]

On the basis of such evidence, it is clear that strong tensions exist within Soviet society and that they have a tendency to express themselves in nationalist terms. Moreover, as pointed out above, there are indications that this nationalism is of a new variety. Thus, although Soviet sociological surveys conducted in the early 1960's indicated that urban dwellers were generally less inclined to display "nationalist prejudices" than rural dwellers, nationalist feelings in the cities were more prevalent among professional people and intellectuals, some of them young and highly educated—perhaps a reflection of job competition among elites of various nationalities.[27] Here, one is dealing with a new type of nationalism which—while drawing on attitudes from the past—has been generated by conditions arising in the context of the modernization and mobilization of Soviet society.

There are three crucial factors underlying the emergence of this new form of nationalism in the Soviet state: (1) the formation of indigenous modern elites who seek sources of legitimacy in their own unique national heritage and in establishing ties with people of their national group; (2) the existence of the federal system, which affords a political-administrative apparatus through which these minority elites can pursue their national-group interests and objectives; and (3) the continued political, economic and cultural hegemony enjoyed by the Great Russian majority and the national chauvinism manifested by this group vis-à-vis the minority nationalities. Let us address each of the factors briefly.

The principal locus of the new nationalism lies in the new indigenous elites composed of articulate citizens with modern skills, the very product of official policies of mobilization and social transformation. These elites, whose ranks are growing rapidly even among the least developed national minorities owing to the broad educational opportunities made available, are now beginning to find themselves frustrated politically and economically. Within their own national areas, they are in competition with the Russians and other outsiders for control of jobs and local decision-making, and their relative input into decision-making at the all-Union level is even lower (see Table 2). In addition to these economic and political pressures, the native elites also sense a constant effort to impose Russian cultural models on them under the guise of spreading Marxism-Leninism. They react by turning to the surviving "old heritage," not only in order to preserve it against Russian inroads but also in order to forge a link with other members of their national group and thus form a power base vis-à-vis Moscow.

This process has been facilitated by the continued existence of the federal structure of the USSR—a system devised, ironically, as only a temporary measure pending the creation of a socialist and internationalist society. The nationality-based units of the federal political-administrative system have provided the minority elites with both the bases and the means for pursuing national-group interests.

As noted above, a strong administrative-territorial base has proved important in the ability of major nationalities (in the union republics and also in Tataria) to withstand powerful pressures toward assimilation. Groups without such strong autonomous geographical and political units have tended to be more susceptible to assimilation, as evidenced particularly by the experience of internal diaspora groups such as the Jews and the Poles. (It should be noted that assimilation does not necessarily entail loss of ethnic identity, a fact demonstrated in the case of the Jews, to be discussed later.)

Moreover, the very complexity of the federal administrative structure affords numerous opportunities for evading central directives and promoting local interests. It is not surprising that party leaders tend to equate efforts of minorities in the republics to pursue their own national interests with manifestations of localism, for, in the dynamics of Soviet national relations, the strains of conscious political nationalism unquestionably intermingle with the complex jockeying for administrative, economic and regional advantage typical of many modern societies. This may explain why there has been such com-

[26] Accounts from these meetings were translated in *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 38, pp. 27-28, and Vol. 25, No. 11, pp. 13-16, No. 13, pp. 5-6, No. 16, pp. 4-10, 36, and No. 22, pp. 11-12.

[27] As reported in the *New World Review*, January-February 1974.

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plicity in manifestations of republic self-interest by republic party and government leaders whether they are members of the indigenous nationality or outsiders (mostly Great Russians). As long as the federal system remains intact, the strands of localism and nationalism will remain inextricably interwoven.

The final critical factor in the growth of nationalist attitudes in contemporary Soviet society is the predominance of the Great Russian majority. Its very weight and omnipresence in the political, economic and cultural realms contribute to the growth of the minorities' sense of ethnic separateness, and—what is perhaps more important—these objective factors are reinforced by the persistence of Great Russian nationalism itself. The latter, deeply rooted in historical Russian attitudes toward non-Russian peoples, involves a paternalistic posture colored by the sense of a Russian *mission civilisatrice* and of the special and superior worth of the Russian heritage and culture. For all the efforts at internationalization and assimilation, the Soviet (Russian) authorities still require that every citizen's internal passport contain an identification of his ethnic background—a category which is filled in at birth and is extremely difficult to change thereafter. An ethnic bias is also implicit in official exploration of means to limit the explosive growth of population in Moslem Central Asia and to revitalize birth rates in European Russia, in order, one suspects, to preserve the Great Russians' majority status in the total population.[28]

The Nationalist Challenge

To summarize, the new nationalism results from a dual process involving (1) a change in content as a result of superimposition of new conflicts on top of old ethnic differences, and (2) a shift in the main locus of nationalistic impulses to the new national elites. Old ethnic antagonisms have been reinforced by powerful new conflicts between the demands of the center and the aspirations of the various national groups. And the force of nationalism seems to be on the rise in a dialectical process of challenge and response—with integrationist and assimilationist pressures resulting in nationalistic challenges to the central leadership, which responds with policies that unwittingly engender greater nationalism.

[28] See, for example, Szporluk, *loc. cit.*, p. 69, and Helen Desfosses Cohn, "Soviet Population Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1973, p. 43.

NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF THE USSR

(According to the 1970 census)



SOURCE: Adapted by the Department of Geography, University of Texas at Austin from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g. (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, pp. 15-16.

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The nationalist challenge to the center is manifested in three broad areas: (1) pressure for broader political autonomy; (2) pressure for greater allocation of investment resources to local projects and for more authority to plan and manage republic economic activity; and (3) pressure for greater freedom to promote local national cultures.

Pressures for broader political autonomy are seen in the effort of local elites to obtain control of the power structure and decision-making in their republics and to achieve fair representation for themselves and their local needs at the all-Union level. Since at least the 1930's, national groups have sought to influence the appointment and promotion of personnel under the so-called *nomenklatura* (key jobs filled by specific party decisions) in order to "pack" local decision-making organizations with local people. Perhaps the most explicit admission of such practices surfaced in the 1973 meeting of the Georgian republic's party activists, where it was reported:

In Abkhazia [the Abkhazskaya ASSR] a half-baked "theory" according to which responsible posts should be filled only by representatives of the indigenous nationality has gained a certain currency. . . .[29]

Problems of personnel promotion and distribution involve not only political *nomenklatura* but increasingly affect a whole range of positions in the economy. This is particularly true where the native population is growing but its skill-levels are low and specialist positions are filled by skilled labor from other parts of the Soviet Union. Such in-migration not only causes local job displacement but also retards the training of local specialists, both resulting in intensified ethnic antagonisms. Such feelings apparently motivated some leaders of the Adzharskaya Autonomous Republic of Georgia to contemplate forgoing economic development rather than risk an influx of alien persons. As reported in the press,

. . . there were executives who urged the Adzhar Party organization to reject proposals . . . to build new factories and plants and to develop resorts and tourism, basing their advice on the premise that this would lead to migration of people from other republics. . . .[30]

Nationalist deviations, as well as opposition to policies of détente with the West, appear to have figured in the political demise of Piotr Ye. Shelest, pictured here (right) during an August 1971 visit to the German Democratic Republic at the head of a Soviet parliamentary delegation. The Ukrainian leader was removed from the CPSU Politburo and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and from the position of First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP in April 1972. Pictured with Shelest are (left) Gerald Goetting, President of the GDR People's Chamber, and Erich Mueckenberger, member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

—Photo by ADN-Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

Local autonomy is also promoted by sabotaging or simply failing to comply with all-Union policies considered undesirable. Practices of this kind—particularly in the economic realm—are apparently so common that they are regarded, except in the most flagrant cases, as no more than venial sins. The local elites also contrive to bypass lines of central control by forming local "backscratching" groups and "family circles" and by cultivating factional "pull" in Moscow.[31] There exists, in fact, consider-

[29] Report from a meeting of the Georgian republic party *aktiv*, *Zaria vostoka* (Tbilisi), April 27, 1973, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 16, p. 5.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] For a discussion of local cliques, see the report of the Georgia party meeting, *ibid.* The rise and fall of members of three factions of the Ukrainian Communist Party—the Dneprepetrovsk, the Kharkhov and the Donetsk factions—have been linked by some analysts with the fate of their respective patrons in the CPSU Politburo, *i.e.*, Brezhnev (and V. V. Shcherbitsky), N. V. Podgorny, and P. Ye. Shelest, respectively. See Christian Duevel's analyses, "MVD Investigation Foiled by Ukrainian CP Leadership," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (New York), Feb. 2, 1971; "Poliansky Eliminated in Sweepstakes for Kosygin's Succession," *ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1972; and "Protégé of Shelest and Podgorny Ousted in the Ukraine," *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1973. See also, *Soviet Analyst* (London), Jan. 4 and Feb. 15, 1973.

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able room for maneuver by skillful republic-level leaders in the massive tangle of conflicting laws, regulations and jurisdictions of the Soviet administrative system.[32]

The drive to maximize local political autonomy is observable in all republics, whether or not the level of indigenous participation in the power structure is high (as in Georgia and the Ukraine) or the leadership is highly "internationalized" (as in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia). Nationalism, nepotism and corruption figured among the charges leveled against republic leaders purged in Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and Latvia in the early 1960's; in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia in 1965 (in conjunction with a post-Khrushchev realignment of the leadership); in Azerbaidzhan in 1969; and in Latvia, the Ukraine and Georgia in 1972 and 1973.

Nationalistic deviations also appear to have figured in the April 1972 removal of Piotr Shelest from the CPSU Politburo and from the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (although the formal complaint was his hard-line opposition to the policy of détente with the West). Shelest evidently displeased the central party leadership by taking a relatively indulgent line toward Ukrainization in the cultural realm and by promoting the Ukraine's regional economic interests.[33] A scathing critique of a Shelest book (*Our Soviet Ukraine*) appeared in *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Kiev) in April 1973, accusing Shelest of failing to show "the favorable influence exerted by Russian culture on the development of Ukrainian literature, art and music . . ." and of treating a number of Ukrainian developments in isolation from the country's overall development both before and after the October Revolution. The article asserted:

There are obvious elements of economic autarkism in the book. They are harmful because they may stimulate nationalist illusions and prejudices. In general, the book places inordinate emphasis on the special features of Ukrainian history and culture.[34]

Similarly, although economic mismanagement, corruption, and permitting free enterprise to flourish were given as the principal reasons for the removal of V. P. Mzhavanadze as an alternate member of the CPSU Politburo and First Secretary of the Georgian CP in December 1972, subsequent criticisms of developments in the Georgian republic strongly suggest that alleged nationalist "deviations" of a political nature—such as attempting to run the republic as if it were an independent fief—also figured in the case against him.[35]

V. P. Mzhavanadze (left of center), then Georgian CP First Secretary, with CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Tbilisi on May 13, 1971, for ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the Georgian Republic and of the republic party organization.

—Photo by G. Kikwadze for TASS via Sovfoto.

[32] For some idea of the imprecise division of authority among ministries of republic and of all-Union competence, see M. I. Piskotin, "Functions of a Socialist State and the Administrative Apparatus," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), October 1973, pp. 3-11; V. F. Kotok and N. P. Farberov, "The USSR Constitution—the Evolving Basic Law of Society and of the State," *ibid.*, June 1973, pp. 3-12; I. O. Bisher, "Ministries of the Union Republics: Pressing Problems," *ibid.*, May 1973, pp. 28-35; M. G. Kirichenko, "The Juridical Nature of the Principles of Legislation of the USSR and of the Union Republics," *ibid.*, April 1974, pp. 18-26; and M. Solomentsev, "Under the Leninist Banner of the Friendship of Nations," *Kommunist* (Moscow), January 1973, pp. 21-38.

[33] Shelest is reported to have circulated Ivan Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification*—a scathing condemnation of nationality policy, cast in Leninist terms—among secretaries of oblast party committees in the Ukraine; to have protected for a time the known dissenter Vyacheslav Chornovil; and to have favored Ukrainization of the educational system and easing of restraints on Ukrainian historiography and literature. See, for example, *Soviet Analyst*, June 8, 1972, and *Ukrainsko Slovo* (Paris), Sept. 24, 1972.

[34] Tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 25, p. 22.

[35] See the report from the meeting of the Georgian party *aktiv*, *loc. cit.* A report from a Georgian CP Central Committee meeting noted that "certain executives have divided the republic into spheres of influence, assume patronage over certain districts, cities and party organizations, and have their so-called "pets" and privileged individuals . . ." *(Zaria vostoka*, Feb. 28, 1973, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 25, No. 13, p. 5).

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In the realm of economics, there is evidence that republic leaderships have become increasingly aggressive in pressing the central planning authorities to approve prestigious local projects and to grant their republics larger shares of centrally-allocated resources, while at the same time they have sought to minimize the extent of their republics' respective contributions to the all-Union kitty.[36] Belorussian First Secretary P. Masherov confirmed such phenomena in an authoritative discussion of nationality relations published in October 1972. He wrote, in part:

In economic relations, this type of anomaly [i.e., *nationalistic and parochial tendencies*] *may be expressed, on the one hand, in a special kind of parasitism, in the desire to receive as many assets and capital investments from the all-Union funds as possible, and, on the other hand, in the belated and incomplete fulfillment of obligations to the country as a whole, in the absence of proper concern for ensuring on-time interrepublic cooperative deliveries and the best and most efficient utilization of allocations from all-Union funds, as well as of local resources and assets.*[37]

The type of haggling that this causes is suggested by an item from Ukrainian *samizdat* (unofficially distributed) materials. According to one account, USSR State Planning Committee officials encounter great difficulties in finalizing plans for capital investment with the Ukrainian State Planning Committee and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers because these republic organs "always stubbornly try to increase capital investment funds, basing their demands on production quotas which the Ukraine contributes to the all-Union fund. They openly speak of being robbed." [38] The demands of the individual republics, however, vary according to their particular situations. The Central Asian republics, for example, appear to press for greater allocations of capital investment funds in order to diversify their economies and become something more than producers of raw cotton.[39] By contrast, Latvians and Estonians frown on greater investment allocations because they fear that these will inevitably bring in more Russians.

It appears, moreover, that a higher level of republic economic development relative to other regions of the USSR does not necessarily mean a decline in economic nationalism. For one thing, the Baltic republics and the Ukraine—the most developed areas of the country—tend rather to compare their economic levels with those of their neighbors to the west, in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, where standards are still higher. On the other hand, the republics of Central Asia may find less cause for dissatisfaction in making comparisons with their Asian neighbors. Moreover, regardless of relative levels of development, each republic wants to have a say in the processes of planning and resource allocation, and beyond this it is not uncommon for republic officials to try to promote local economic interests by resorting to such practices as nonfulfillment of plans and quotas, unauthorized diversion of resources, falsification of reports, and illegal deals.

Asserting National Cultures

While the political and economic manifestations of nationalism described above are of serious concern to the Soviet central leadership, perhaps the most abrasive and explosive area of national relations in the USSR is that which encompasses nationalistic pressures in the cultural realm. What is involved here is the assertion of cultural autonomy in such areas as the writing of national histories and in artistic and literary expression. While all of these tendencies existed in fact or *in potentia* prior to the advent of the Soviet system, the processes of modernization and mobilization may, paradoxically, have both intensified and facilitated their expression by making clearer the inequalities between different national groups, by providing modern techniques of communication, and by creating or revitalizing some of the very forms (e.g., language, national historiography, literary movements, etc.) through which nationalist sentiments have become increasingly expressed. The renascent national cultures have

[36] See, for example, Violet Connolly, *Beyond the Urals*, London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1967, and Leslie Dienes, "Issues in Soviet Energy Policy and Conflicts over Fuel Costs in Regional Development," *Soviet Studies*, July 1971, pp. 26-58.

[37] "Several Traits and Features of National Relations in Conditions of Mature Socialism," *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1972, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 46, pp. 1-5.

[38] "Politicheskii dnevnik" (Political Diary), *Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata* (Collection of Samizdat Documents), New York, Vol. 20, AS 1002, p. 33.

[39] Christian Duevel notes some hints of resistance by Central Asian leaders to increases in cotton-production quotas for their republics; see "Some Cryptic Remarks by Brezhnev in Tashkent," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (New York), Sept. 28, 1973.

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gained further strength through resisting the simultaneous and insistent propagation of official "Marxist" (or Russian) cultural models from Moscow.

The dynamics of this process may be traced through the development of national historiographies. Research and writing on the national history of the diverse minority groups has unquestionably been fostered by the Soviet system's stress on education and publishing. Even while encouraging the writing of national histories (in a genuine observance of the policy of permitting the national cultures to "flourish"), the central leadership has always insisted that such works be written through the prism of class criteria with the clear injunction that the national heritage be interpreted from the perspective of two distinct historical "streams"—one "progressive" and the other "reactionary." In practice, this meant historical distortion by interpreting any self-assertion of a minority vis-à-vis Russian encroachment as "reactionary." The battle for more objective historiography has been fought since the 1930's, but particularly after 1956 (when greater freedom of interpretation was granted) there surfaced "incorrect" (*i.e.*, unapproved) interpretations of history in a number of republics. "Nationalist deviations" in the recent works of Georgian, Ukrainian, Kirgiz, and Armenian historians came under particular fire in late 1972.[40] A. Yakovlev, in a particularly strong diatribe, blasted "attempts to prettify and whitewash certain representatives of bourgeois nationalism, attempts found in a number of publications dealing with Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, the Georgian Mensheviks, the Social Federalists, and the Armenian Dashnaks. . . ." [41]

The profusion of such works of nationalist historiography, as well as of a wide range of literary and artistic works with "incorrect" or "nationalist" orientation, involved not only a large number of members of the creative and academic intelligentsia, but also of media and publishing houses. One can only assume that republican party hierarchies either found no great fault with these developments or even actively sponsored them, as suggested in the Shelest case.

Closely related to the development of cultural-ethnic differentiation has been the continued or increased adherence of minorities to traditional religions. Religious faith and observances have formed an integral part of the growing national identity of most of the ethnic minorities of the USSR, a linkage which is recognized by the Soviet leadership.[42] Thus, the Roman Catholic religion has been an integral part of Lithuanian nationalism, and similar roles have been played by the Uniate Church in the western Ukraine, to a somewhat lesser extent by the ancient Orthodoxy of Georgia and Armenia, and by Lutheranism in Estonia and Latvia. For the peoples of Central Asia, as well as the Tatar, Azeri Turks, and others, Islam has provided a unifying bond and a mark of distinctiveness which has helped to insulate them against the integrative impact of social change. Moreover, the pressure of official atheism to eradicate such "vestiges of the past" has unquestionably tended to generate a reactive adherence to these very cultural forms and to spur demands for the freedoms of religious worship and education guaranteed under the Soviet constitution.

Differences of Degree

Surveying the overall picture of nationalist pressures, one observes a striking growth in the visibility of these pressures in the last decade. Latent but suppressed earlier, ethnic nationalism appears to have come into its own in recent years, perhaps under the catalytic effect of the succession struggle following Stalin's death in 1953 and the Khrushchev "Thaw" of 1956-57. It appears that there is hardly a union republic which has not manifested "orthodox" nationalism, *i.e.*, the conscious pursuit of greater political, economic and cultural autonomy within the framework of the existing system. In each case, a new national elite of intellectuals, including

[40] For example, U. I. Sidamonidze was criticized for a book on the role of Georgian Mensheviks in the period of revolutionary consolidation, and A. I. Menabde, for attempting to rehabilitate "nationalist deviationists by condoning their struggle against the Transcaucasion Federation" (see *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 11, pp. 8-9). Armenian historian A. M. Mnatsakanian was criticized for an article on Lenin and the national question (*ibid.*, Vol. 24, No. 44, p. 5). Kirgiz historians K. Nurbekov and R. Turgunbekov drew criticism for various works including their joint 1969 monograph, *The Formation and Development of the Sovereign State of the Kirgiz People* (*ibid.*, Vol. 25, No. 12, p. 17). In the Ukraine, R. P. Ivanova's monograph on 19th-century Ukrainian national liberation leader M. P. Dragomanov and N. P. Kisyenko's book on the Zaporozhe Cossacks were accused of nationalist deviations (*ibid.*).

[41] "Against Antihistoricism." *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Nov. 15, 1972, tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 47, pp. 6-7. In this article Yakovlev also attacks Great Russian chauvinism.

[42] See complaints of republic party leaders above; also the comment in a *Pravda* editorial of Sept. 15, 1972: "We still encounter attempts to present religious practices as a feature of national distinctiveness and to depict the nonobservance of religious holidays as all but apostasy from the 'behest of one's fathers' " (tr. in *CDSP*, Vol. 24, No. 27, p. 8).

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members of the local power apparatus, has acted as the standard-bearer of the new sense of national identity. The degree to which the broad masses identify with this new nationalism remains an open question, although there is evidence that in even the most backward republics the rural masses do identify consciously with national traditions.[43]

The intensity of "orthodox" nationalism varies. Among the historic nationalities, such as those of the Baltic states (incorporated into the USSR in the 1940's), or the Georgians and Armenians, the sense of national identity has not only been preserved but has strengthened. The Ukraine, with its more than 40 million nationals and its economic base, is a special case. Also a historic nationality, the Ukrainians experienced some loss of national self-awareness in the 1930's, but a vigorous revival has taken place in the last two decades, perhaps under the stimulus of the incorporation of the western Ukraine as a result of World War II. Whatever the reasons, the Ukrainians seem at the forefront of the national reawakening, and solution of the national problem in the Ukraine is crucial for the Soviet leadership, because, if the Ukrainians were successfully assimilated, pressures from other minorities would be of only marginal importance.

In Central Asia and also to a degree in Azerbaidzhan, development of a sense of separate ethnic identity was long circumscribed by the cultural unity of Islam within the Turkestan territorial base. However, all Moslem nations have experienced a rapid growth of modern nationalism in the Soviet period. National consciousness there is most clearly visible in the cultural sphere, but it is beginning to exert pressure in the political and economic spheres as well. The Kirgiz and Kazakhs, more modernized perhaps than the others and a minority in their republics, and the Uzbeks (the largest Moslem nationality) boast the most articulate native elites.[44] As for the remaining republics, information on the Moldavians is too fragmentary to attempt an assessment, while Belorussia alone appears to be experiencing a decline in nationalist manifestations. The lesser nationalities having autonomous-republic as opposed to union-republic status also seem to be moving toward assimilation along with the diaspora groups.

Yet, as the case of the Soviet Jews illustrates, it is one thing to become highly assimilated and another to renounce one's ethnic identity. The Soviet Jews are dispersed throughout the Soviet Union without any significant administrative-economic base, almost totally urbanized, highly mobilized, widely habituated to using the Russian language, and accustomed to expressing themselves in Soviet cultural modes (in part as a result of restrictions on cultural autonomy not experienced by most minorities). Nevertheless, in recent years growing numbers of Jews have reasserted their ethnic identity, and many have even signaled their rejection of the Soviet system by choosing to emigrate to Israel.[45] It should be emphasized, however, that the situation of the Jews in the Soviet context is unique, both because of the existence of a powerful external focus of ethnic identity—Israel—and because of the failure of the Russians and other national groups in the Soviet Union to afford the Jews genuine social acceptance.

Of course, the Jews are not the only national groups in the Soviet Union to exhibit "unorthodox" nationalism. Such examples of separatism and rejection of the system, however, appear to have surfaced only in isolated pockets. Ruthlessly suppressed, unorthodox nationalism is known to observers in the West mainly through *samizdat*. Such forms of nationalism apparently emerge where a historical sense of national identity coincides with a strong cultural stimulus, such as religion. It has been observed in the Ukraine, in Lithuania, and among the Crimean Tatars, and also to a lesser extent in Latvia and Estonia. For example, there were waves of nationalist unrest and consequent arrests in the Ukraine in 1966-67 and again in 1972. In March 1972, some 17,000 Lithuanian Catholics sent a memorandum to the United Nations Secretary General protesting persecution, and two months later troops were required to suppress rioting in

[43] See Barry M. Rosen, "An Awareness of Traditional Tadzhik Identity in Central Asia," in Edward Allworth, Ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*, New York, Praeger, 1973.

[44] See James Critchlow, "Signs of Emerging Nationalism in the Moslem Soviet Republics," in Norton T. Dodge, Ed., *The Soviets in Asia*, Proceedings of the May 19-20, 1972, symposium of the Washington Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, Mechanicsville, Md., The Cremona Foundation, 1972.

[45] It is difficult, of course, to draw sweeping generalizations about the relationship between assimilation and nationalism even in the case of the Soviet Jews. Zvi Gitelman, a leading authority on Soviet Jewry, notes that the emigration has come both from among urban Jews in the Soviet heartland who are linked with other dissident groups and from such little-assimilated groups as the Georgian Jews (the latter comprise only 3 percent of all Soviet Jews but 30 percent of the emigrants!). These observations were made in an oral presentation at Carleton University on April 3, 1974.

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Kaunas following the self-immolation of Roman Kalanta and two other Lithuanian youths.[46]

The formation of underground groups or even the circulation of nationalist or religious *samizdat* also constitutes clear evidence of unorthodox political dissent. A number of such underground groups existed in the Ukraine in the 1960's, some as a continuation of wartime independence-seeking groups, as exemplified by the Ukrainian National Liberation Front.[47] In the summer of 1973, copies of *Lietuvos Kataliko Baznycios kronika* (A Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church) and an appeal to world Communist parties from the Crimean Tatars (with 105 pages of handwritten signatures) were disseminated in the West. Smaller-scale attempts at establishing underground organizations and at distributing *samizdat* in the republics of Latvia and Estonia were also reported.[48]

The Official Response

That the Soviet leadership is aware of and concerned about nationality relations in the USSR is beyond dispute. Politburo ideological specialist Mikhail Suslov has singled out ethnic antagonism as one of the three major conflicts standing in the way of the building of communism in the Soviet Union,[49] and a 1972 CPSU Central Committee resolution recognized the national problem as "one of the critical sectors in the struggle between socialism and capitalism." [50]

In examining the official nationality policy of the Soviet leadership, there is little need to review the various phases of that policy prior to 1953. Following upon the aggravation of ethnic tensions caused by the intensified Russification drive of the late Stalin period, national minority pressures surfaced in the struggle for power following Stalin's death and apparently played a not inconsiderable role in the efforts of contending leaders to line up support. There is evidence that L. P. Beria, in his abortive bid for power, posed as a champion of minority rights. His short-lived ascendancy in the Central Committee Presidium resulted in a CC Plenum decision of June 12, 1953, "to end the mutilation of Soviet nationality policy." This shift apparently was to involve placement of local Communists in leading positions in their republics and a reversion to the use of local languages (rather than Russian) in the conduct of all official business there,[51] and there was evidence of compliance in several republics.[52] However, Beria's colleagues viewed this policy reversal as an effort "to aggravate nationalist tensions between Russians and non-Russians, as well as tensions between the central leadership in Moscow and

This September 1972 concert marks the opening of another Song Holiday, a century-old annual tradition in Tallin, the capital of Estonia.

—Photo by TASS via Sovfoto.

[46] For information on nationalist resistance in these and other Soviet republics, see *The Chronicle of Current Events*, published in translation by Amnesty International, London. See also, Vyacheslav Chornovil, *The Chornovil Papers*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1968; van Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968; John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*, Toronto, Peter Martin Associates, Ltd., 1970; and Michael Browne, Ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine*, London, Macmillian, 1971.

[47] See Victor Swoboda, "The Western Republics," in the collection "Ethnic Pressures in the Soviet Union," *Conflict Studies* (London), No. 30, December 1972. The front reportedly attempted to enlist Chinese aid to appeal to Western journalists to protest political arrests in the Ukraine in the summer of 1973.

[48] See Albert Boiter, "Soviet Dissent and *Samizdat:* Summer 1973," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, Oct. 17, 1973.

[49] "The Social Sciences—a Combat Arm of the Party in the Building of Communism," *Kommunist*, January 1972, pp. 18-30.

[50] "Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1972, p. 12.

[51] This was cited in a petition by 17 Latvian Communists to leaders of foreign parties, smuggled to Sweden in the summer of 1971 and reported in *Radio Liberty Research Report*, Jan. 27, 1972, *The New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1972, and *Soviet Analyst*, March 2, 1972.

[52] The First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP was removed for "abuses of Leninist nationality policy" (see *Pravda Ukrainy* [Kiev], June 13, 1953). A Russian serving as Second Secretary of the Lithuanian CP was removed on similar charges (*Sovetskaia Litva* [Vilnius], June 18, 1953), and a special plenum of the Central Committee of the Latvian CP discussed personnel policies (*Sovetskaia Latvia* [Riga], June 28, 1953).

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the local leadership in the republics," [53] and the policy came to naught when they removed him from power a short time later.

Nevertheless, continued ethnic pressures did gain some recognition at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. First Secretary Khrushchev at that time transferred some federal powers to the republics and also permitted the rehabilitation of some purged national leaders and certain minorities removed from their ancestral homelands during World War II. However, the intensification of ethnic pressures that ensued soon brought a reaction which was heralded by the removal of various republic leaders in 1959 for "localism" and "nationalistic tendencies." Even the 1957 reform in economic management, instead of benefiting the local interests of the republics, proved to be a measure that made them more and more a superfluous link in the management chain.[54]

Khrushchev reacted to the challenge of growing ethnicity by amending the official theory of national relations. In the new Party Program, adopted in 1961 at the 22nd CPSU Congress, it was stated that in the new period of Communist construction,

. . . the nations will draw still closer together, and their complete unity will be achieved.[55]

The new formula was cast in dialectical terms, affirming that separate national cultures were to flourish by a "drawing-together" (*sblizhenia*) stressing cultural phenomena common to all Soviet groups until the final dialectical leap to "merger" or "achievement of complete unity" (*sliianie*). Presentation of the new formula was accompanied by pointed remarks on the "obsolete character" of federal state forms.[56]

Ethnic elites were far from happy with the new formula, and there is reason to suspect that counter-pressures from this sector were a factor in Khrushchev's fall in October 1964. Certainly his successors made some prompt tactical concessions to the republics, including restoration of traditional lines of administrative jurisdiction in economic management and paying lip service to the need for all republics to develop their national forms and cultures. References to a "merger" of nationalities were dropped, although official statements continued to invoke the concept of "drawing together." In addition, during the late 1960's the chairmen of republic supreme soviets were made *ex-officio* members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and chairmen of republic councils of ministers were made *ex-officio* members of the USSR Council of Ministers. The same principle was applied to presidents of republic supreme courts and planning committees.

Nevertheless, the "drawing-together" formula continued to be in vogue and emerged as a leading theme in the deliberations of the 24th CPSU Congress, held in the spring of 1971, where Brezhnev called for an intensive ideological and educational campaign to foster popular understanding of the concept. He also condemned "nationalism and chauvinism, national narrow-mindedness and conceit

Fourth-year students of Russian and Central Asian origins in the Department of Mechanics and Mathematics at the Computer Center of Tashkent University in Uzbekistan; from left, S. Yakubova, N. Shokhidov, A. Sattarov, and Kh. Khadarov.

—A 1971 photo by Novosti via Sovfoto.

[53] *Khrushchev Remembers*, with an Introduction by E. Crankshaw, tr. and ed. by S. Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., Bantam Books, 1970, p. 357. This statement was preceded by Khrushchev's observance: "Beria was preaching that the predominance of Russians in the leadership of the non-Russian republics had to be reversed. Everyone knew that this was right and that it was consistent with the party line, but at first people did not realize that Beria was pushing this idea in order to aggravate national tensions . . ."

[54] See the author's "The Dilemma of Nationalism in the Soviet Union," in John W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1971, pp. 115-34.

[55] *Current Soviet Policies IV*, p. 26.

[56] *Ibid.* The impermanent, tactical nature of federal forms was commented on by P. G. Semenov in "The CPSU Program for the Development of Soviet National-State Relations," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, December 1961, and B. L. Manelis, "V.I. Lenin's Development of the View of Marxism on Federation," *ibid.*, No. 4, 1962.

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in any form whatsoever," and made references to the pivotal role of the Russians in Soviet society.[57]

The uncertainty among the Soviet leadership concerning how to deal with this major domestic issue is evident in Brezhnev's 50th anniversary speech. In it, he stated bluntly:

. . . the party regards as impermissible any attempt whatsoever to hold back the process of the drawing together of nations, to obstruct it on any pretext, or artificially to reinforce national isolation. . . .[58]

Yet the whole tenor of the General Secretary's address reflected the strength of nationalist pressures as he took obvious pains to justify the "special historical role" of the Russian Federation within the USSR and to remind people in republics such as the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Kazakhstan that their progress and development has been possible only because of membership in the multinational socialist state. At the same time, Soviet publications carry critiques of the revival of Slavophile (extreme Great Russian nationalist) conceptions and caution that the process of "drawing together" is a long-term matter, in which "tactful and attentive consideration" should be paid to the interests of each nation and nationality.[59]

Amidst this climate of official ambivalence, the national problem has continued to grow in magnitude. This fact has come sharply into focus since the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Federation in December 1972, as a proliferation of authoritative statements in political and professional journals has attested to the leadership's recognition of the dimensions of the problem and to its determination to prevent a further growth of ethnic nationalism.[60] Yet there seems to be no agreement on what major new policies will be needed to turn the tide, and there is even evidence of controversies between autonomists and assimilationists evocative of the 1920's. The directions which policy seems to be taking include renewed emphasis on policies of assimilation in the economic and cultural spheres, a major campaign of political education aimed at discrediting nationalist behavior (see references above to party ideological meetings in 1973), and harsh responses to the most flagrant violations of "internationalism."

The Future of the Republics

Revival of active discussion of the need to revise the Soviet Constitution to reflect new circumstances may be an indirect response by the party leadership to the persistent national problem. Constitutional revision became quite topical in 1961 and was mentioned again at the time of the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, but has since been on the back burner of political priorities. In his 50th anniversary speech, however, General Secretary Brezhnev brought the matter back to the forefront, promising that a draft of the new Constitution would be made public for discussion prior to the next party congress (presumably to be held sometime in 1975 or shortly thereafter).[61] While no portions of the new document have been published, the discussion of possible provisions has afforded certain scholars a forum for suggesting that the ethnically-based territorial units are becoming obsolete and that in the field of economic administration increased centralization is a necessity.[62] Other commentary suggests that while the union republic units will be retained, their laws will be brought into even stricter conformity to all-Union legislative norms.[63] While such proposals are not necessarily definitive, their publication can be construed as a veiled threat to the position of the republics and their native elites.

According to one Western observer, the most threatening—and hence most controversial—aspect of the discussion lies in calls for more centralization of the economy. These have evoked counterappeals for "safeguarding of the republics' rights in this field. . . ." [64] Of course, this issue emerges in more concrete forms than mere discussion of possible constitutional verbiage. There is a strong policy commitment by central leaders, including Brezhnev, to

[57] See General Secretary Brezhnev's report at the 24th CPSU Congress, *loc. cit.*

[58] *Loc. cit.*

[59] On the first point, see A. Dymshits, "Against Yielding in the Ideological and Esthetic Struggle," *Kommunist,* No. 11, July 1972; and A. Yakovlev, "Against Antihistoricism," *loc. cit.* On the latter point, see P. Fedoseev in *Pravda,* Oct. 20, 1972, tr. in *CDSP,* Vol. 24, No. 42, p. 19, and V. P. Sherstobitov in *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow), No. 3, May-June 1972, tr. in *CDSP,* Vol. 24, No. 44, p. 15.

[60] See the author's article, "Recent Trends in Soviet Nationality Policy," in *The Soviets in Asia, op. cit.*

[61] *Loc. cit.*

[62] See, for example, Kotok and Farberov, *loc. cit.,* and A. Kositsyn, "The Government of a Mature Socialist Society," *Kommunist,* No. 6, April 1973, pp. 59-70. The latter article makes no mention whatsoever of federalism.

[63] Kirichenko, *loc. cit.*

[64] Paul Wohl in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Dec. 14, 1973, p. 17.

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

Construction in May 1974 at the Nurek Hydroelectric Station on the Vakhsh River in Tadzhikistan. Besides providing irrigation for cotton fields in the Tadzhik, Turkmen and Uzbek republics, the dam is to furnish power for an aluminum complex at Regar and an electrochemical complex at Yavan. According to a New York Times *report of May 27, 1974, construction was behind schedule and incurring heavy cost overruns.*

—Photo by A. Kuzyarin for TASS via Sovfoto.

increased centralization of economic management. The General Secretary stated in his December 1972 speech,

The fusion of the economic potential and resources of all the republics accelerates the development of each republic—from the smallest to the largest. All-Union economic management and planning have made it possible to take a rational approach to the siting of productive forces, have provided freedom for economic maneuvering, and have enabled us to deepen cooperation and specialization, the total advantages of which exceed by far the simple arithmetic sum of the component efforts of each republic, district and province. This path has been tested; it is reliable; and we shall advance along it to new achievements, to new gains in Communist construction.[65]

This orientation has colored discussions and implementation of various recent reforms in industrial management in the USSR, once again revealing conflicts between priorities at the all-Union and at the union-republic levels. A new law on industrial associations (*obedineniia*), published April 3, 1973, in *Pravda*, raised anew the specter of industrial management organs whose competence extends over plants in more than one republic (the *sovnarkhozy* established by Khrushchev in 1957 were an earlier attempt at creating efficient horizontal coordination of industrial management regardless of existing administrative-territorial divisions). In discussing the reordering of industrial management, a *Pravda* editorial of May 13, 1973, spoke of a 3- or at most 4-link system of economic management. While this account specifically mentioned a union-republic link, it stressed the point that

. . . the administrative boundaries and departmental subordination of enterprises and organizations must not serve as obstacles to the introduction of more effective methods of management. . . .

Other commentary has been even more explicit in suggesting that the republic-level organs of industrial management (ministries) be eliminated where expedient.[66] Compromise proposals have suggested that republic links be eliminated in the chain of management in heavy industry and retained in areas such as production of consumer goods, where local needs should be more directly represented.[67] Regardless of the final outcome of this heated debate, it is clear that republic prerogatives in the realm of economic planning and management face diminution.

What one finds, then, in surveying the state of national relations in the Soviet Union today is un-

[65] *Loc. cit.*

[66] Thus, V. Kistanov states: "In a number of instances, the union-republic boundaries and the territorial economic complexes that objectively exist or are in the process of formation do not coincide. . . . It would appear that some forms of associations including several nationalities would be economically expedient in certain cases." (*Voprosy ekonomiki*—Moscow—December 1973).

[67] Bisher, *loc. cit.*

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questionable evidence of growing modern nationalism among the major minority peoples. This nationalism is most often expressed by native elites in the context of the nationally-based union republics and is directed against the dominant force of the Great Russian majority, which continues to exercise its historical hegemony in the land.

It has long been the hope of the CPSU leadership that the edge of minority nationalism will become blunted under the impact of policies of social mobilization and economic growth. Yet, although social mobilization may encourage integration and certain types of assimilation to the Soviet (Russian) model, it also seems to have the contrary effect of promoting awareness of national identity on the part of major Soviet minority groups. As for efforts to consolidate and streamline all-Union planning, administration and management, these have encountered strong resistance on the part of republic elites who recognize the threat posed by such measures to their own prerogatives. Moreover, the chances for success of yet another attempt at streamlining the economy are slim in view of the very vastness of the Soviet Union and the complexity of its administrative apparatus. Thus, it is unlikely that there will be a dramatic economic advance capable of erasing remaining inequities.

Options and Outlook

Therefore, over the long run, the swelling tides of nationalism seem to be on a collision course with party policies. The leadership seems to lack a clear consensus on how to proceed on this thorny issue. Indeed, the available options are far from attractive.

Theoretically, the Soviet leadership might choose to eliminate the federal structure, which provides much of the focus for modern nationalism, disperse members of the new national elites, and engage in mass resettlement of populations in order to physically achieve "internationalization" of the populace. Such a policy, though fully legitimate in ideological terms and perhaps having some few adherents at the highest levels, would require a vast terror apparatus of the Stalinist variety and would almost inevitably cause an upheaval which the system could not sustain. It seems extremely unlikely that the more rational and cautious members of the CPSU leadership, let alone those members of the Politburo and Central Committee whose power base is in the union republics, would even seriously consider such a course of action.

In addition to domestic repercussions, abolition of the republics would have serious foreign-policy implications. The national republics, especially those in Central Asia, have been an asset in dealings with the Afro-Asian world and the Arab Middle East. Those nationalities that straddle borders provide a means of influencing neighbors with similar ethnic populations.[68] Conversely, the Soviet leaders also have to bear in mind Chinese propaganda efforts to discredit Soviet assimilationist policies and to foment unrest among minority groups in Soviet areas bordering on China. So far, these groups do not seem too impressed with Peking's own policies toward national minorities, but elsewere the Asian image of China and the similarities between Maoism and the doctrines of such Moslem Communists of the 1920's as Sultan Galiev may make the People's Republic more attractive. Moreover, in at least one case, nationalist dissidents have sought Chinese ap-



An administrative building arises in Shevchenko, a multinational city with a Ukrainian name, built during the last decade on the Mangyshlak Peninsula of Kazakhstan.

—Photo by Y. Kuidin for Novosti via Sovfoto.

[68] To cite one example, the promotion of the Tadzhik ASSR to the status of union republic was clearly designed to increase Soviet influence in Afghanistan, Iran and the then British subcontinent of India (see the author's *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). Vernon Aspaturian notes that the formation and subsequent abolition of the Karelo-Finnish union republic was motivated by considerations of Soviet policy toward Finland (see "The Union Republics and Soviet Diplomacy: Concepts, Institutions and Practices," *American Political Science Review*—Menasha, Wisc.—June 1959).

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proval.[69] Any draconian measures directed against the minority republics may increase Chinese leverage.

Beyond all this, the Soviet leadership tends to view Soviet national relations as a prototype for relations within the socialist commonwealth of nations, and hence developments in the first sphere color Soviet relations with client states in Eastern Europe. As a reviewer of Brezhnev's book, *KPPS v borbe za edinstvo vsekh revoliutsionnykh i miroliubivykh sil* (The CPSU in the Struggle for the Unity of all Revolutionary and Peace-Loving Forces), observed:

The principle of proletarian internationalism as evolved in the practice of construction of the Soviet multinational state has become, in conditions of the victory of socialism in numerous countries, also the rule in the relationships within the socialist commonwealth.[70]

For all these reasons, it would seem unlikely that the Soviet leadership will drastically alter the federal structure of the Soviet Union, at least as it appears on paper. The most that one might expect from constitutional revision *per se* would be some grouping of smaller republics—say those of Central Asia, the Baltic, or the Caucasus—into larger and more efficient entities and elimination of such outdated provisions as Article 17 of the 1936 Constitution (granting the republics the right to secede) and the amendments of 1944 allowing the republics to maintain direct foreign relations with other countries and to have their own military formations.

Short of abolishing the republics, the central authorities can, however, move to further concentrate administrative authority in Moscow. Amid the discussions of constitutional revision and of reform in the chain of economic management there are numerous indications that the overlapping jurisdiction of all-Union and union-republic administrative organs is viewed as inefficient. This duplication of administrative competence is quite likely to be eliminated in at least some instances by abolition of republic-level organs, a move which will further reduce the room for maneuver of the various republic elites.

The Soviet leadership has so far been spared the burden of dealing with simultaneous and concerted pressure from all major nationality groups. There is little evidence of coordination among nationalities, partly because the rate of growth of national consciousness varies from group to group, and also because of interminority antagonisms which are on the upswing. Moreover, as long as there exists a measure of "collective leadership" in the central party leadership, there would seem to be some mechanism for adjustment of republic pressures through factional groupings in that leadership. In this environment, we have seen the growth of influence of at least some republics, most importantly the Ukraine. Even with the setback administered to the Ukrainians in the Shelest affair, one can envisage the possibility of further increases in the influence wielded by major republics—or even groupings of smaller republics—in Moscow's corridors of power. Of course, such a brokering of national interests within the top party leadership would become less feasible should there be a sharp turn toward "one-man rule" in the CPSU.

In sum, given current conditions, one can anticipate a continued growth of national awareness among the Soviet minorities—despite or even because of the policies of the ruling elite in Moscow. Such attitudes will prove increasingly disruptive, but not necessarily destructive of the existing political system. Although from time to time, perhaps with growing frequency, nationalist aspirations will be expressed in "unorthodox," separatist ways, the leadership should have little difficulty quashing such extreme manifestations under normal conditions. However, in the case of a major unheaval or external stimulus such as an international conflict, these isolated cases of separatist nationalism may come to displace more orthodox nationalist attitudes. The lessons of the Great Fatherland War (World War II) are perhaps instructive. That conflict revealed the absence of a broad consensus among the minorities regarding the legitimacy of the Soviet system and its fundamental principles, and diverse national groups opted for separation when the opportunity seemed to arise. Whether or not a suitable consensus has been built in the subsequent thirty years is doubtless a troublesome question for the Soviet regime. It cannot be answered here with any certainty, but the portents appear negative.

[69] Swoboda, *loc. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

[70] "Socialist Internationalism in Action," *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 3, February 1973.

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The Kádár Mystique

By Charles Gati

What film makers call the "stop effect"—the sudden, often distorting, even grotesque freezing of a moving image—has had a curious impact on Western perceptions of Hungary in recent years. For nearly a decade after the popular revolution of 1956, Hungary in Western eyes remained the country it was in November 1956—one in which a courageous anti-Soviet revolution had taken place, supported by the overwhelming majority of the people but crushed in the end by Soviet forces. The rapidly unfolding events of those ten revolutionary days had many of the qualities of a powerful drama difficult to forget: the Sampson-and-Goliath theme, the vision of children using homemade weapons pointedly named "Molotov cocktails," the heartbreaking sight of streams of refugees, and what some, perhaps wishfully, thought of as the ultimate moral defeat of the victorious side.

In the more immediate past, another picture has emerged. As the new Hungarian regime under János Kádár's leadership established order, consolidated its authority, and terminated the terror of the immediate post-1956 era, the old picture gave way to that of a tolerant regime striving to realize some of the revolution's national aspirations and governing by persuasion rather than coercion, while the population was seen as enjoying the new prosperity, sipping *eszpresszó* in the intimate coffee houses of Budapest, and feeling generally grateful for Kádár's "goulash socialism."

The evolution of the Hungarian political system since 1956, however, cannot be described in the simple either/or categories of coercion *or* persuasion, Soviet tanks *or* partially fulfilled national aspirations, the moving sight of a defeated people *or* contented consumers. True, under Kádár's guidance, Hungary has come a long way since the ill-fated 1956 revolution. In the political realm, after a period of repression which culminated in the execution of Imre Nagy and several other revolutionary leaders in 1958, the regime has come to show considerable leniency toward divergent viewpoints. Its political style—Popular Frontish or "alliance-oriented" in nature—reflects its determination to avoid the "we-they" dichotomy of the pre-1956 period, which had caused mutual mistrust, suspicion, hatred, and ultimately the upsurge of revolutionary sentiments, and which had therefore proved counterproductive. While under Mátyás Rákosi's Stalinist rule this dichotomy (in the name of the class struggle) was being constantly and artificially sharpened and the resulting conflicts thus exacerbated ("whoever is not with us is against us"), under Kádár a less demanding slogan ("whoever is not against us is with us") has come to signify the regime's willingness to accept less than total commitment.

The Impact of Experiences

If not the Soviet puppet he was once thought to be or the mere opportunist he is often portrayed to be, what is Kádár, and what are his politics? How has he accomplished that political *tour de force* whereby his countrymen, known for their strong anti-Russian and non-Communist sentiments, can

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still widely view him (as they do) not only as the best Hungary can have under the circumstances, but as a broad-minded man of considerable integrity?

Several aspects of the man and his outlook deserve mention in this context. Some derive from his extensive political experiences. Particularly relevant here is his pre-1945 involvement in the illegal Communist movement. Having joined the party in 1932, when he was only 20 years old, Kádár learned early enough of the necessity of working together with non-Communists—Socialists and Populists, in particular—for the common goal of liberating Hungary from authoritarian rule and retarded economic and social conditions. It was in that atmosphere of close cooperation with non-Communist elements that his tolerance for policies and approaches somewhat different from his own was born. He also made many friends among his leftist, but nonparty, comrades—especially in the miniscule anti-Nazi resistance movement during World War II. Indeed, while the party's other leaders enjoyed relative comfort and isolation in the Soviet Union, Kádár was politically engaged in conflict-ridden and war-torn Hungary.

Kádár's early party career and his frequent references to it provide at least a partial explanation for what may be the most telling feature of his regime, his broad "alliance policy." That policy, which is generally similar to Tito's, entails substantial confidence in and reliance on nonparty people and stresses the reduction of the party's all-knowing and especially all-doing posture as well as the curtailment of its direct involvement in routine matters of everyday life. Kádár himself has noted:

I sometimes say that the connection between Marxism-Leninism, socialism, communism, the Hungarian working class and the Hungarian people is not that we have an excellent theory and that we test it on some ten million experimental subjects. And that if the theory is good it has to work. I think of it in reverse: the reason why Marxism-Leninism and the whole system of Communist ideas exists is to ensure that these ten million Hungarians are better off. For if this was not the reason for its existence, and if something went wrong in this respect, then we would not be doing our work properly. I am very glad that this realization is growing stronger steadily amongst us, that those representing the Marxist-Leninist ideology are increasingly inspired with a sense of reality and humanity, with respect and esteem for non-Communists, and with the realization that we can only progress all together.[1]

The second political experience that stands out in Kádár's career is his imprisonment between 1951 and 1954. Although he has never made public reference to the humiliations he suffered during his internment, there can be no doubt about the lessons he learned in prison, for in the post-1961 period of consolidation, it was he who abolished the widely-hated system of internal exile and internment without trial, declared general amnesty, purged the political police (AVH), and fired from positions of responsibility the judges and prosecutors of the political trials of the Rákosi era. From a man who had been Minister of the Interior during the phony trials of József Cardinal Mindszenty and László Rajk in 1949—who, in fact, personally talked Rajk into making the false confession that sealed his fate[2]—and who, after all, was responsible for the wave of terror that swept Hungary for several years after 1956, Kádár has changed into a more consistent advocate of "socialist legality" than can be found anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

Even if personal revenge did play a role in Kádár's decision to eliminate the remnants of the Stalinist past, his regime still has not been particularly vindictive toward its present critics and opponents. In the widely reported case of sociologist András Hegedüs and two other scholars accused of non-Marxist views in 1973, it must be kept in mind that they were expelled from the party rather than tried or imprisoned.[3] The writer Miklós Haraszti was tried on October 15-16, 1973, then again on January 10-11, 1974, on charges of slandering the state and falsifying conditions in a tractor factory, the locale of his novel *Darabbér* (Piecework). In the end, however, Haraszti received a suspended sentence.[4] Thus, either in comparison with the performance of other East European regimes or with that of the Hungarian regime in the pre-Kádár era, the record of the

[1] János Kádár, "Reflections at Sixty," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), Vol. 8, No. 48, Winter 1972, pp. 10-11.

[2] George Paloczi-Horvath, *The Undefeated,* London, Secker & Warburg, 1959, pp. 259-62.

[3] The Hegedüs case is traced in "Documents: Hegedüs, His Views and His Critics," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1969, pp. 121-52. The party's 1973 statement of charges against Hegedüs and his colleagues—whose views on modernization were identified with both "petty-bourgeois revisionism" and the New Left—was published in *Szociológia* (Budapest), No. 1, 1973, pp. 45-55.

[4] The background of the Haraszti case is described at length in Gyula Borbandi, "Haraszti's Dossier," *Uj Látóhatár* (Munich), Vol. 24, No. 5, 1973, pp. 433-46. First-hand reports of Haraszti's trials—examples of Hungarian *samizdat*—appeared in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), December 8-9, 1973, and in *Irodalmi Ujság* (Paris), Vol. 25, Nos. 1-2, January-February 1974, pp. 4-5.

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First Secretary János Kádár with workers of a Budapest factory.

—Photo by Gabor Palfai for Interfoto MTI (Hungary) via Eastfoto.

Kádár government suggests that coercion has not been one of its characteristics during the last 10-12 years, and that Kádár's personal aversion to political trials has become state policy.

Kádár's rather modest upbringing and educational background have also left their imprint on his political style and orientation. Unlike his predecessors, he is neither a theoretician nor an intellectual. He does make frequent references to Marxism-Leninism, but the finer points of theory or ideology do not seem to interest him. Especially when he speaks extemporaneously, his stories, anecdotes, and metaphors are always simple, if not simplistic, and for that reason they are easily understood by all. Even in the stately atmosphere of the Tenth Party Congress in 1970, for example, he found it possible to make a point in the following way:

Recently, I was on a visit in the eighth district of Budapest. In the conference room of the party committee there, where our conversations took place, there was a Lenin portrait on the wall. As time passed by, I turned to the comrades, suggesting that something else should be put on the wall as well—a clock. For at our place in the headquarters of the Central Commitee there is both a Lenin portrait and a clock on the wall, and they're very suggestive. When we look at both, Lenin and the clock together tell us what we should be doing, when, in what spirit, and in what direction. The clock by itself also suggests that time is rapidly passing by, let's hurry as much as we can.[5]

Kádár's life-style complements the simplicity of his speeches. He is known to be a chess fan, is often seen at soccer games, and apparently enjoys playing cards—preferring neither a sophisticated game like bridge, nor the gamblers' favorite, poker, but the Hungarian equivalent of gin rummy, called *ulti*. He has also been observed taking leisurely walks in Budapest and doing so at times without a police escort. In contrast to other politicians—in Eastern Europe or for that matter elsewhere—who feel they must humble themselves to display human qualities, Kádár is not burdened with a complicated intellect and can therefore make people feel at ease in his company. As a result, while he has probably not converted many to the subleties of Marxism-Leninism, his simplicity has made him, and through him the system he has built, palatable, if not popular.

Political Finesse

The simplicity of Kádár's leadership style, his unwillingness to exploit fully the coercive capabilities of the state, and his search for mass support through a Popular Front orientation have all contributed to both his regime's stability and his own personal staying power. While in 1956 or 1958 he was widely considered to be a traitor, today most Hungarians seem to take pride in his realism and political finesse. Indeed, it is that political finesse—exemplified by his astute appraisal of Soviet-East European relations—which constitutes the most important component of the Kádár mystique.

To understand and appreciate this appraisal, it is necessary to keep in mind the years 1955-56, that most crucial period in Soviet-East European relations, when vastly exaggerated hopes had arisen in

[5] János Kádár, *A szocialista Magyarországért: Beszédek és cikkek, 1968-1972* (For a Socialist Hungary: Speeches and Articles, 1968-1972), Budapest, Kossuth, 1972, p. 390.

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Eastern Europe about the prospects of "national independence," particularly in Poland and Hungary. These hopes stemmed from the dramatic rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1955, the Austrian Peace Treaty of that same year, and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. In addition, it was generally known among the elites of the region that at the July 1955 secret plenum of the Soviet party's Central Committee Anastas I. Mikoyan had strongly denounced discriminatory Soviet economic policies toward the East European countries. Subsequently, during the Hungarian crisis, *Pravda* publicly stated that the Soviet government was determined to "remove any possibilities of violating the principles of national sovereignty, national advantage, and equality *in economic relations.*" [6]

The more relaxed Soviet policy—expressed in the notion of a "socialist commonwealth"—was widely interpreted to include political as well as economic relations. As a matter of fact, there was much speculation both in the region and in the West about the extent to which the Soviet Union was prepared to encourage "different roads to socialism." [7] The issue was often posed as a question of Soviet limitations on *either* foreign *or* domestic political experimentation, and even as late as the aftermath of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis, it was still assumed that a more moderate Czech stance in *either* the domestic *or* the foreign policy area would have forestalled Soviet intervention.

Without further exploring this most delicate of all issues in the Communist world, it is instructive to consider the way Kádár interpreted the emerging post-Stalin policy toward Eastern Europe. Once again, his approach reflected his political common sense. He seems to have viewed Soviet statements, such as the one published in *Pravda,* quite correctly, making the distinction between "different economic roads to socialism" on the one hand and "unity" on political and ideological questions on the other. Accordingly, he could later on pursue a far-reaching program of economic reform, called the New Economic Mechanism or NEM, in the knowledge that an improved and modernized economy, and for that matter expanded foreign trade with the West, did not run contrary to Soviet interests as defined by Moscow. So long as the agricultural sector was collectivized and the means of production were in "public" hands, he correctly perceived, the Soviet Union would welcome those modifications in the economy necessary to make it more productive and efficient. What the Soviet Union has presumably reiterated throughout Kádár's tenure, and Kádár has accepted, is that the Soviet leadership is not prepared to concede any substantial departure in the *political* realm from Soviet-type institutions, processes, and ideology—that it would, in short, prevent a political reorientation.

Decision-making Style

Finally, this sketch of Kádár's qualities and general outlook would be incomplete without adding a word on his style of decision-making. During much of his political life, Kádár has followed a consistent, though often misleadingly simple, pattern of decision-making. At first, he collects information, avoids commitments, delays action, tests the political climate. Because of such circumspection, he arouses the expectation of compromise, of a *necessary* reconciliation of differing positions; given his reputation as the pragmatic centrist he is, he

Kádár (right) is welcomed to Moscow by Soviet Politburo member M. A. Suslov in March 1957.

—Photo by TASS via Sovfoto

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 31, 1956. Emphasis added.

[7] For an example of somewhat excessive optimism concerning East European autonomy, see my "Soviet Tutelage in East Europe," *Current History* (Philadelphia), Vol. 60, No. 362, October 1971, pp. 206-09, 243.

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is always thought to seek a middle course between the "extremes" of right and left. Yet, on closer examination, Kádár's most important decisions suggest another interpretation: that while he is cautious in the first phase of the decision-making process, he is quite prepared to act in a firm and authoritative manner subsequently, at the time when policy decisions are actually finalized, announced, and implemented.

Kádár has adhered to this pattern during at least three of the more dramatic turning points of his political career. In the first instance, when he was released from prison and rehabilitated in 1954, he joined neither the revisionist party faction led by Imre Nagy nor the dogmatic faction still led by Rákosi. He played a waiting game for two years, until the early summer of 1956, when he finally turned against Rákosi openly and, after Rákosi was removed, rejoined the reconstituted party leadership. Having made up his mind at last, he became a resolute supporter of the 1956 destalinization movement, even allowing himself to be caught up in the revolutionary momentum of October-November 1956.

In the second instance, after the Soviet Union installed him as head of the new Hungarian party in November 1956, he again deliberated for nearly two years before moving unequivocally against the right —a course that included the secret trial and execution of Nagy and his revisionist colleagues in 1958, as well as the forceful collectivization of Hungary's independent-minded peasants between 1959 and 1961. Finally, as mentioned earlier, Kádár weighed alternatives for several years in the early 1960's before taking steps to quash his opponents and critics on the left so as to allow him to prepare for the institution of the New Economic Mechanism and generally to develop the character of his more tolerant regime.

In all cases, international rather than internal factors—primarily sensitivity to Soviet developments —appear to have constituted the major consideration for both the substance and timing of Kádár's policy shifts. In early 1956, it was the anti-Stalinism of the 20th CPSU Congress and Soviet leader Mikoyan's visit to Budapest that made Kádár an active opponent of Rákosi and Rákosi's Stalinist practices; in the immediate aftermath of 1956, when he turned against the revisionist alternative, he drew his inspiration from rapidly deteriorating Soviet-Yugoslav relations; and he assumed the moderate stance later on only after Nikita S. Krushchev's decisive victory over the hard-line dogmatists at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961.

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (left) chats with János Kádár (center), and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin at a Budapest country estate on July 12, 1967, during a meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries.

—Photo by UPI.

The foregoing account of Kádár's decision-making pattern during the course of his "three crises" suggests that his highly political regime, while sensitive to a variety of external pressures and needs, remains particularly responsive to those emanating from the Soviet Union. No longer merely the puppet placed and kept in power by the Soviet Union, Kádár nonetheless remains conscious of the necessity of avoiding Soviet displeasure. Attuned as he is to the nuances of Soviet politics, he has carefully refrained from alienating or even embarrassing the Soviet leadership, whose confidence he apparently cherishes. Indeed, his regime has never deviated from the general direction of Soviet foreign policy, and on domestic matters he has repeatedly obtained Soviet approval for Hungary's often controversial departures from Soviet patterns. It was suggestive of Kádár's political acumen, for example, that he arranged the postponement of Leonid I. Brezhnev's visit to Budapest from September to December in 1972 so that the Soviet leader could specifically endorse the resolutions of the November 1972 Hungarian Central Committee plenum and thus strengthen Kádár's position.

Kádár's qualities and outlook have found most vivid expression in what is the hallmark of his

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regime: Hungary's New Economic Mechanism.[8] As that experiment in economic reform—mainly because of its political consequences—is under growing challenge at the present time, it is necessary to trace its evolution and examine its implications with a view to assessing Kadar's ability to preserve the mystique that he strove to generate.

The Politics of NEM

Although formally introduced only in January 1968, economic reform had been conceived as early as 1957. At that time, a number of economic committees, made up of both party and nonparty specialists, put forth a series of sweeping recommendations which included a critique of exaggerated centralization and planning, and a proposal for the adoption of indirect methods of economic guidance.[9] In a reflection of the political uncertainties of those years, the reports were first published, then authoritatively rejected, and finally, several years later —after Kádár had removed from office some of his more leftist or "dogmatic" critics—implemented. The apparently bitter struggle in the early 1960's preceding the adoption of NEM was not fought over questions of economic management and priorities alone. More than anything else, it amounted to a political and ideological confrontation within the party hierarchy. The removal of such members of the Politburo as Károly Kiss, Imre Dögei, and probably György Marosán appears to have been connected with their "dogmatist" contention that the proposed system of decentralization, incentives, and inter-enterprise competition would endanger the proper, commanding role of the Communist Party. Subsequently, Kádár himself noted that not only economists but also members of the Central Committee had held "essentially divergent opinions" on these questions.[10]

Thus, the New Economic Mechanism came into being in response to the recognition by the majority of the leadership at the time that (1) the transition from extensive to intensive development *required* a less centralized and generally more flexible economic structure, and (2) economic progress necessitated the shelving of some of the political assumptions and considerations of the past *despite the political risks inherent in that process.* In other words, the leadership was aware of the likely challenge to centralized one-party rule that would emerge in the wake of economic reform. Confident that it could handle the challenge, the party thus opted for an economic policy that represented—and today still represents—the most comprehensive and controversial departure from the Soviet-type model of economic management in Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of the Yugoslav system and the ill-fated Czechoslovak experiment of 1967-68.[11]

It is clear, then, that the urge for economic reform stemmed from the pressing, if not unavoidable, necessity of economic progress and innovation. It is equally clear, moreover, that the leadership was most conscious of the relationship between the economic "base" and the political "superstructure"—that is, of the seemingly universal dilemma that David Apter has summarized this way:

. . . the closer a modernizing country comes to the stage of industrialization, the greater the political problem of controlling and integrating the process. If this assumption is correct, the transition to industrialization requires an exceptionally well organized political system, able to maintain a high degree of control. . . . However, after that phase of develop-

[8] By far the most comprehensive and judicious treatment of NEM, with somewhat optimistic overtones, is William F. Robinson, *The Pattern of Reform in Hungary: A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis,* New York, Praeger, 1973, especially pp. 99-195. For a highly critical appraisal, see Barnabas Büky, "Hungary's NEM on a Treadmill," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1972, pp. 31-39.

[9] Between 1959 and 1965, the following piecemeal measures were introduced: (1) a four-tier pricing system, with specified fixed prices for some products, maximum prices and limits on prices for others, and free or market-determined prices for the rest; (2) decentralization of industrial management by reducing the jurisdiction of the ministries and increasing the jurisdiction of large-scale trusts and enterprises; (3) the reordering of industrial priorities, emphasizing the profitable chemical, pharmaceutical, electronics, and telecommunications industries, for which resources were more easily available; (4) the addition of quality norms to quantity quotas, in order to make Hungarian products competitive on foreign markets and signify the transition to intensive development; and (5) the recognition of individual and group incentives through a new profit-sharing system. These piecemeal measures were then incorporated into NEM in 1968.

[10] As cited in Robinson, *op. cit.,* pp. 90-91.

[11] Of the growing literature on East European economic reforms, see especially Radoslav Selucky, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe: Political Background and Economic Significance,* New York, Praeger, 1972; Ota Sik, *The Bureaucratic Economy,* White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1972; Michael Gamarnikow, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe,* Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1968; J. Wilczynski, *Socialist Economic Development and Reforms,* New York, Praeger, 1972. The most comprehensive account of the pre-reform economic systems of Eastern Europe is still Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe,* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Technology Press, 1957.

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ment has been completed, . . . the need . . . is for greater decentralization of high control systems. If the industrial sector can also carry with it certain organizing properties so that they reduce the need for direct governmental control, a noncoercive, high information situation will result, with government playing a mediating and coordinating role.[12]

The party's formula for dealing with the political implications of NEM was to open up the decision-making process to specialists—in particular economic experts—while at the same time trying to uphold its exclusive claim to power and authority. Unprepared to play merely a "mediating" or "coordinating" role, the party nonetheless concluded that not one but three types of legitimate interests existed in contemporary Hungary: the interests of the state (or of the "people"), the interests of individuals, and the interests of groups. The significance of this theoretical revision was that it explicitly recognized other than societal interests in a socialist community, including the existence and perhaps even the desirability of competition and conflict among different groups in it.

The legitimization of the three-tier interest structure was not meant to introduce "pluralism" into the Hungarian polity. Although there was some consideration given to a system of checks and balances,[13] early expectations regarding the new interest structure turned out to be premature: it was, in fact, intended to revitalize the present system, allow for more open discussion of alternatives, and generally make the economy more productive. By raising the specter of "socialist pluralism," however, the Kádár regime made the possibility of limited political competition an open issue—and in the process created an explosive problem for itself. For, while the regime's survival and stability remain beyond serious challenge, and while the economy, having negotiated a successful transition from the earlier command model to NEM, is also doing quite well,[14] *the relationship between economic policies and political goals has become unclear, divisive, and even contradictory.* Specifically, the economic system has been promoting a program of individual material incentives at the same time that the political system concurrently pursues an unrelenting campaign against the corollary petty-bourgeois mentality—or what is unkindly called "money-grubbing." And though NEM has been giving substantial incentives to the peasantry and to the non-party specialists of the urban middle class, the political system simultaneously still claims to act for and on behalf of the industrial proletariat, the group that has benefited least from economic reform so far.

The Workers' Opposition

The main question that has divided the Hungarian leadership, especially since 1972, therefore, is not the direction of the economy *per se;* rather, it is the problem of coping with the political and social consequences of the New Economic Mechanism. The leadership is split between those who remain committed to economic reform and are prepared to accept its essentially nonegalitarian features and those who seek to eliminate excessive decentralization and income differentiation. The debate between

[12] David Apter, "Political Systems and Developmental Change," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, Eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research,* New York, Free Press, 1970, p. 158.

[13] The electoral system was altered in the 1960's to allow for contested elections, with two or more candidates competing for one seat in the National Assembly. In addition, the Assembly's committees have become somewhat more active, and interpellations can now be raised from the floor. However, the regime's effort to endow the legislative branch with a watchdog function—expressed in the 1966 and 1970 electoral reform laws—has not led to viable legislative activity. The Assembly's sessions remain perfunctory: they last only two or three days at a time and are held three or four times a year.

[14] By the curious standards of many economists, no economy is ever "doing quite well," of course—especially in the Communist world. In the Hungarian case, Barnabas Büky, for example, emphasizes NEM's "limits," "flaws," and "miscalculations" (*loc. cit.*), yet the data he himself presents on the period up to 1972 (see his table on p. 39) clearly demonstrate that most indicators of the Hungarian economy under NEM reveal significant progress. The 1973 results are now also available, showing that in that year national income grew by 6-7 percent, industrial production by more than 7 percent, and agricultural production by 5 percent—all exceeding the guidelines of the central plan. The following summary of the 1973 economic indicators appeared in *Népszabadság* (Budapest) on Feb. 3, 1974. All data represent increases over 1972 and are given in percentages except those for investments, which are in billions of *forints.*

	Plan	*Performance*
National income	4.0-5.0	6.5-7.0
Industrial production	5.5-6.0	7.2
Agricultural production	1.0	5.0
Per capita real wages	6.0	6.5-7.0
Popular consumption	5.0-5.5	4.5-5.0
Retail trade	6.2	5.7
Investments	13.0	6.4
Imports	7.0	9.0
Exports	7.0	18.0
Budget revenues	9.0	11.0
Budget expenditures	9.0	10.0

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"reformers" and what may be called the "workers' opposition" thus recalls some of the issues that surfaced in the Soviet Union in the early 1920's, when members of the Workers' Opposition—anticipating Lenin's New Economic Policy—questioned the wisdom of favoring the peasantry over the industrial working class, of relying on non-Communist experts and specialists in industry, and indeed of altering the economic base on which the new Soviet political and social superstructure was to be built.

Fascinating as the historical analogy is, however, the contemporary significance of the present Hungarian debate lies in the acute interest of other East European party-states in the progress, problems, and prospects of the Hungarian reform.[15] Indeed, should the reform be blocked, the reversal might be achieved less by the efforts of the reform's domestic political adversaries or by the prospect, now unlikely, of economic failure than by the disinclination of other socialist countries to accept and work with Hungary's socialist version of the market economy. Another way of pointing up the international dimension of the Hungarian debate is to suggest that if an important East European country such as Poland—or the Soviet Union, of course—were to adopt or borrow extensively from the Hungarian experience, admittedly not a very likely possibility, such a development would obviously strengthen the position of the reformers and thus assure the implementation of the reform itself.

In fact, however, the evidence of the last two years clearly suggests a falling-off of the momentum of reform. Especially since the November 1972 enlarged plenum of the Central Committee, a slow but steady erosion of NEM's principles can be observed. Retrenchment was strongly indicated, for example, by the party's 1972 decision to place six of the country's largest industrial firms under "state protection" again—meaning that, if necessary, they can now be saved from bankruptcy by the central authorities. By 1973, in a further revision of the reform, central allocation planning was restored to 50 of the country's larger industrial enterprises. Taken together with the Central Committee's November 1972 and November 1973 resolutions,[16] which indicated the party's growing desire to slow NEM's pace and curtail its presumed excesses, these measures constituted the beginning of an official revision of the New Economic Mechanism. It is quite telling that Soviet concern about NEM's social and political consequences had been publicly voiced in *Pravda* as early as February 3, 1972.[17]

The period from 1972 to March 1974 should be considered one of temporizing and reassessment. Very much according to his past decision-making pattern, Kádár was testing the political climate in preparation for a crucial decision whether or not to shelve the reform altogether and return to the practice of economic planning and management prevalent in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It is clear that economic performance militated against reversal of the reform; it is equally clear, however, that the workers' opposition, supported by powerful voices in some of the other socialist countries, made a strong political case against the reform. To the extent that Kádár had anticipated the problem of coping with the political implications of NEM, he could and did deal with their first manifestations. What he could not foresee, however, was that the modernizing process he had accelerated would have consequences beyond his control.

Specifically, critics of the reform capitalized on NEM's anti-egalitarian tendencies, pointing out that the involvement of the proletariat in the political process and in the country's cultural life had actually declined. For example, since admission standards in the country's universities and advanced high schools (*gimnáziums*) had been changed in the 1960's to make talent rather than class origin the decisive consideration, upward social mobility had all but ceased: children of workers and peasants, who had formerly enjoyed an advantage in getting

[15] The extent to which East European countries learn from each other's experiences and the impact these experiences have had on each other's economies is explored at greater length in Roger E. Kanet, "Modernizing Interaction Within Eastern Europe," in Charles Gati, Ed., *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe: Testing the Soviet Model*, New York, Praeger, 1974, forthcoming. Kanet concludes that economic reforms in particular "are studied for their possible relevance—either as potential future problems or possible solutions to existing problems—elsewhere."

[16] The text of the Central Committee resolutions appeared in *Népszabadság*, Nov. 17, 1972, and Nov. 30, 1973, respectively.

[17] That concern was subsequently reflected in an unusual increase in the number of high-level visits between Hungary and the USSR during the second quarter of 1972 as compared with the corresponding figures for visits between the USSR and other East European countries (data compiled in Radio Free Europe, *Research* [Munich], Hungary/12, July 14, 1972):

Country	*Jan.-March*	*April-June*	*Total*	*Difference*
Hungary	16	26	42	+10
Bulgaria	13	17	30	+ 4
Czechoslovakia	14	12	26	− 2
Poland	25	28	53	+ 3
Romania	6	7	13	+ 1

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







HUNGARY IN THE 1970's —Various dimensions of contemporary Hungarian society are depicted in the accompanying photographs. Clockwise, from the upper left: arrival of the motor age creates parking problems in a downtown Budapest sidestreet; pursuit of the "good life" at a Lake Ferto dacha; students on the campus of Budapest Technical University; fresh fruit on sale at a Budapest market; workers at a chemical plant in Kazincbarcika.

—Photos by Interphoto MTI via Eastfoto and Photoreporters.

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admitted, had begun to find it difficult to pass the entrance examinations and obtain higher education. (In the industrial city of Budapest, 69 percent of the *gimnázium* students today are children of intellectuals, managers, and white-collar workers, *i.e.*, members of the urban middle class.[18]) Yet, if the regime were to decide to return to its previous policy of favoring the working class, it would deprive itself of the kind of manpower its increasingly sophisticated economy needs.[19]

In addition, there was the pressing problem of wage differentiation. The New Economic Mechanism had opened the way for enterprises to compete for manpower. Moving from one job to another, even for marginal advantage, became common practice—one that would complicate and impede planned development. Far more disturbing, however, given the regime's socialist orientation, was the *increasing* gap between the poor and the well-to-do. In a remarkably candid study, Zsuzsa Ferge pointed out that since incomes frequently varied by a factor of eight or ten in contemporary Hungary, the country's wage structure was not markedly different from that prevalent in the capitalist world. Hence, she added, "it contains the seeds of social tension." [20] Indeed, while the average income of the Hungarian wage earner remained under $85 a month, the poor and the pensioner earned as little as $30 and the well-to-do as much as $300. Since the purchasing power of the *forint* is higher when it comes to basic necessities (and lower for most consumer goods), those in the higher brackets could often save enough to own a car, travel in the West, or buy lakefront property. The fact that there were more private cars in use in 1973 than refrigerators ten years earlier illustrated the direction of change. In the meantime, however, people with average or below-average income could only observe the new prosperity and question the values and preferences of Kádár's "goulash socialism." True, after the 1972 Central Committee plenum their questioning did lead to the adoption of a "new income policy," but the salary increments introduced in the industrial sector were unsatisfactory, even unacceptable. In fact, at the last trade union conference, held in the fall of 1973, the party's economic specialist, Politburo member Rezsö Nyers, was so severely criticized that he had to adopt a defensive posture about NEM and promise additional wage increases for the industrial proletariat in the near future.[21]

HSWP Politburo Member, Rezsö Nyers—known as the party's specialist on the New Economic Mechanism—was removed from the Central Committee's Secretariat in March 1974.

—Photo by Jeno Papp for Interfoto MTI via Photoreporters.

Beyond the specifics of cultural and economic anti-egalitarianism, what troubled the critics most was the politically undesirable psychological climate NEM had engendered. Since 1972, ramifications of the so-called petty-bourgeois mentality have filled

[18] György Ránki, "Has Modernity Made a Difference?" in Charles Gati, Ed., *op. cit.* A leading Hungarian historian and social scientist, Ránki does not seem to think that a definite choice has to be made between "talent" and "class origin."

[19] On some of the problems of involving workers in the political process, see László Molnár, Ferenc Nemes, and Béláné Szalai, *Ipari munkások politikai aktivitása* (The Political Activity of Industrial Workers), Budapest, Kossuth, 1970. For a sophisticated sociological study of Hungarian society as a whole, see Zsuzsa Ferge, *Társadalmunk rétegezödése: Elvek és tények* (The Stratification of Our Society: Theories and Facts), 2nd printing, Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1973.

[20] Ferge, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-98.

[21] Magyar Távirati Iroda (Hungarian News Agency) reported on the opening of the plenary session of the National Trade Union Council in its English service on October 11, 1973.

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the pages of every newspaper, weekly, and monthly in the country. Promoted as a grand national debate, it is more a condemnation of the very attitudes the regime's own policies have fostered. After all, if the economic reform relies on individual incentives, as it does, what is wrong with "money-grubbing"? If enterprises are to utilize their newfound independence, as they are told to do, why are company directors taken to court for introducing new products they were not specifically authorized to make? If profit sharing is an integral part of NEM, as it is claimed to be, why is petty-bourgeois "selfishness" the central target of this press campaign?

The March Plenum and Beyond

The serious dilemmas inherent in these questions were at least partly and temporarily resolved at the recent March 19-20, 1974, plenum of the Central Committee.[22] Of the four resolutions made public, the first one dealt with the international situation, emphasizing the need for vigilance in the face of determined efforts by "extremist reactionary forces" to undermine East-West détente. The second and probably most ominous decision concerned the position of the industrial working class in Hungarian society—"the Central Committee considers it necessary to develop a network of well thought-out measures through which the workers' weight will increase gradually in all spheres of life." The third decision, on education and culture, identified the presumably still low educational level of the working class as "the central problem of education" and called for "purposeful efforts to mold a socialist mentality." Finally, and most dramatically, the Central Committee made the party's shift unmistakably clear by effecting several personnel changes. The most important of these were the removal from the Party Secretariat of Rezsö Nyers, the party's leading advocate of economic reform, and the transfer of György Aczél, the party's leading advocate of cultural tolerance, from the Party Secretariat to a largely administrative position as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Other changes such as the election of Károly Németh and Imre Györi to the Party Secretariat also pointed to the erosion of the reformers' influence and the growing strength of the workers' opposition.

[22] The text of the Central Committee resolutions appeared in *Népszabadság*, March 21, 1974.

Although the final outcome of the struggle between the reformers and the workers' opposition will have to await the 11th Party Congress, now scheduled for March 1975, it is clear that the party has already returned to the principle of the "priority of politics," which stresses party-controlled, ideologically correct political development. More specifically, this principle emphasizes the necessity of strengthening the power of the industrial working class, dismisses "pure" economic points of view, and affirms "socialist values" in culture and education. The party has thus signaled the beginning of the end of the era of temporizing—the era during which the party still sought to reconcile economic efficiency with the concurrent pursuit of Marxist-Leninist ideals and ideas.

While the leftist direction of change is clearly indicated, the period between now and the party

György Aczél, Politburo member and party specialist on cultural matters, removed from the Secretariat in March 1974.

—EUPRA.

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congress next March must still be regarded as one of continued political infighting. The issue before the Politburo is whether to shelve the reform altogether because of its social and political implications or merely to arrest its momentum.

In attempting to gauge the chances for the reform's survival, it is instructive to consider the unprecedented situation confronting the current Politburo—namely, that only four of its 13 members (Kádár, Biszku, Fock, and Németh), hold significant positions elsewhere (see table). Two others (the demoted Aczél and Gáspar) may be regarded as in marginal positions of power, while the remaining six (Apró, Benke, Fehér, Kállai, Nemes, and Nyers) now occupy relatively minor positions hardly commensurate with their Politburo memberships (for a variety of reasons such as lack of economic expertise, old age, or political demotion).

Under the circumstances, it seems very likely that those who have pressed the case against the reform's "excesses" (Németh and Gáspár, in particular) will obtain, or have already obtained, substantial backing from that disenchanted minority which has been eased out of positions of power in recent years. Motivated more by personal pique than political principle, members of that large Politburo minority could well join forces with the workers' opposition to make it impossible for Kádár to return to his eclectic blend of economic modernization and political tolerance on the one hand and a Marxist-Leninist sociopolitical order on the other. That Kádár may still have enough prestige and authority to recreate his precarious balance, however, is implied in his appointment as chairman of a newly created commission to prepare the party's "new program declaration" for the 11th Party Congress.

In either case, Kádár's position has been seriously compromised. Two of his closest colleagues were demoted. The Central Committee resolutions did not even refer directly to the New Economic Mechanism, the hallmark of his tenure in power. All in all, the party that Kádár rebuilt after 1956 and has led ever since has moved away from his particular orientation—without, however, having the political muscle, courage, or perhaps, as yet, the desire to remove him from office. Accordingly, Kádár has until the next party congress to recoup his forces. The early indications are that, in line with his past strategy, he has tentatively accepted the majority's direction, but that he is at the same time prepared to appeal for support to both the general public and especially the Soviet leadership. For example, in a remarkably revealing speech made in the provincial city of Nyiregyhaza after the March plenum, he defended his past policies, reminded the Soviet leaders of his loyalty, and rebutted his critics in these words:

Our policy has always been characterized by frankness and a lack of ambiguity. We have always stated, frankly and openly, the intentions and aspirations of our party and our people. This has applied, presently applies, and will continue to apply also to fundamental aspects of both foreign and domestic policy. We feel that a socialist country cannot pursue a

Composition of the Hungarian Politburo (May 1974)

Name	Year of Birth	Year of Full Membership	Main Function
Kádár, János	1912	1948-	First Secretary, CC
Biszku, Béla	1921	1957-	Secretary, CC
Fock, Jenö	1916	1957-	Chairman, Council of Ministers
Németh, Károly	1922	1970-	Secretary, CC
Aczél, György	1917	1970-	Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
Gáspár, Zoltán	1917	1956-	Secretary General, Trade Union Council
Apró, Antal	1913	1946-	Chairman, National Assembly
Benke, Valéria	1920	1970-	Editor, party monthly
Fehér, Lajos	1917	1957-	Retired
Kállai, Gyula	1910	1956-	President, Patriotic People's Front
Nemes, Dezsö	1908	1959-	Director, Party Academy
Nyers, Rezsö	1923	1966-	Director, Institute of Economics

SOURCES: "The Hungarian Party Leadership," Radio Free Europe, *Research* (Munich), Hungary/16, Sept. 11, 1972, updated on Nov. 2, 1973; *Népszabadság* (Budapest), March 21, 1974.

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double-dealing policy, that a Marxist-Leninist, a Communist party cannot represent an equivocal policy vis-à-vis its own class, its own people, and others. We feel that people listen to us and trust us if we say the same thing on the same issue in Budapest, New York, and Moscow alike and do not deviate from it according to where we say it. You can recall that, in foreign policy, we have always openly sided with the Soviet Union even in the most difficult times.[23]

In defending himself against implicit charges of double-dealing, equivocation, and deviation from policies and norms prevalent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Kádár thus recalled his past support of the Soviet Union "even in the most difficult times," an allusion to Hungary's somewhat belated and grudging support of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968—surely the "most difficult time" in recent East European political history. His defense, then, is also a warning to his colleagues and to the Soviet leadership: if his policies are reversed altogether, and especially if he is removed from power, the country's present stability may well give way to uncertainty and political disequilibrium. Thus, relying on his popularity and his hope of continued Soviet confidence in him, Kádár still seeks to conclude his political career on his own terms, knowing that his place in Hungarian—and indeed East European—history will be determined by the wisdom of his present choices and by the skill with which he resolves this latest and probably last crisis of his political life.

[23] *Ibid.*, March 30, 1974.

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The Unique Role of the Swedish CP

By Daniel Tarschys

Sweden's Social Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme is on the horns of a dilemma. The tie in the Swedish Parliament resulting from the September 1973 elections—175 socialist members now face 175 nonsocialists (see accompanying table)—has left his government without a working majority and will sooner or later force him to choose between two options. A "socialist" course would no doubt lead to the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of new elections that might restore some seats to his party but could hardly be expected to give it an absolute majority. A "liberal" course might pave the way for an accommodation with one or two of the opposition parties, but this would infuriate the Social Democratic left wing and risk driving some of the party's supporters over to the Communist electoral camp.

Last year's elections were the immediate cause of Palme's predicament, but the basic problem is not a temporary one. Before the constitutional reform of 1967-69, Sweden's electoral system frequently helped the Social Democrats to acquire a parliamentary majority, although only two elections in history—those of 1940 and 1968—gave them more than half the actual popular vote. Under the present system, however, every party receiving more than 4 percent of the votes cast gets a parliamentary representation proportional to its strength in the electorate, with the result that the Social Democrats can no longer expect to gain and maintain an absolute majority in the *Riksdag*. Hence, the party that has ruled Sweden for 42 years has become much more dependent on outside support and will have to reconsider its long-term strategy.

These effects of the new electoral system were probably not fully understood at the time the reform was enacted. The prosperous years of the late 1960's were a time of mounting support for the government, and in 1969 the polls indicated that 54 percent of the electorate was prepared to vote for the Social Democrats. Yet, only one year later, the party was back to its more "normal" figure of 45.3 percent and was again compelled to envisage a minority government dependent upon Communist parliamentary support as the only alternative to a nonsocialist coalition. In this situation, the proximity of the Communists to the crucial 4-percent dividing line became a matter of great concern to the Social Democrats, who found themselves in the curious position of having to acquiesce in a certain number of tactical cross-overs in the 1970 elections in order to assure continued Communist representation in Parliament. The Communists polled 4.8 percent of the vote, and the government narrowly escaped the threat of imminent defeat.[1]

The key position that the Swedish Communists have occupied for the last three years, and may retain if Mr. Palme chooses to satisfy the Social Democratic left wing, makes it timely to take a fresh look at the recent development of the party and to assess its role in the Swedish political system. The direct influence of the small Communist parliamentary delegation, to be sure, is slight, since the govern-

A Research Associate in Political Science at the University of Stockholm, Mr. Tarschys is a frequent commentator on Swedish politics. He is the author of Beyond the State: The Future Polity in Classical and Soviet Marxism, *1972, and is currently studying issues of problem-perception and political priorities in the Soviet leadership.*

[1] The source for this and other election results cited in this article is Arne Halvarsson, *Sveriges statsskick* (The Swedish Polity), 2nd ed., Stockholm, Esselte Studium AB, 1974, p. 28.

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ment never enters into negotiations with it or consults its members before laying down government policy. As a social and political force, however, the Communists have certainly had at least a limited impact on Social Democratic conduct, and their presence continues to affect the chemistry of political decisions in Stockholm.

A Party in Transition

Sweden's Communist Party traces its origins back to a faction that broke away from the Social Democratic Party in February 1917. Two years later it joined the Comintern, and in 1921 it assumed the name of *Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti, sektion av Kommunistiska Internationalen* (Swedish Communist Party, Section of the Communist International). Relations with the Comintern were strained, however, leading to several splits within the party during the 1920's. Between 1929 and 1934, there were two separate Communist parties, one supporting and the other opposing the Comintern. The latter disintegrated as some of its leaders returned to the Social Democrats and others joined the National Socialists. The loyal organization, which remained faithful to Moscow through the years of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, endured mild political repression in the early stage of World War II, but subsequently was able to capitalize on the growing good will of the Soviet Union. In the communal elections of 1946, the party reached its all-time peak of popular support, receiving 11.2 percent of the electoral vote.

This level could not be sustained, however, and in the following years the Communist vote fluctuated between 3 and 6 percent of the total.[2] The ups and downs of the party were evidently related to international developments: severe losses were suffered after the 1948 Communist takeover in Prague, the 1956 revolt in Hungary, and the 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall. In the eyes of the younger and more revisionist cadres, the last two setbacks proved the folly of the party leadership's unflinching loyalty to Moscow. Following the communal elections of 1962, in which the Communists polled a dismal 3.8 percent after having defended East Germany's hard-line Ulbricht regime in their campaign, a strong opposition group called for a thorough "modernization" of the party. In order to give it a new nationalist and democratic image, they demanded that the party cleanse itself of its old submissiveness to the Comintern and its alien-sounding rhetoric.

The cleavage within the party in the early 1960's was partly a generation gap. On one side were the old "men of 1929" (the year of the split between the pro- and the anti-Comintern parties) in the leadership and the older rank-and-file party members still profoundly attached to the Soviet Union; on the other were the young militants, generally not much impressed with the virtues of socialism as displayed in the East European Communist countries. At the same time, the controversy was partly geographical. In his loyalty to the Soviet example, party leader Hilding Hagberg typified the attitude of the people of his own Norrbotten region in northern Sweden. The Norrbotten Communists, many of Finnish descent, had greeted the October Revolution of 1917 with rare enthusiasm and had ever since maintained close ties with the Soviet Union.

[2] For a commune-by-commune analysis of the bases of Communist support, see Sven Rydenfelt, *Kommunismen i Sverige: En samhällsvetenskaplig studie* (Communism in Sweden: A Social Science Study), Lund, Gleerups, 1954. For an overall analysis of the party's electoral following, see Leif Lewin, Bo Jansson, and Dag Sorbom, *The Swedish Electorate 1887-1968*, Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1972.

Distribution of Seats in the Swedish Parliament, 1960-73

Election Year	Nonsocialist Parties			Socialist Parties		Total
	Moderate Coalition	Center Party	Liberal Party	Social Democratic Party	Left Party, Communist (VKP)	
1960	58	54	73	191	7	383
1964	59	54	69	191	10	383
1968	57	59	60	204	4	384
1970	41	71	58	163	17	350
1973	51	90	34	156	19	350

SOURCE: *Statistisk Arsbok 1973* (Statistical Yearbook, 1973), Stockholm, P.A. Norstadt & Söner, 1973, p. 405.

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In periods of distress, there had even been some emigration from this area to the USSR, mostly of young workers eager to share in the Soviet experience. As a consequence, the northern Communists in the 1960's were not inclined to question the claim that repressive Soviet or East German policies were justified by external threats to the socialist camp, and they regarded the party "modernizers" in the south with suspicion and contempt.

After the disastrous 1962 elections, however, the balance of forces within the party was hardly in favor of the "men of 1929." As Hagberg's base of support kept shrinking, the old guard agreed to his resignation, but on condition that the chief candidate of the "modernizers" not be nominated to assume the leadership. Instead, the editor-in-chief of the main party organ *Ny Dag,* C. H. Hermansson, was launched as a compromise candidate acceptable to both sides. Hermansson, an economist who had joined the party in 1941, was old enough to be trusted by the executive committee, but also sufficiently young to be attractive to the "modernizers." He was elected unanimously at the 20th Congress of the Swedish party in 1964.

The choice of Hermansson proved felicitous. Soft-spoken and reasonable, the new leader made a very good impression on the TV audience and was soon a popular figure in Swedish politics. The party gathered new momentum. In the parliamentary elections of 1964, it collected 5.2 percent of the vote, and in the subsequent communal elections of 1966, 6.4 percent. Though many members of the old guard remained in powerful positions in the leadership and in the apparatus, resistance to Hermansson within the party was weak. At least initially, the promise of new party strength was sufficient to silence the remonstrances of the Norbotten conservatives.

Veteran party chief Hilding Hagberg (left) hands over the leadership of the Swedish Communist party to C. H. Hermansson on January 5, 1964.

—Photo by Pressens Bild.

Meanwhile, in order to preserve internal unity, the effort to modernize the party was kept modest and implied no abrupt break with the past. On such key questions as the party's relations to the Social Democrats and to the trade unions, the soft line of the 1950's remained basically unchanged. Thus, the party continued to present itself as a loyal part of the Swedish labor movement sharing the movement's aims and always willing to cooperate with the Social Democrats. In the trade unions, it urged all workers to disregard party affiliations and to cast their vote for "the ablest comrades"—the tacit assumption being, of course, that the ablest comrades were Communists. Hermansson's achievement, therefore, was not the initiation of this "friendly" line, which had been party policy ever since the discontinuation of the last Moscow-commanded assaults on the "fascistization" of the Social Democrats in 1953, but rather his success in making it more credible and agreeable by changing the party's image of subservience to Moscow. Under his predecessor, the efficacy of the "friendly" line had been impaired by the party's constant defense of the USSR. The new leader was intent on avoiding that error.

Avoid it he did. Although an outright denunciation of the East European version of socialism was impossible in view of the lingering sympathies of many old Communists, the leadership adopted a posture of somewhat indulgent detachment toward the Soviet bloc. The Swedish party thus became a conspicuously passive member of the Communist world movement, while at home Hermansson took great pains to underscore the party's independent and national character. Eager to dispel all doubts about their patriotism, the "modernizers" went in for a demonstrative kind of nationalism that appeared almost outmoded.

At the doctrinal level, the most significant shift involved the party's position with respect to the established political system and the party's road to power. In the 1950's, Swedish political opinion had

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drawn a line between the four democratic parties that accepted the "rules of the game" of the Swedish system—the Social Democrats, Agrarians, Liberals, and Conservatives—and the Communists, who were generally seen as rejecting the system in favor of their own ideal of proletarian dictatorship or "popular democracy." Now, Hermansson strongly protested this discriminatory differentiation and asserted that the Communist Party had no qualms about living under the existing democratic system. His crusade was fairly successful. Within a few years the depreciatory distinction was dropped, and the mass media and the other parties began treating the Communist Party as a legitimate member of the democratic family. By the mid-1960's, to be a Communist no longer was to be an outcast.

Courting the New Left

At this juncture, the emergence of a vigorous New Left movement in Sweden brought about a marked change in the national political climate confronting the Communists. More influential in Sweden than in most other countries, this movement profoundly affected intellectual attitudes in the late 1960's. Radical youth, disenchanted with a political establishment that had held power for more than 30 years without reforming the basic economic structure of society, began casting about for other alternatives, but the Communist Party, politically inefficient and still wrestling with its uneasy heritage, hardly seemed an attractive substitute. The main inspiration came from elsewhere—from exciting new social theorists on the European continent, from the rediscovered young Marx, and above all from the revolutionary ideologists of the Third World. The ideas of such personalities as André Gorz, Frantz Fanon, and Ho Chih Minh appeared far more relevant to Sweden's youth than those of such old fogeys as Tage Erlander or Hilding Hagberg.

The New Left arose outside the two labor parties and remained largely unorganized for several years. Hostility to political machines was part of the movement's creed: the young militants wanted to work in a live, spontaneous, and amorphous community without submitting themselves to an apparatus. Hence the emergence, between 1965 and 1968, of a well-nigh uncountable number of short-lived groups, *ad hoc* committees, and loose associations, often without formal structure, responsible functionaries, or the capacity to survive past the first few months of enthusiasm. The new mood had an immediate impact on Swedish fiction, art, and music, and at the universities it set the stage for the student "revolts" of the spring of 1968.

To the new leader of the Communist Party, the New Left movement presented both a challenge and an opportunity. Striking a balance between the anarchist extravagance of the students and the orthodoxy of the old party cadres, Hermansson sought to establish himself as a spiritual leader of the youth movement. In a book published in 1965, *Vänsterns vag* (The Road of the Left), he played upon several key themes of the non-Communist socialists, indulged in some pungent self-criticism of past Communist errors, and even raised the question of dissolving the Communist Party in favor of a broader organization of the Left. This courtship of the New Left met with some criticism inside the party, but the still powerful conservative party forces apparently gave it their assent for the sake of preserving party unity. There was still at this time a risk that some elements in the party might break away to form a socialist people's party on the Danish and Norwegian models. If Hermansson's middle course could prevent this and keep the party intact, his flirtation with New Left ideas may well have appeared tolerable.

The move to modernize the party reached its acme at the 21st Party Congress in 1967, which adopted a new party program.[3] This document included some balanced criticism of the socialist countries as well as an unambiguous declaration of support for the parliamentary road. The strictures against the revisionism of the Social Democrats were still severe, but they were now couched in everyday language and not in dialectical jargon. The new party statutes codified the transformation of the party apparatus from a network along traditional Comintern lines into a relatively loose political organization comparable to the other Swedish parties. And as a final token of its resolution to make a fresh start, the party dropped its old name, *Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti,* adopting instead the name of *Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna* (Left Party, Communist—or VPK). This itself was a compromise solution as the most fervent "modernizers" would have preferred to eschew any reference whatever to communism.

The modernizers had clearly won the day, but their victory proved short-lived. Within the next

[3] For the 1967 party program, see *Socialistik alternativ* (Socialist Alternative), Gothenburg, Västans tryckeri AB, 1967.

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couple of years, the modernist line came under challenge from various groups of more or less orthodox dissidents inside the party. In true Hegelian fashion, the triumph of modernism became the inception of its fall as the realization of its program unleashed contrary forces of negation.

Retreat to Orthodoxy

The first challenge came from a left-wing group which broke away from the VPK soon after the 1967 Congress. Calling itself the Marxist-Leninist League, it was at the outset an organization of intellectuals but soon gained some proletarian backing. Condemning the "new revisionism" of the VPK and the embourgeoisement of its political style, the League set itself the task of founding a truly revolutionary party. With regard to the Sino-Soviet split, an area in which the Communist Party had navigated with great caution, the Marxists-Leninists took a clear-cut stand on the Chinese side. Whereas the Communists had indulged in some mild reproaches against the illiberal policies of the Soviet party leadership, the League flatly denounced Soviet "social capitalism."

In their own activities, the Marxists-Leninists adhered to the classical principles of democratic centralism, unquestioning compliance, and work duty for all members. To get in touch with and organize the masses, they began to set up or penetrate various front organizations with "minimal" platforms likely to attract people from all walks of life. The most successful of these fronts was, and still is, the "United NLF-Groups" [4] of Sweden, which underwent rapid expansion during the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Yet the League's cooperation with non-Communist groups did not please all its members, and the more uncompromising cadres broke away in 1970 to form an organization called the Revolutionary Marxists-Leninists, centered chiefly in Gothenburg.

Another faction alienated by the modernization of the party was the old guard around Hilding Hagberg and the Norrbotten Communists close to the newspaper *Norrskensflamman.* This group had unsuccessfully fought against some of the programmatic innovations adopted in 1967 and remained

Stockholm groups demonstrate in October 1967 against American policy in Vietnam and in support of the Vietnam National Liberation Front.

—Wide World Photos.

dissatisfied, though refraining from open polemics. With Hermansson's strongly-worded denunciation of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, it could no longer remain silent. A split on this issue appeared immediately before the September 1968 elections, and when the returns were in—with the Communists obtaining a meager 3.0 percent of the vote—the dissidents unleashed a barrage of bitter complaints against the party leadership for having failed to stand up for Communist principles.

Subsequently, still a third group rose to challenge both the excesses of the modernization movement and the old line of the Norrbotten Communists. In the absence of an established name, the group may be called the "new Leninists." Its members were mainly converts from the New Left who had refrained from joining the Marxist-Leninist League for a variety of reasons ranging from personal antipathies to disagreement over strategic issues and doubts about the viability of an independent force outside the VKP. They were young, doctrinaire, and impatient with the emasculation of Communist militancy. In their view, both Hagberg and Hermansson had erred in taking a soft attitude toward the Social Democrats instead of intensifying Communist propaganda and exposing the passivity of the labor movement. The "new Leninists" wanted to make short work of the "modern," "democratic" profile of the party and advocated a return to the classical Marxist-Leninist analysis of the capitalist state.

[4] The Swedish title of this front organization is *Förenade FNL-grupperna,* the FNL standing for the Communist-led National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

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These combined pressures proved too strong to resist. Because of the mounting competition on the left, Hermansson could no longer use sweet words to appeal to the Social Democrats without being attacked as a revisionist, nor could he give vent to "democratic" indignation over abuses of power in Communist Eastern Europe. No longer, too, could the party echo the phraseology of the Socialist People's parties in Denmark and Norway. The days of "modernization" were gone. And so, in fact, were many of the "modernizers." This faction of the party, largely based in Stockholm, was largely a transitory phenomenon, and many of its members soon abandoned the idea of adapting to the mainstream of Swedish politics and culture. Several of the leaders moved leftward and are now to be found in the neo-Leninist wing of the party. Indeed, the radicalization of the VKP in recent years may be ascribed in large measure to the "Leninization" of some of its erstwhile New Left and Left-Socialist strata.

In response to these currents, the VKP adopted a new and somewhat more militant party program in 1972.[5] The document bore the imprint of the views of several factions, while it simply glossed over many moot issues. There was, for instance, no reference at all to developments in Eastern Europe, no doubt a concession to the old guard and the group around *Norrskensflamman.* At the same time, "the road to power" was defined in considerably more revolutionary terms than in 1967, reflecting the influence of the neo-Leninist opposition. On the other hand, there was no clear-cut denunciation of the Swedish political system, and the retreat from the modernist line was not made explicit.

The Communists' Limited Political Role

In a party which for 25 years has never garnered more than 6 percent of Sweden's electoral vote, the endless debate on the issue of "the road to power"—whether parliamentary or otherwise—must be tinged with a sense of futility. The real import of the debate, however, is largely symbolic: its purpose is not to lay down a firm strategy for a distant takeover but rather to indicate the party's attitude toward the Social Democrats. Even in the long run, the Swedish Communists themselves have little hope of commanding anything like a majority in parliament or the electorate, or even of building a sufficient base for a violent overthrow of the system. The Social Democrats have a firm grip on the Swedish working class, and only this party would be capable of bringing about a socialist society. Hence, the logical conclusion for most Swedish Communists is that their party must work for the radicalization of the whole labor movement.

To do this requires a party message with an appropriate mixture of honey and vitriol. The Communist leaders are constantly critical of the Social Democrats, but at the same time they try to be pleasant and cooperative—and would likely jump at almost any invitation to collaborate with the government. Unfortunately for the Communists, the Social Democrats never invite them to do so, and the Communists' yearning for a joint workers' front is shared by only a tiny minority in the major party. The traditional posture of the government has been to decline any cooperation with the Communists, and only rarely have there even been talks between high-ranking representatives of the two parties.

Communist leader Hermansson marches in a Stockholm demonstration protesting the August 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

—Photo by Pressens Bild.

[5] *Partiprogram för vänsterpartiet kommunisterna* (Party Program for the Left Party, Communist), Gothenburg, Västans tryckeri AB, 1972.

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This attitude has not changed since the 1970 elections. In spite of the fact that the survival of Mr. Palme's cabinet now depends on steady support from the Communist deputies, the Social Democrats have shown no interest in further contacts with Mr. Hermansson. No formal arrangement has been made to secure his backing; neither have there been any negotiations on concrete issues. The Social Democratic calculation has apparently been that a policy of benign neglect would be enough to assure the support of the Communists in Parliament, at least on crucial issues; and thus far it has. During the first parliamentary term after the elections, the Communist MPs often opposed the government on minor questions, but when the cabinet's fate was at stake, they consistently aligned themselves with the Social Democrats against the nonsocialist parties. Yet, only on one occasion were the Communists able to bring about a shift in government policy, forcing the cabinet to finance an adjustment of the income tax through a rise in the payroll tax instead of an increased value-added tax as originally planned by the Ministry of Finance.

Although it might seem strange to outsiders that the Communists can get so little in return for their votes in Parliament, the logic of their unconditional allegiance to the Social Democratic government is quite simple. The fact is that, despite its strategic position, the VKP has no real bargaining power. If it were to withdraw its support from the government, it would be responsible for the formation of a nonsocialist coalition cabinet, and while some Communists, for tactical reasons, might fancy letting a "bourgeois" government run the country for a while, the party would have an exceedingly difficult time justifying its course in the eyes of its working-class constituents in the next elections. As a consequence, Hermansson is under constant pressure to sustain the Social Democrats in power, and his party cannot achieve anything by threats.

Thus, the key position of the Communist parliamentary group has been of little avail to the VKP. As previously, the Communists are not allowed to participate in the actual policymaking process at any stage and cannot exert any direct influence on the government. Yet there are other and more subtle ways in which their parliamentary activity can exert an impact. By giving vent to popular complaints and demands, they can put the government under pressure and restrict its freedom of action. On several issues, the Communists skillfully articulate views that are widespread among the Social Democratic rank and file and hence are difficult for the government to oppose. Moreover, by making himself the mouthpiece not only of his own party but of the entire Left, Hermansson can make trouble for the Social Democrats in the labor movement.

These endeavors are facilitated by the relatively strong position that Communists and Social Democratic left-wingers occupy in the mass media. While there has been much unfounded carping about the *vänstervridning* ("leftward drift") of some of the national newspapers and the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation (a public monopoly), it is probably true that there has been a substantial influx of socialists into the journalistic profession and that this has left its mark on the handling of news. The Swedes' image of the world and of their own society has surely changed in recent years, whether this change be regarded as merely an "awakening" to a hitherto concealed reality or as a perilous "bolshevization" of the public mind. News media now allot increased space to international affairs and often seem intent upon presenting political and economic problems from the viewpoint of the underdog. The presence of socialist undertones in the news coverage has drawn a great deal of criticism, particularly from the older generation.

It would clearly be wide of the mark to attribute this transformation of public opinion to Communist manipulation of the media. The VKP does not control much of anything, least of all the *"gauchisants"* in the media. Yet the perspectives and concerns of the new communicators have to some extent been beneficial to the party by helping create a more sympathetic public understanding of some Communist initiatives. If the Communists have failed in their efforts to gain a direct voice in governmental decision-making, they have at least had some success in influencing the cognitive framework of the decision-makers.

Much the same thing can be said about the role of Communists in the trade unions and a few other national organizations. Only a small number of union locals are under Communist control, and at the national level the supremacy of the Social Democrats is absolute. Nevertheless, through constant espousal of a more militant course, left-wingers in the trade union movement have often been able to push the leaders in that direction. Moreover, wildcat strikes have recently become more frequent on Sweden's traditionally peaceful labor front, although such actions are probably ascribable less to the influence of the VKP than to the activities of various splinter

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groups. VKP officials, eager to appear responsible, normally avoid taking the lead in such ventures.

In all this, it should be noted, the left wing of the Social Democratic Party plays a key role. For its members, the persistent competition of the Communists provides an expedient argument in favor of more resolute assaults on the capitalist structure of society, and they are constantly warning the Social Democratic leadership that votes may be lost if the government fails to act along that line. Whether such warnings are heeded, depends greatly on the current balance of political forces. In situations where the main danger to the government appears to be a leakage of support to the nonsocialist opposition, the forebodings of the left-wingers do not receive much attention. The same is true when the Social Democrats are positively interested in giving a boost to the Communists, as they were in 1970 when the 4-percent dividing line under the new electoral system threatened to deprive the government of a supporting Communist bloc of votes in Parliament. On the other hand, in a situation where the Communists might appear likely to surpass their "optimal" (from the government's viewpoint) strength of about 5 percent, the Social Democratic leadership might well opt to move leftward to prevent a further drain of votes to the Communists.

Olof Palme (left), Swedish Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden, and Carl Henrik Hermansson, leader of the VKP (Left Party, Communist), during the tallying of results of the September 1973 elections in which the two leftist parties captured exactly 50 percent of the seats in the Swedish Parliament.

—Photo by Pressens Bild via Photoreporters.

Hence, in order to arrive at an accurate assessment of Communist influence in Sweden, it is crucial to distinguish between *institutional power* and *cultural power (i.e.,* influence deriving from the special politico-cultural context of Swedish national life). The impact of the VKP on national politics is predominantly indirect and rarely achieved through actual participation in the policymaking process. The party's peripheral position in the political spectrum, in combination with its consistent strategy of seeking collaboration with the Social Democrats, greatly reduces its ability to maneuver in Parliament and to put a price on its votes. With a bargaining power close to nil, it can only affect the outcome of minor issues by shifting support to the nonsocialist opposition. What the VKP can and does exercise, however, is a certain degree of influence on the "definition of the situation"—that is to say, on the general perception of political problems and the parameters of choice, or, to borrow a concept from a recent work on American politics, "the building of the agenda." [6] In this politico-cultural sphere, the lively minds of the Swedish Left play a far greater role than they do in the political institutions.

Outlook for the Future

As indicated at the outset, the future role of the VKP depends to a great extent on how Prime Minister Olof Palme decides to resolve the dilemma facing the ruling Social Democratic Party as a consequence of the current balance of forces in Parliament. For Mr. Palme, the tacit collaboration of the Communists during 1971-73 was an inexpensive arrangement that required virtually no concessions and enabled the Social Democrats to pursue their own course. Had it been possible to go on in this fashion, he would certainly have done so, but since the dramatic elections of 1973, the obliging compliance of the

[6] See Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building,* Boston, Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1972.

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Communists is no longer sufficient to provide the government with a stable parliamentary base. To stay in power, the Social Democrats must either (1) secure a broader majority in Parliament through new elections, or (2) win the cooperation of a part of the nonsocialist opposition. Such cooperation could be sought on an *ad hoc* basis, but this would go against the grain of Swedish politics. With a characteristic penchant for safety, Swedish politicians like to do their log-rolling (or "cow-trading," as they call it) on a lasting basis.

Each of the two solutions has its drawbacks. As for the first, an effort to restore the socialist majority in Parliament might well result in failure, which would mean the advent of Sweden's first nonsocialist government in 42 years. Early this year, the country's most prestigious pollster gave the nonsocialist opposition parties a 4-percent lead over the Social Democrats in voter support, and even if the Social Democrats—whose election machine is unequalled in Northern Europe—might be able to catch up in an eventual electoral campaign, the prospects of their emerging with a safe margin of parliamentary superiority are dim. Moreover, this situation may well be a long-term phenomenon, inasmuch as the new electoral system affords little chance of establishing a solid Social Democratic majority in Parliament and, on the contrary, makes it quite possible that the nonsocialist parties may gain the upper hand. Finally, even if the Communists were to win enough parliamentary seats to give them a swing-position, a permanent reliance by the Social Democrats on the votes of the Communists, though perhaps not costly in terms of policy restrictions, would inevitably tend to impair both the party's reputation and its self-confidence.

The second solution—a Social Democratic alliance with one or two of the nonsocialist opposition parties—would appear to be a far better way of stabilizing Social Democratic supremacy, but it is liable to encounter strong resistance among the party rank and file. In the 1950's, the Agrarian League served as a coalition partner of the Social Democrats for six years, but in its present form this group (now called the Center Party) has become a sharp critic of the government's alleged policy of centralization. Today, the small Liberal Party would seem to be a more likely potential ally; however, there is a great deal of mistrust to be overcome on both sides before such an alliance could materialize. The left wing of the Social Democrats is as hostile to the idea as the right wing of the Liberal Party, and years of fierce competition between the two parties are not easily forgotten.

If these obstacles could be surmounted, the task of forging a common policy for such a coalition would probably not be all that difficult. Contrary to the impression created by such manichean labels as "socialist" and "nonsocialist," the attitudinal differences between the government and the opposition in Sweden are not very great, and neither domestic nor foreign issues evoke fundamental disagreement. The "nonsocialists" have no intention of scrapping the welfare state, and the Social Democrats, though they toyed with the idea of nationalizing private industry in the late 1960's, are now less than eager to take such a step. Subtler techniques of manipulating the economy are preferred by the government, and most of them are also accepted by the opposition. This may explain why, after four decades of "socialist" rule, the state-owned sector is still smaller in Sweden than in France, Italy, or West Germany.

To the Communists, of course, this itself is sufficient proof of the *embourgeoisement* of the Social Democratic Party. If the VKP continues to attract the young, more radically-inclined voters, as it has in recent years, Mr. Hermansson's expostulations on this score may finally have some effect on the Social Democrats, but they are not likely to produce any major shift in the government's policy. In the uneasy equilibrium created by last year's elections, Mr. Palme and his cabinet appear to be more disposed to look for new friends in the nonsocialist opposition. The VKP would then very likely lose its strategic position in Parliament—a position that has earned it a measure of prestige but very little real influence in Swedish politics.

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Allende in Retrospect

By Paul E. Sigmund

World attention has moved away from Santiago since the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts, the only available response to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and external political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or was the downfall of the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choices which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race.[1] What they do not mention is that in the congressional run-off between the two front-running candidates he was elected president by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteeing the independence of the military from political control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist takeover.

Political and Economic Strategy

When he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a "second model" of Marxism—the *via Chilena* to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich Engels on the possibility of

. . . a peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the

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[1] Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of his own Socialist Party *(Partido Socialista*—PS), the Communist Party *(Partido Comunista*—PC), the main body of the Radical Party *(Partido Radical*—PR), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular United Action" *(Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido*—MAPU), and two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups were the centrist Christian Democratic Party *(Partido Democrata Cristiano*—PDC) and the rightist National Party *(Partido Nacional*—PN).

In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, Jorge Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate.

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people have all power and in accord with the constitution can do what they desire when they have the majority of the nation behind them.[2]

Yet it was precisely the question of majority support that was Allende's central problem in his design to carry out a peaceful transition to "socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty." The parties in his coalition were in a distinct minority in the Congress, and although there was no doubt about the legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because of the conditional support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it should be noted, included both Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the day after the popular election, clearly inferring his future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan de Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party to prevent it from voting for Allende in the run-off. In the immediate aftermath of the election the PDC was controlled by the Tomic forces, who claimed to be in favor of "communitarian" socialism, nationalization of copper, acceleration of agrarian reform, and reduction of Chile's *dependencia* on the United States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his acknowledged goal of majority support for the transition to socialism would have been to try to arrive at an understanding with the Christian Democrats on the points in his program with which they were in agreement. This might have provoked the secession of some of the rightist members of the PDC, but if an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority in the Congress for at least part of his program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to terms with the party which he had termed "the new face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy. The next congressional elections were not scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event of a conflict with the Congress over the text of a constitutional amendment, the President could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popular support for his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, in accordance with the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral

[2] *El Mercurio (Santiago)*, Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.

Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in January 1971, three months after his election as President of Chile.

—Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.

house, to be elected immediately following the approval of the amendment. The Congress would be certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende had the support of a majority in the country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control of the unicameral legislature that would then be established.

Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral support was an economic one which drew as much from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Marx. The Chilean economy, already operating below capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was to "prime the pump" by adopting a deficit budget, increasing public expenditures, and redistributing income by skewing the annual wage readjustment for the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970) in favor of the low-income sector of the population (the lowest income groups received a 40-percent increase). The utilization of unused industrial capacity, combined with strict enforcement of price controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and refusal to devalue the Chilean *escudo* in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain possible inflationary pressures which might result. (The Allende government also had a cushion of nearly $400 million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei government as a result of high international prices for copper, Chile's principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist element—

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accentuation of the class struggle. At the same time that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an effort to increase their class consciousness *(concientización)* through government publications and the use of the media to remove the elements of "false consciousness" instilled by "bourgeois" propaganda. Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende said in a press conference just after his installation, "I am *not* president of all Chileans." And in his first "State of the Nation" message to the Congress he asserted:

. .. *the People's Government* (Gobierno Popular) *is inspired in its policy by a premise that is artificially denied by some—the existence of classes and social sectors with antagonistic and opposing interests.*[3]

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an additional source of revenue for the government from the "exploitative" profits of the industries that were to be nationalized by the new government. The partially American-owned copper mines were to be taken over by a constitutional amendment—both to lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of the Frei Chileanization agreements of 1967 and 1969, and because a general consensus in Chile favored nationalization.[4] Other companies were to be nationalized after a controlling interest was gained through the purchase of shares on the open market by the government development agency. The latter course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price of shares had been depressed since the elections, and further economic pressures could be created by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise in prices. The legal adviser to the government, Eduardo Novoa, also outlined other "legal loopholes" in existing Chilean law which could be used for "temporary" takeovers of companies, including "intervention" because of labor disputes and "requisition" because of a "breakdown in supply of an article of prime necessity."

[3] Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Way to Socialism," in Paul E. Sigmund, Ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, 2nd rev. ed., New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 450.

[4] Frei's Chileanization program had involved the purchase by the Chilean state of a controlling interest in the large copper mines owned by the Kennecott and Anaconda companies. The agreements had also provided that Chile's payments to the American companies were to be invested in the expansion of copper production and refining in Chile, earning the country additional revenue in the 1970's to pay back the loans contracted to finance the purchases.

The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity program, was thus seen as an essential part of an economic and political strategy aimed at achieving and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid acceleration of agrarian reform (again using existing legislation—the 1967 agrarian reform law—but exploiting provisions such as one authorizing the expropriation of "abandoned or badly-farmed land," with one percent payment in cash and the rest in bonds), the planned takeover meant that even if the effort to create a unicameral left-dominated legislature failed, the Allende government could destroy the economic base of the "capitalist" opposition through a series of "irreversible" *faits accomplis (hechos consumados)* which would give the

*A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south of Santiago which was seized from its owners on the pretext that it was "operated unproductively" (*mal explotada*).*

—Photo by Maggi Castelloe.

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government control of the economy and of the excess profits that the private sector had used for luxury consumption or had sent out of the country as profit remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, the fact that the policy remained within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention by the military was unlikely.

Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy was not universally accepted within his coalition. Most of his own Socialist Party—beginning with its newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos Altamirano—and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (*Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo*—Organized Vanguard of the People), were openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elections and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevitable. Allende's effort to portray the transition to socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971. In these, Debray declared that "in the last analysis and until further notice, political power comes out of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean situation required that he observe legality "for the time being." Allende himself organized an armed personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP *(Grupo de Amigos Personales)*, and—we now know—as early as December 1971 received reports on the illegal importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and to his bodyguards.[5]

While there were thus intermittent hints of revolutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic strategy was "socialist consumerism,"[6] combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy

[5] See Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report, found in the presidential palace.

[6] On "socialist consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years of Popular Unity," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1972, pp. 38-51.

A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

—Photo by Claus Meyer for Black Star.

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was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende coalition by an appeal to the material interests and the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was the interaction of the various elements of this political and economic strategy that finally produced the breakdown of Chilean constitutionalism and the intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.

Initial Success

At the outset, the new economic policy was astoundingly successful, although it had within it the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution stimulated demand, while price controls and an artificially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971 the *Sociedad de Fomente Fabril* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), representing Chilean business and industry, admitted that production had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure of 12 months before, and by May that figure had reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Economics of the University of Chile later reported that unemployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3 percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June 1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8 percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 and had only increased by 6 percent by the time of the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.

This wave of economic prosperity—combined with the absence of the political repression that some rightists had predicted would result from a victory by the Marxists—led many, particularly in low income groups, to vote for the candidates of the Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elections. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its electoral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 percent of the total), and the candidates of all the parties supporting Allende received about 50 percent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent which the President himself had received only seven months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were, the coalition was still a few votes short of the absolute majority that Allende required to win a plebiscite on a constitutional amendment. He was later criticized for not calling the plebiscite at the time when the regime's popularity was at its highest point,[7] but in retrospect it does not appear at all certain that he would have won—particularly since by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and political situation would have been much less favorable.

The period after the municipal elections now appears to have been crucial for the long-term survival of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the Christian Democrats had elected a compromise leadership which was not committed to either of the party's wings, and the short-run economic and political indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking action on the economic front to stem the loss of foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pressures—and on the political front to prevent the movement of the Christian Democrats into an alliance with the right-wing opposition parties—the regime continued its previous policies, confidently assuming that in the long run "the people" would support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois" economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the expansion of demand, and the sharp decline in investment would produce disastrous consequences in the following year.

Political Polarization

The hardening of the Christian Democratic position began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June by the assassination of the former Christian Democratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by extremists, at least one of whom had been released from prison by Allende upon his accession to power. A month later in a by-election in Valparaíso, the victorious Christian Democratic candidate received the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight deputies and a number of other party leaders to form the pro-Allende *Izquierda Cristiana* (Christian Left). This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of the seven Radical senators (including two former presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the *Partido de la Izquierda Radical* (Party of the Radical Left—PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a

[7] See, *e.g.*, Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power," *Monthly Review* (New York, London) December 1973, pp. 1-11.

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PR policy resolution which the dissidents described as "completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to "the interest of the middle social strata" whom the party had always represented.[8] For a time, the PIR continued to support the Allende government, but within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposition.

In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted in favor of the constitutional amendment nationalizing the copper mines, but from that point forward, the pattern was one of polarization of Chilean politics and society into two opposing blocks. The Allende forces controlled the executive and pursued an increasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who were not entirely sympathetic to the government. The opposition controlled the legislature, and in October 1971 the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties attempted to assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by voting in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the use of the intervention and requisition procedures and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with specific legislation adopted by the Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," became the focus of a continuing deadlock between the President and Congress that lasted until Allende's overthrow in September 1973.

Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the Congress appeared to the congressional opposition to be a decisive indication of his determination to bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats began to cooperate with the rightist parties in opposing the executive. One method was to impeach ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforcement of the law. The first of many such impeachments took place in January 1972. Another method was to present a united electoral front against the government. Informal cooperation between the rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972, and a month later these groups formed the Democratic Confederation (*Confederación Democrática*—CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congressional elections. A third area of cooperation was in marches and demonstrations against the government, the most famous of which was the March of Empty Pots in December 1971, in which thousands of housewives, mostly of middle-class background, marched, banging pots to protest food shortages.

Those shortages had developed because the predicted economic difficulties resulting from the Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971. The balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit of $315 million, while in 1970 there had been a surplus of $91 million) that in November 1971 the Allende government called a moratorium on payment of its foreign debts. Chile had already experienced difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank as a result of its failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. The debt moratorium was bound to make it considerably more difficult for Chile to secure foreign credits, particularly for the short term.[9] In December 1971, the Chilean government finally permitted a partial devaluation of the Chilean *escudo* so as to decrease the distortions created by its overvaluation, but this created pressure on prices of goods manufactured with imported components. Shortages of certain food items—especially cooking oil, detergents, sugar, toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the government to upper-class hoarding and to increased consumption by low-income groups; however, the dislocations in the countryside associated with the very rapid expansion of the agrarian reform (Allende took over almost as much land in his first year in office as Frei had in six years) clearly had something to do with the problem as well, and the situation could be expected to get worse with the harvest in early 1972. A 100-percent increase in the money supply as a result of the government's deficit spending was also beginning to produce inflationary pressures now that the unused capacity of Chilean industry had been taken up by the 1971 expansion. Most important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent) meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in 1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.

Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not

[8] *El Mercurio*, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.

[9] On the inaccuracy of the term "invisible blockade" to describe the Allende government's credit problems, see Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.

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Workers occupying a plant outside of Santiago proclaim their intention to hold it to the death. The initials of the Unidad Popular *(Popular Unity) are painted on the wall by the gate.*

—Photo by Maggi Castelloe.

immediately evident from the figures for 1971. Industrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian production (based on plantings before Allende's accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent, and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity "conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong inflationary pressures could make our situation acute," but the government took no action to deal with the problem. The continuing optimism of government policymakers at this time was expressed at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the University of Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office in March 1972. In the course of discussion Radomiro Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presidential candidate, asserted that the Allende government had committed a "fatal political error" in failing to establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress through a "far-reaching agreement between socialists inspired by Christianity and those inspired by Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats and Popular Unity—in the period following the 1970 presidential election." Allende's representatives confidently replied that "with a gradual heightening of the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers' winning sufficient strength to gain control of the legislature as well as the executive." [10]

On the political front, there were individuals and groups on both sides who attempted to stem the movement toward polarization, which they correctly foresaw would lead to the breakdown of Chilean institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a compromise on the issue of the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" were made in the first part of 1972. In April the Left Radicals, who had entered the Allende government in January, carried on lengthy negotiations with the Christian Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The Left Radicals responded by leaving the government and joining the opposition, a move Allende described as "a stab in the back." [11] A second set of negotiations in June between the head of the Christian Democratic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice broke down when the time limit set by the Christian Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations seem to have collapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept a compromise which would slow down or stop the forward movement of the government nationalization program, while in June the right wing of the Christian Democrats could point to an impending by-election in mid-July as a reason for discontinuing discussions. Both cases illustrated a general problem posed by the Chilean multiparty system. Once political conflict became polarized, the extremes held the rest of the opposing coalitions hostage and prevented what could have been a convergence of views in the center.

The negotiations were interspersed with a series of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations by the government and the opposition which always stopped just short of open violence. Several observers, including the American Ambassador to

[10] J. Ann Zammit and Gabriel Palma, Eds., *The Chilean Road to Socialism,* Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, pp. 38, 247. The Communist Party report appears in *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.

[11] Partido Izquierda Radical, *Trayectoria Politica del PIR* (Political Path of the PIR), Santiago, 1972, p. 79.

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Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the pattern of "brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited.[12] Social and political tensions increased—but as long as economic deterioration was not reflected in runaway inflation, the Chilean political system seemed able to contain them.

The Turning Point

The strains in the system only became unmanageable in mid-1972, when the lid blew off the fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures that had been building up for at least a year. As the deficit in government spending rose, particularly because of its subsidies to the "social area," its foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance Minister. The Matus-Millas team sought to "find stability at another level," ordering a drastic currency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized sector, and permitting limited agricultural price increases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-living index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September. A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase in the cost of living only accelerated the inflation, so that by the end of the year the official consumer price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1). In September, industrial output began to drop in absolute terms (*i.e.*, not merely in terms of the rate of increase)—a drop that continued every month thereafter until the September 1973 coup.[13] Agricultural production (excluding livestock) also commenced to decline, and mineral production registered precipitous drops, although copper production rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that a number of new mines came into operation. (On other elements of the worsening economic situation, see Table 2.)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the political arena. Several additional ministers were impeached, including the Minister of Interior, who was charged with abetting the illegal importation of arms from Cuba in March. (The Allende government claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba—*"bultos Cubanos"*—were "works of art," but after the September 1973 coup, the government White Book published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds of arms sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs

Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices and Industrial Output under Allende

	Month	Consumer Price Index	Industrial Output [a]
1970	Oct.	35.6	—8.0
	Nov.	35.3	4.3
	Dec.	34.9	—0.3
1971	Jan.	28.1	—4.5
	Feb.	22.8	—7.3
	March	20.1	6.3
	April	20.2	1.6
	May	21.0	13.5
	June	21.1	10.7
	July	19.1	6.7
	Aug.	17.4	10.7
	Sept.	15.6	25.5
	Oct.	16.5	22.6
	Nov.	18.8	22.1
	Dec.	22.1	19.5
1972	Jan.	24.8	18.5
	Feb.	32.0	11.9
	March	34.0	10.2
	April	38.1	12.6
	May	40.0	11.4
	June	40.1	2.5
	July	45.9	5.0
	Aug.	77.2	3.6
	Sept.	114.3	—7.8
	Oct.	142.9	—7.7
	Nov.	149.9	—8.1
	Dec.	163.4	—11.1
1973	Jan.	180.3	—6.8
	Feb.	174.1	—4.7
	March	183.3	—2.8
	April	195.5	—11.3
	May	233.5	—11.0
	June	283.4	—14.8
	July	323.2	—10.7
	Aug.	303.6	—11.9
	Sept.	286.0	—22.9
	Oct.	528.4	18.0
	Nov.	528.9	5.1

[a] Percentage of change from the same month of the previous year.

SOURCE: *Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (National Institute of Statistics)*, Santiago; *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril.* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), Santiago.

[12] A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the State Department, published in Jack Anderson's column in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC) on March 28, 1972, commented that "the Chileans have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other, and back off." On the same point see Mauricio Solaún and Fernando Cepeda, *Allende's Chile: On the Politics of Brinkmanship*, Bogota, Universidad de Los Andes, 1972.

[13] The Allende government blamed the drop in production on the October 1972 strike, but this ignored the fact that production declines began before October.

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Table 2: Some Indices of the Chilean Economy, 1970-72

	1970	1971	1972
Gross domestic product (% change)	3.7	8.3	1.4
Investment (% change)	8.6	−24.2	−8.5
Real wages and salaries (% change)	13.0	30.0	−9.0
Exports ($ million)	1129	1045	853
Imports ($ million)	1020	1124	1287

SOURCE: Department of Economics, University of Chile.

had been forbidden to inspect.[14]) The judiciary joined in the conflict, protesting the failure of the Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while progovernment demonstrators denounced the *viejos de mierda*—"filthy old men"—in the Supreme Court. As it became apparent that there was no real possibility of resolving their differences, the two sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbiters, and the national holidays in mid-September 1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Congress and the President to ingratiate themselves with the military.

The political involvement of the military was accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragedy—the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the "employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by pro- and anti-Allende forces, it began far from Santiago, in the remote southern province of Aysen, with a strike by small truckers. (Referred to by the government press as the "truck-owners," the membership of the truckers' *gremio*—guild—was almost entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks who feared an announced plan to establish a state trucking agency which would have had priority access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrats and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and the work stoppage dragged on for over a month resulting in an estimated loss of $150-200 million in production. Agriculture was particularly hard hit because the strike took place in the midst of the planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part, though not all, of the 25-percent drop in the 1973 harvest was the consequence of the strike. Industry was not as adversely affected, since workers attempted to keep factories going despite management's efforts to cease production—and the October strike saw the emergency of "Industrial Belts" *(Cordones)* and "Communal Commands," which seemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular power" that leftist theorists had spoken of as the basis of a genuine revolutionary class consciousness to replace the materialistic "economism" that had characterized Chilean workers until this time.[15] When the workers seized closed factories, the plants were usually "intervened" by the government, so that an important result of the October strike was a considerable expansion of the government-controlled sector of industry and trade.

The most important outcome of the strike, however, was the direct involvement of the military in the Allende cabinet. A condition of the settlement of the strike was that the military take over key cabinet posts. This resulted most notably in the assignment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carlos Prats, so as to assure that the congressional elections scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely and impartially.

The involvement of the military and the preparations for the March elections brought about a lull in the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi-

[14] Secretaria General del Gobierno, *Libro Blanco* (White Book), Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-08.

[15] The *Cordones* were more or less spontaneously organized committees of workers from seized factories which coordinated production and distribution in a given industrial area. The Communal Commands *(Comandos Comunales)* were organized by the *Cordones* to mobilize the local population in the surrounding area. They included representatives of neighborhood committees *(juntas de vecinos)*, mothers' groups *(centros de madres)*, price control and distribution committees *(juntas de abastecimiento y precios)*, and other groups. On the persistence of worker "economism," see James Petras, "Chile: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change and Popular Participation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Spring 1973, pp. 24-51; also available in James Petras, Ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution*, New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2.

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Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Santiago wall poster denounces the country's Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."

—Photo by Juan de Onis for *The New York Times.*

tably, however, it also produced political divisions within the military itself, which had hitherto been relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans for the initiation of what he took to be a food-rationing system. It is now also known that the first plans for a possible coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972.[16]

Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into illegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural produce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and a flourishing black market aimed at middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion of the powers of government-appointed Supply and Distribution Committees (JAPs) to deal with the black-market problem led the opposition to charge political manipulation of food distribution; nonetheless, the government seemed powerless to combat black-market operations.

The March 1973 Elections

The congressional elections in March did not resolve anything. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped that food shortages and economic difficulties would produce a two-thirds majority against the government, which might in turn permit the impeachment of the President, but the results, while showing an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave the Allende regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most observers had predicted. The opposition pointed out that the vote of the pro-government forces had declined from the 50 percent they had registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while the government compared its 44 percent with the 36 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the only proper basis for comparison was the

[16] *The New York Times* (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.

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

Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Santiago neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the outside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."

—Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.

1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the leftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain oppositionists later argued that the Left would have suffered much greater losses had it not been for a government-assisted electoral fraud involving some 200,000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented in support of the argument are unconvincing.[17]

While the government's interpretation of the elections as proof that it was expanding its popular support was not accurate, the election results indicated that at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as previous governments faced with similar economic reverses. Despite a wage readjustment in October, real wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and raging inflation continued to consume the wage increase in early 1973. However, the combination of discriminatory distribution of government-produced goods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to have stemmed the erosion of support, at least among the masses of the poor.

Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of class consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middle-class areas to organize themselves into "Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an impending election was no longer present. A government proposal to limit full wage readjustments to those making less than three times the minimum wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-income groups.

Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be another attempt in March at an accommodation between the regime and the opposition forces, possibly under the auspices of the military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, of a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single national unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum including compulsory courses in socialism and work

[17] See report of the Investigating Committee of the Catholic University Law School, reproduced in the *Libro Bianco*, pp. 220-30. The statistics on new voters in 1973 omit the 21-to-24-year-old group who would have been too young to vote in 1970. They comprised almost exactly the number of "fraudulent" voters estimated in the report.

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periods in factories. The ensuing uproar involved the Catholic Church for the first time in formal opposition to the government and mobilized thousands of secondary-school students in violent demonstrations in downtown Santiago. Stories of fierce arguments over the school proposals among the top military officers (the military had left the cabinet after the elections) filtered into the national press, and a military delegation held a formal meeting with the Education Ministry to express their opposition. The controversy subsided only when the government announced that the proposal had been postponed, pending further discussion.

Within the government, the debate continued on whether to "consolidate in order to advance" (the Communist position) or to "advance without compromise" (the Socialist stance). One indication of how the debate was resolved was the decision by the government to use a constitutionally-authorized "decree of insistence" allowing the cabinet to override the rulings of the Controller General of Chile, Hector Humeres, who had disallowed the requisitioning of some of the factories taken over during the October 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued with the judiciary over the executive's refusal to obey court orders to return seized properties. On May 26, the Supreme Court sent a public letter to the President denouncing

> *. . . the illegal attitude of the administration . . . [its] open and continual rebellion against judicial orders . . . which signifies a crisis of the rule of law [and] the imminent breakdown of the juridical structure of the country.*[18]

The stalemate between the executive and the Congress over the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" was compounded when the Constitutional Tribunal refused to take jurisdiction over the disputed question of whether, in the absence of a plebiscite, the Congress could override the President's item vetoes by a majority or by a two-thirds vote.[19] A second constitutional conflict along the same lines developed when the opposition majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment to give farms under 40 hectares (about 100 acres) in size an absolute guarantee against expropriation and to compel the distribution of land in the "reformed" sector to the peasantry after a transitional period of two years. (The government had once again used a loophole in the 1967 law to postpone indefinitely the distribution of expropriated land by individual title.)

In May the official price index jumped 20 percent, indicating that the inflation was moving into a new hyperinflationary stage. The one effort that the government had made to hold the line—its refusal to grant a full cost-of-living wage increase to the El Teniente copper miners on the grounds that under their contract they had already received partial cost-of-living increases—led to a bruising two-and-a-half month strike, which included a miners' march on Santiago, mass rallies, and simultaneous one-day general strikes for and against the government in mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more ready to resort to military involvement in the cabinet to restore social peace.

Last Stage—Decline and Fall

On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army units had been in contact with *Patria y Libertad,* a right-wing political organization, and had planned to seize President Allende at his residence and to occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment decided to free him and in the process to seize the presidential palace as originally planned. General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in a few hours—most of which were spent in negotiation rather than shooting—but not before President Allende had gone on the air to urge "the people" to take over all industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious military men." The Central Labor Federation also urged the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day the number of companies taken over by the government rose from 282 to 526. The "Industrial Belts" that had sprung up at the time of the October strike now achieved new importance. The spread of "people's power *(poder popular)* had been seen by Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup, but it created many additional problems for the

[18] *Libro Blanco,* p. 215.

[19] The term "item veto" reflects the fact that the Chilean president, unlike his US counterpart, can veto or even rewrite individual sections of proposed laws.

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Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchforks march in Santiago in support of the Allende administration during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti-Marxist elements in mid-June 1973.

—Wide World Photos.

government. Production declined sharply after the takeovers, the opposition got fresh fuel for its claim that the expansion of state control of industry was being carried out through extralegal channels, and *"poder popular"*—as expressed in the worker occupations—appeared to some extent to pose a possible threat of an alternative to the power of the central government

After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts to secure military involvement in the government, but his negotiations with the armed forces were unsuccessful.[20] Instead, they embarked on a policy of vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a measure which had been adopted in October 1972 but only sporadically enforced thereafter. This law authorized any military or police commanders to carry out arms searches if there was "a presumption of the clandestine existence of illegal firearms." [21] The right-wing *Patria y Libertad* organization had now announced publicly that it was going underground in an attempt to overthrow the government by force, and military intelligence was also aware of the initiation of arms training by all the government parties, even the centrist Radicals.[22] In the course of their crackdown, the military found arms caches in factories in Santiago and Concepción, and the killing of a worker in one such arms raid provoked protests from the leftist parties.

At this point, the Chilean Communist Party and the Catholic Church both concluded independently that the only solution to the impasse in Chile was one more attempt at an agreement between the Allende government parties and the Christian Democrats. The Communists initiated a campaign against civil war almost simultaneously with a statement by the Chilean hierarchy calling for a renewal of dialogue. Probably in response to these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both Allende and the Christian Democrats agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, but disagreement continued on the constitutional reforms. Allende offered to sign the amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a constitutional amendment specifying that the Congress could only override presidential vetoes of constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also proposed the establishment of joint committees to work out further agreements. However, the Christian Democrats denounced these proposals as "dilatory" and broke off the negotiations.

A few days before the dialogue was initiated, the truckers began another strike, which was to last from July 26 until the coup on September 11. As in October, the truckers were joined by the other *gremios*. Coming at a time when the 12-month inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget deficits and subsidies to the nationalized industries and agriculture, had reached 323 percent—and in a situation where inventories had not yet been built up from the October strike—the truckers' action created much more serious problems for the government than the earlier strike. This new crisis once again raised the question of military participation in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

[20] Two conflicting accounts of those negotiations appear in *Ercilla* (Santiago), July 11-17, 1973, pp. 7-10.

[21] Law No. 17,798, *Diario Oficial* (Santiago), Oct. 21, 1972. By a quirk of fate the law had come to Allende's desk in the midst of the October strike, and since it had the strong support of the armed forces, he was compelled to sign it despite the opposition of the Socialist Party and the MIR.

[22] Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in arms-training at his vacation house outside of Santiago. The MAPU began arms-training in December 1972, and the Radicals did so in July 1973. The armed forces were aware of this at least by the end of July. See documents in *Libro Blanco*, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200.

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

Trucks stand idle outside Valparaíso, Chile on September 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing transportation strike.

—UPI.

On August 9 Allende swore in what he called a "national security cabinet," with General Prats as Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet posts.

Almost coincident with the entrance of the military into the cabinet, the naval establishment became involved in a serious conflict with the left wing of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in Valparaíso and Concepción. The announcement accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano, MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques, head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors" of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the congressional immunity of the first two, who sat respectively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Two days before the September coup, Altamirano admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist their coup-minded *(golpista)* officers.[23]

This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service command from below was combined with maneuvers by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him. When General Ruiz resigned his cabinet post on August 17 in protest against his lack of sufficient power to settle the strike, Allende compelled him to add that his departure from the cabinet "implicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it met serious resistance from within the Air Force, provoking a series of actions which ultimately led directly to the September 11 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide whether to resist Allende's action. By evening, Ruiz had persuaded them to accept it on the condition that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer, General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking military officers, including those of six generals, gathered in front of General Prats' house to present a letter asking for his resignation. When the demonstration was broken up by police tear gas, it provoked such dissension in the armed forces that on the following day General Prats decided to resign both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He was joined by two other generals who, with Prats, had led the military forces that had quelled the tank-regiment revolt in June.

The resignation of what appeared to be the last defenders of Allende in the army now meant that all three services were opposed to the President. It coincided with the adoption on the same day of a "sense of the house" *(acuerdo)* resolution by the Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and the military ministers, drawing their attention to "the serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order." [24] The resolution criticized the Allende government for repeatedly bypassing the legislature through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing to promulgate the constitutional reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property, persecuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal paramilitary organizations. In conclusion, it stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic" and urged the military ministers to "put an end to the *de facto* situations listed above which violate the Constitution and the law" or be

[23] It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that newsstands in downtown Chile at this time contained a left-wing publication headlined, "Soldiers, Disobey Your Officers," and a magazine of the extreme Right with the headlines, "The Right of Rebellion," "Rebellion and its Goals," and "Resistance to the Tyrant."

[24] *Libro Blanco*, pp. 239-42.

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guilty of "compromising the national and professional character of the armed forces."

In its original form, the resolution had declared the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the *acuerdo* had later been softened in order to secure the support of the Christian Democrats. Yet its effect was still to give a congressional green light to the military, and Allende immediately so interpreted it. He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress of "promoting a *coup d'état* by asking the military forces to make governmental judgments independently of the authority and direction of the President"; he also pointed out that according to the Constitution the only way that the Congress could decide on the legality of the President's conduct of his office was through impeachment by a two-thirds vote.[25]

The congressional vote was echoed by several professional associations. The Medical Association called on their "colleague" Allende to resign—a request that was echoed by the Federation of Professionals (CUPROCH)—and resignation petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association issued a declaration which—"without attributing a malevolent intention" to the President—asserted an "incompatibility between the institutional framework within which he is supposed to exercise his office and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out in his program." Arguing that Allende "would appear to be incapacitated *(impedido)* in the exercise of his functions as he understands them," the statement suggested that he could be removed from office under Article 43 of the Constitution, which authorizes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity.[26]

The Coup

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup was made is not yet certain, but it evidently was reached in the days following Prats' resignation. The armed forces had contingency plans for the control of vital points throughout the country in case of any emergency, and it only required a signal to put them into operation. Hence the actual seizure of control required little preparation.

After the resignations of the third week of August, Allende restructured his cabinet without the top military commanders but still retained representatives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos Briones, who was known to be interested in another attempt at accommodation with the Christian Democrats. The president also canceled a projected trip to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. The government and the opposition again staged rival demonstrations in connection with the third anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections.

On the weekend before the coup, the Christian Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a meeting at which a proposal was adopted for the simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the President and for new elections to resolve the con-

Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a conference on the transport crisis.

—UPI.

[25] *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The chairman of the Christian Democratic Party told the *New York Times* that "neither we nor the armed forces favor anything but a democratic solution to Chile's political crisis" but emphasized that the only way to avoid a breakdown of the Constitution was the appointment of military men in at least six cabinet posts, as well as in key undersecretary positions and as heads of the chief governmental agencies. *The New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12.

[26] *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1973, p. 7.

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Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.

—Photo by *The New York Times*.

flict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coup.[27]

Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on September 7, the military commanders proceeded on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the *pronunciamiento* issued on September 11. They did not secure the agreement of the National Police until early on the morning of the coup itself, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had taken over the position of police commander.[28]

On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaíso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned to port and by early morning of the 11th had seized control of that city. Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a known center of leftist activism, was taken over without a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.

To justify their action, the military commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While admitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the class struggle," by refusing to implement the decisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in the country, and by bringing about a state of inflation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and external security of the country." The coup leaders concluded:

These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine . . . to justify our intervention to depose a government which is illegitimate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation.[29]

At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to

[27] Information from the author's personal interviews with Patricio Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.

[28] Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1973; *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 19, 1973; and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," *Encounter* (London), March 1974, pp. 72-80.

[29] *Libro Blanco*, pp. 248-49.

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the Chilean people over the single pro-Allende radio station that had not yet been shut down by the military. He began:

This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak to you. . . . My words are not spoken in bitterness but disappointment. In the face of these events I can only say to the workers, "I am not going to resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my life for the loyalty of the people.

Blaming "foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction" for persuading the armed forces to break with their tradition, he said:

History will judge them. . . . My voice will no longer come to you, but it does not matter. You will continue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the least, you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the revolution.[30]

At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those who wished to do so to leave the building, and—except for his personal secretary—all the women, including Allende's pregnant daughter, left. The military also offered the President and his family safe conduct out of the country if he would surrender. Allende rejected the offer. The Air Force then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which repeatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and the members who had been with him left the building in single file, led by the secretary carrying a white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on a sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put two bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro.[31]

Conclusions

Since the coup, comments in the world press representing widely divergent political postures have cited the Chilean case as proof that the hope of achieving Marxist socialism through democratic means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy, neither of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism:

(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his administration to justify his course states as a prerequisite "the support of the majority of the people." Allende acted as if he had that support, but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April 1971 elections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at expanding his electoral base, was more successful in pitting professional and middle-class groups against him than in widening his support among workers, peasants and low-income groups.

2) Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on investment and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and combined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture—a course far removed from the "two steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The consequences of these policies after their deceptive initial success were massive government deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende's economic problems were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from $9 million to $40 million between 1970 and 1973.[32])

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[30] Translated from the transcript of the tape recording of the speech published in Ricardo Boizard, *El Ultimo Dia de Allende* (The Last Day of Allende), Santiago, Editorial de Pacífico, 1973, pp. 53-55.

[31] On Allende's suicide, see the medical report in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The eyewitness testimony of one of the President's personal physicians, who entered the room immediately thereafter, is published in *Ercilla*, Jan. 2-8, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allende's widow has asserted that witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chest and stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous factual errors and describes events which could not have taken place because of the physical design of the building. On this and many other myths of Left and Right concerning the overthrow of Allende, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the Myths," *Worldview* (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21.

[32] Secretaría, Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP), *El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile* (Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Chile), Washington, DC, 1974, p. V-9.

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Specific aspects of the Chilean system also made the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one. He was able to come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic system and because the Marxist parties were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the 1930's. However, he was required to operate within an institutional system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportional representation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult and often gave veto powers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy had been characterized for nearly a century by a chronic tendency to inflation, and successive governments had consistently ignored agriculture in the interest of securing urban electoral support. The most important systemic constraint of all, of course, was the existence of a professionalized and institutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to the ideological blandishments of the Left.[33]

The immediate causes of the military intervention are apparent from the preceding account. In the last part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean politics by both sides and became as polarized as the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming majority joining the opposition to Allende. The conflict over education in March-April 1973 heightened that polarization just at the time the military were attempting to extricate themselves from political involvement. Then the expansion of arms searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activity among enlisted men and presidential maneuvering with promotions and retirements provided the classis scenario for a *coup d'état.*

[33] The Socialists always believed that they could convert the military to their outlook. This is strikingly revealed in Socialist Party documents published in the *Libro Blanco*, pp. 124-30.

One can also relate Allende's difficulties to the inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory to which he appealed. At the same time that he proclaimed his faith in a democratic, pluralist and libertarian transition to socialism, many of his Marxist supporters spoke and acted on the basis of a belief in the inevitability of armed confrontation. With his knowledge, they armed themselves and—what was worse—talked incessantly about revolution. The repeated statements of Régis Debray and others that the observance of the rules of "bourgeois" legality was only a tactic until the balance of forces had improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy. When the importation and distribution of arms was combined with efforts to reorganize education along ideological lines, to subvert military discipline, and to rearrange the hierarchy of command, it is not altogether surprising that the military finally took action.

A positive evaluation of the Allende years would certainly credit him with a sincere effort to raise the living standards of low-income groups and to involve them actively in the determination of their own future. It would likewise stress the continued existence of freedom of expression for all points of view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative assessment would ask whether the low-income groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an economic policy which after the first half of 1972 produced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a reduction in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more critically, one could inquire who has suffered the most in economic and in human terms as a result of the breakdown of the Chilean system—the Marxist politicians, many of whom were able to escape or go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum-dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply reduced consumption and the strictures of draconian military rule.

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Books

Two Views of Stalin

By Harrison E. Salisbury

ADAM B. ULAM: *Stalin. The Man and His Era.* New York, The Viking Press, 1973.
ROBERT C. TUCKER: *Stalin As Revolutionary, 1879-1929.* New York, W. W. Norton Co., 1973.

ULAM'S STALIN is dead—dead these more than 20 years. Tucker's Stalin is alive, in full bloom. The year is 1929. He has captured the party. Trotsky has been driven out. Collectivization and crash industrialization are the order of the day.

Ulam has done Stalin in a single large volume. Tucker projects three. Ulam's study is traditional, Tucker's experimental. Each, however, is responding to a felt need —the need for a new study of Stalin to replace, broaden, and deepen Deutscher's classic portrait; to give us the full man, not the political caricature of Trotsky's Stalin; to begin to come to grips with the epic question of the 20th century: What was Stalin's role in Russia, and how has it affected our world?

To compare Ulam and Tucker is not necessarily a productive undertaking. It is too much like comparing apples and oranges. Each is good, wholesome, and nutritive in its own way. Ulam already boasts a National Book Committee award; Tucker will surely pick up medals on the way. These two important works do not compete for our attention; they supplement each other. One gets from them a fuller picture than we have yet been able to read.

The biographies draw upon rich legacies. One is the mere legacy of time. Two decades have gone by since Stalin, incredibly as it seemed to many Russians, irrefutably proved his personal mortality by dying, according to the official protocol, at 9:50 p.m., March 5, 1953. The passage of 20 years has granted the scholar a depth of perspective which enables him more accurately to set Stalin within the framework of his own times. We are now distant enough from the turgid events of the 1930's, for example, and from the melodramatic period of World War II and the controversial postwar period, to perceive Stalin and his role with greater clarity.

A second and more important legacy is the insight afforded by the magnificent materials which have become available, beginning with Nikita S. Khrushchev's famous "secret speech" of February 24-25, 1956. Actually, a trickle of new facts on Stalin and his epoch had already begun before then, but this has been largely overlooked in the freshets touched off by Khrushchev's dramatic revelations.

The joy of the Tucker work is his masterly grasp of newly-available materials. These by no means merely pertain to the later events of Stalin's career. Much useful detail on his early life, even his boyhood, is contained in the reminiscences of his daughter, Svetlana, as well as in a wide variety of Georgian sources which have been exhaustively examined by Professor Tucker. New light has also been shed on Stalin's activities after his emergence on the Russian political stage by the publication of additional memoir material (both within the Soviet Union and abroad) and of much more detailed records of party congresses, meetings and protocols than were available during Stalin's life.

It is now possible, as it never was before, to trace with considerable sureness the evolution, for example, of Stalin's relationship with Lenin and the frequent occasions on which Stalin assumed positions contradictory to those of Lenin. Not all of this material, in the opinion of this reviewer, is utilized by Professor Tucker as well as it might have been, mainly because of a conceptual framework which makes heavy use of Freudian theory—particularly in its interpretation by Karen Horney and Erik Erikson[1]—as a tool for

[1] See, for example, Karen Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth,* New York, W.W. Norton, 1950; and Erik H. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence,* New York, W.W. Norton, 1969.

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exploring Stalin's motivations and psyche. Professor Tucker perceives Lenin as Stalin's hero image, and possibly for that reason he does not place as great an emphasis upon the contrast and conflict between the two men as Ulam does.

But, of course, much more archival material is really needed in order to understand fully the complex interrelationships between the two men. It is clear that at many critical junctures Stalin and Lenin were, at least temporarily, on different sides—for example, in the initial period of *Pravda's* founding and again in the days after Stalin returned to Petrograd in March 1917 (also in regard to *Pravda's* position); at various points during Lenin's complex maneuvers in the summer and autumn of 1917; and, of course, repeatedly in the last months of Lenin's declining political activity. But it is by no means certain to what extent these were normal conflicts between two radically different political temperaments, and to what extent they reflected fundamental deviations — and even, in the last months, conscious plotting by Stalin to shunt Lenin aside and begin concentrating power in his own hands.

We now have a much richer collection of Lenin's notes. But we have not yet had access to any considerable collection of Stalin material—for example, the text, if indeed there was one, of his apology to Krupskaya (or to Lenin) for his rudeness toward Krupskaya in the winter of 1922-23. There are even substantial lacunae concerning the very ordinary years of Stalin's life—*e.g.*, his last years in exile in the Turukhansk territory in 1913-17, when he was apparently on the very worst of terms with all of his fellow exiles.

On that most controversial question relating to Stalin's early revolutionary days in Georgia—Did he become, at least for a time, an agent of the Czar's Okhrana?—the verdict of both Ulam and Tucker is that classic of the law of the Scots: Case Not Proven. But neither is prepared to exclude the possibility entirely. After all, too many young revolutionaries (and some of their older comrades) did become double agents. There are puzzling elements in the facts of Stalin's life at that time: curious periods of apparent indolence, the ease of his escapes from Siberia, etc. But while much suspect evidence has turned up, positive evidence to link him to the Czarist police has not yet appeared. There is, of course, the long persisting suspicion in Soviet party circles (a suspicion even reflected in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago)* that Stalin did have some deep stain on his party escutcheon and that this, psychologically at least, was a factor in his paranoia.

Tucker is intensely interested in the accuracy of Lenin's legacy and of Lenin's conclusion that Stalin's fatal defect lay in his personality—the "decisive trifle." Ulam, too, sees Stalin's personality as the decisive element in shaping the dictator's methods of rule, but he arrives at his conclusions by the conventional methodology of history rather than by Tucker's "psychohistory."

Thus, Tucker finds that Stalin "could not help striving to demonstrate that the birthday tributes were no more than his due, that the idealized version of himself symbolized to his own mind by the name 'Stalin' was the truth. He was driven to consummate the Lenin succession." Tucker concludes:

In the terror of the thirties, untold thousands of loyal party members and other Soviet citizens would

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have to be condemned as covert enemies of the people so that Djugashvili could prove to himself and Russia that he was really Stalin.

Ulam puts it somewhat differently:

Stalin—a restless, rebellious man —sensed (the) universal religious existentialist craving in human nature because he felt it so acutely himself. And that is why he was able to build a system of terror and a structure of personal power unprecedented in modern history. The terror was necessary, not only to keep men obedient, but even more to make them believe.

Both men can be right. Or neither. The fact remains that, whatever the reason, Stalin perfected the most ruthless and terroristic dictatorship of modern times. The legacy haunts the world, as well as the rule of his successors in the Soviet Union. And regardless of the impact which Solzhenitsyn hopes *The Gulag Archipelago* will make on the still strong, still terror-oriented Soviet regime, only an optimist could forecast any early clearing from Russian skies of the smog and debris of the Stalinist heritage.

Professors Ulam and Tucker have contributed importantly and perceptively to our knowledge and understanding of Stalin the man and of the era which goes into history bearing his name. Yet, it would be an uncautious critic, indeed, who would suggest that either Ulam's already dead Stalin or Tucker's still-living dictator has the stature to win that rare term "definitive" in the classification of political biography. The definitive work, if there is ever to be one, probably still lies some distance in the future, when the passage of even more years will have given historians greater perspective and, just as importantly, when more archives will have become available for inspection.

Gulag: A Chronicle of Soviet Extralegal History

By Robert Sharlet

A. SOLZHENITSYN:
Arkhipelag GULag, 1918-1956, Chasti I-II (The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956, Parts I-II). Paris, YMCA Press, 1973.

"FROM THE Bering Strait almost to the Bosporus were scattered the thousands of islands" of the Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn's apt metaphor for the Soviet penal system or, in bureaucratic jargon, the Main Administration of Corrective-Labor Camps. Solzhenitsyn's concern is to depict how—in the language of his metaphor—"streams" of people struck down by the "sword" of political justice were swept into a "sewage system," carried by "ships" to "ports" of the "underground" archipelago, and thence led in "slave caravans" from "island to island" to the end of their journey.[1] To put things more conventionally, he meticulously describes how millions of people, from 1918 to 1956, fell victim to the Soviet extralegal system, got transported in prison trains to distant transit prisons, and were then convoyed by various means from point to point in the remote network of forced labor camps until they reached their final destinations, where they began serving their sentences.

In its first two published parts, consisting of 16 chapters and 606 pages, Solzhenitsyn's *Arkhipelag GULag* defies easy classification by genre. It appears to be a composite of legal history, the author's prison autobiography, and reconstruc-

[1] The quoted words and phrases of the metaphor can be found on pp. 17, 37, 79, and 489, and in the chapter titles of Part I, Chap. 2; Part II, Chaps. 1-4. The name *GULag* (rendered as Gulag in English) is an acronym for the Russian *Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei* (Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps).

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tions as in a "nonfiction" novel—all skillfully woven together into a dark tapestry of Soviet extralegal history by Solzhenitsyn's continuous thread of moral criticism. Based on a vision shaped by his own years of confinement as well as by the artistic license he enjoys as a great writer,[2] Solzhenitsyn's moral critique of political justice transcends the Russian experience and has relevance beyond the Soviet audience to whom the book is nominally addressed.

As a study in extralegal history, *GULag* is organized to some extent like a treatise on Soviet law, with substantial sections devoted to legislation, commentaries, and cases demonstrating how the judiciary, criminal law and procedure, and corrective-labor law were coopted for purposes of political justice. Other sections discuss extralegal institutions themselves, in particular the secret police and their investigative methods, the extrajudicial boards, convict transportation network, and prison system. Thus, the book can be read at three levels: as a monograph on Soviet extralegal history; as a textbook on the administration of political justice, with chapters on arrest, investigation, sentencing, execution, transportation, and imprisonment; and as a case history of Solzhenitsyn's own picaresque journey from his arrest at the front in 1945 to the beginning of his incarceration in the Gulag Archipelago.[3]

Besides his personal history, Solzhenitsyn draws heavily on material provided him by 227 people who had also experienced the Soviet penal system (p. 10). In addition, he consulted a wide range of published sources, including the memoirs of former prisoners, prosecutional speeches, jurists' studies, a Chekist's memoir, Lenin's writings, a trial transcript, Soviet laws, and an authoritative Western source on Soviet extralegal history.[4]

The central theme of Solzhenitsyn's book is a profound moral condemnation of the Soviet regime as a system fundamentally hostile to human purposes. He supports this judgment by demonstrating how the machinery of political justice and the prison system evolved from the Bolshevik Revolution onward, and by documenting how, step by step, millions of ordinary individuals were swallowed up in the Gulag Archipelago along the way.

Solzhenitsyn's moral indictment of the Soviet regime rests on his rejection of Khrushchev's destalinization thesis that " 'the violation of the Leninist norms of legality began approximately in the year 1934' " (p. 409). Refusing to exculpate Lenin,[5] and through him the system, Solzhenitsyn finds the impetus for extralegality in Lenin himself, who wrote in January 1918 that the main task was " '*to purge* the Russian land of all harmful insects' " (p. 40). Although Stalin was to become Lenin's finest "pupil" in this work, Solzhenitsyn is nevertheless critical of the relative overemphasis placed on the years 1937-38 and the implication that the Great Purges may have been an abnormality in Soviet "legal" history. To refreshen the memory of those who can only recall the purge trials of "Bukharin and Zinoviev" (p. 305), Solzhenitsyn painstakingly traces their roots back to the earliest political trials of 1918. Similarly, he dates the original streamlet of prisoners into the "sewage system" from late 1917, and he seeks to correct the impression that the Great Purges served as the major source of victims by showing that the years 1937-38 provided only "one of the three largest streams of prisoners in the continuous flow that poured into the Gulag Archipelago—the other two being the collectivization campaign (1929-30) and the early post-World War II period (p. 37).

IN MAKING HIS "case" against the Soviet system, Solzhenitsyn ascribes the origins of political justice to the Bolshevik Revolution, beginning with the foundation of the Cheka, the party's administrative machinery for carry-

[2] As implied in the book's subtitle, *Opyt khudozhestvennovo issledovaniia* (An Experiment in Literary Investigation).

[3] Solzhenitsyn's autobiographical account runs integrally throughout most of the book from the first chapter to the last.

[4] The following are some of the sources in the order referred to above: R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik, *Tiurmy i ssylki* (trans. into English by P. S. Squire as *The Memoirs of Ivanov-Razumnik*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965); N. V. Krylenko, *Za piat let, 1918-1922 gg.: Obvinitelnye rechi* (For Five Years, 1918-1922: Prosecutional Speeches), Moscow and Petrograd, GIZ, 1923; A. Ya. Vyshinsky, Ed., *Ot tiurem k vospitatelnym uchrezhdeniiam: Sbornik statei* (From Prisons to Educational Institutions: Collected Articles), Moscow, Sovetskoe zakonodatelstvo, 1934; M. Ya. Latsis, *Dva goda borby na vnutrennem fronte: Populiarnyi obzor dvukhgodichnoi deiatelnosti ChK* (Two Years of Struggle on the Internal Front: A Popular Survey of Two Years of the Cheka's Work), Moscow GIZ, 1920; *Protsess Prompartii* (The Trial of the Industrial Party), Moscow, Sovetskoe zakonodatelstvo, 1931; and presumably (although Solzhenitsyn cites the authors by name only) David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947.

[5] On this crucial point, Solzhenitsyn rejects not only the Soviet party's official position on Lenin, but also the Leninist thesis of the major dissident leader, Roy A. Medvedev, in his *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, trans. by Colleen Taylor and ed. by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt, New York, Knopf, 1971.

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ing out summary executions. The principal instrument of political repression during War Communism (1917-21), the Cheka in a year and a half shot 8,389 people and arrested 87,000 in just part of the Soviet Russian Republic (p. 306). In the early years, the next most important instrument of political justice was the network of Revolutionary Tribunals headed by the former Civil War leader, N. V. Krylenko. These were judicial bodies which observed a regular procedure and could impose the death sentence. Since the Bolsheviks had abolished the Tsarist legal system, the judges were guided primarily by their "revolutionary conscience" (p. 310). In the prevailing situation, Krylenko observed, the tribunal was " 'simultaneously a *creator of law* [Krylenko's emphasis] . . . *and a political weapon* [Solzhenitsyn's emphasis]' " (p. 313).

Gradually, the Bolsheviks filled the vacuum with Soviet law—initially in 1919, with the "Guiding Principles of Criminal Law of the RSFSR"; then in 1922, with the first Criminal Code of the RSFSR, which included a forerunner of Article 58 on counterrevolutionary crimes in the more elaborate code of 1926. Solzhenitsyn devotes considerable space to a learned exegesis of all 14 variants of this notorious article, which was to serve as the legal basis for condemning literally millions of people to the Gulag Archipelago. In the words of his rich prose, "the sword of article 58," forged in 1926 and tempered thereafter in the streams of prisoners of the next decade, was applied with full force "in the attack of the law on the nation in the years 1937-38" (p. 79). Only the refinements of 1934—the draconian criminal procedure amendments following Kirov's assassination and the creation of the NKVD's "Special Boards" as successors to the OGPU's Judicial Collegia[6]—remained to complete and bring to a state of perfection the machinery of Soviet political justice.

This, then, was the evolution of the system of political justice. Most of the first political trials were handled by the Revolutionary Tribunals, the more important ones by the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal or by the Moscow tribunal, in both of which Krylenko served as prosecutor. Later cases were dealt with by the regular judiciary, which had been fully reconstructed and given broader powers by the mid-1920's.

As part of his demonstration that extralegality emerged as a product of the Bolshevik Revolution under Lenin and was later brought to perfection by Stalin, Solzhenitsyn commences by briefing a number of the early and generally forgotten political trials. In the spring of 1918, for example, the editor of a well-known newspaper was put on trial for printing an article suggesting that Germany had helped Lenin return to Russia; for this offense, he received three months' confinement. Shortly afterward, three investigators of the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal were prosecuted for accepting bribes from a gold speculator and sentenced to long prison terms. In 1919, a Tolstoyite who refused to serve in the Red Guards on the grounds of conscientious objection drew a death sentence for his convictions, although this was subsequently commuted to 15 years' imprisonment (still a very long term under Russian conditions). Two prominent Russian Orthodox laymen, charged with organizing an ecclesiastical society in 1920, were sent to a "concentration camp *until the full victory over world imperialism*" (p. 329). Later that year, Krylenko prosecuted the "Case of the Tactical Center," one of the first major group trials. It involved 28 members of the Russian intelligentsia accused of sympathizing with the counterrevolution. Similar trials took place in 1921 as this aspect of political justice gradually became more routinized.

The year 1922 was especially significant in Soviet extralegal history. It witnessed the trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries, which set the pattern for the 1931 Menshevik trial and later trials of alleged political opposition groups or parties.[7] Another landmark was

[6] The Soviet secret police, created in December 1917, underwent a number of organizational and name changes between 1918 and 1956. The abbreviated designations commonly used included the Cheka (1918-22), GPU (1922-24), OGPU (1924-34), USSR NKVD (1934-41), NKVD and NKGB (1943-46), MVD and MGB (1946-53), and MVD (1953-54), and since 1954 secret police functions have been primarily located in the Committee on State Security (KGB) of the USSR Council of Ministers. For details, see Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, Eds., *The Soviet Secret Police*, New York, Praeger, 1957, Part I; and Robert Conquest, Ed., *The Soviet Police System*, New York, Praeger, 1968, Chap. I.

[7] The trial of the "Right" Socialist Revolutionaries in 1922 was the first of a series of contrived show trials which served as dress rehearsals for the Great Purge trials of 1936-38. Twelve of the 34 defendants were leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party (founded in 1902) who openly opposed the Bolshevik regime. Since the head of the Provisional Government of 1917, Alexander Kerensky, was an SR, the defendants, in addition to other charges, were held responsible for the actions of that government. Most of them were convicted, and nearly half were sentenced to death, but the death sentences were not carried out because of adverse international reaction. The later Menshevik trial of 1931 was a more polished political charade. The *(continued on page 68)*

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the "Case of the Suicide of Engineer Oldenborger." The case, tried in court after the chief engineer of the Moscow waterworks was falsely denounced for sabotage and committed suicide, was the precursor of trials—like the Shakhty trial of 1928 and the Industrial Party trial of 1930[8]—of alleged conspiracies to "wreck" the economy.

The case against V. V. Oldenborger had more than a tinge of absurdity to it. Oldenborger had been in charge of the waterworks since the turn of the century, and—in Solzhenitsyn's words—through "four State Dumas, three wars, three revolutions, all Moscow had drunk the water of Oldenborger. Acmeists and Futurists, reactionaries and revolutionaries, Junkers and Red Guards, the Council of People's Commissars, the Cheka, and the Worker's and Peasant's Inspectorate all had drunk the clean, cold water of Oldenborger" (p. 341). Such reasoning could still vindicate a man in 1922, when "bourgeois specialists" were needed for the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), but what seemed an outrageous denunciation in this instance became a standard and serious accusation as the decade wore on. Before long, nothing was too absurd to be perpetrated in in the name of political justice.

The themes of the 1922 cases, developed and perfected in subsequent political trials, eventually converged in the fantastic charges of political conspiracy and economic "wrecking" in the Great Purge trials of 1936-38. Political justice had triumphed. By 1944, extralegality had become so thoroughly institutionalized that an investigator arrogantly explained to one particular political prisoner how it worked:

"The investigation and trial are only the legal staging and cannot change your participation [in the case] which has already been planned earlier. If it's necessary to shoot you, even if you're completely innocent, then you'll be shot. If it's necessary to acquit you, no matter how guilty you are, you'll be whitewashed and found innocent." (p. 155)

THE DESTINATION of those caught up in the administrative and legal machinery of political justice was inevitably the Gulag Archipelago. In documenting the gradual, steady evolution of the prison system from the Bolshevik Revolution onward, Solzhenitsyn identifies three major "streams" *(potoki)* of prisoners (in 1929-30, 1937-38, and 1944-46, as already noted); but he carefully maps the numerous secondary streams of prisoners as well, many of which are mentioned below. By this technique, he creates the image of a constant flow of human beings into the Gulag Archipelago.

The flow began in late November 1917 with the purge of the Kadet party. A month later, the purge was followed by arrests of many Tsarist officials. In 1918, it was the turn of the clergy and church personnel. For the next two years, numerous Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Anarchists—the so-called "socialist traitors" (p. 42)—swelled the tide. Abortive uprisings against the Bolsheviks, including the suppressed Kronstadt and Tambov rebellions,[9] provided fresh streams of prisoners in 1920-21. During the NEP years, Gulag was fed by an influx of religious believers, troublesome university students, and young Trotskyists. The discovery of "wrecking" *(vreditelstvo)* as part of the cultural revolution and simultaneously as a way to ac-

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Menshevik Party (founded in August 1917) had been suppressed along with the SR party in 1922, but a number of Mensheviks had continued to work in Soviet institutions. Although they had long ceased to be politically active, 14 former members were charged with counterrevolutionary activity and sabotage in collaboration with Menshevik leaders abroad. All were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms. For the revealing post-Stalin documentation on the fraudulent nature of the trial, see Medvedev, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-37.

[8] The Shakhty trial of 1928 was the first of several well-publicized assaults on "bourgeois specialists" during the Soviet cultural revolution of the late 1920's and early 1930's. The trial was staged in the city of Shakhty, in the Donets Basin, and involved 55 non-Communist mining engineers charged with "wrecking" in the coal industry. The majority were convicted; five were executed, and the rest received varying prison sentences. On this trial, see Bertram D. Wolfe, "Dress Rehearsals for the Great Terror," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), April 1970, pp. 1-24. In the Industrial Party trial two years later, which Prosecutor N. V. Krylenko explicitly called "a reproduction of the Shakhty case on a larger scale," the eight defendants, all high Soviet economic officials, were accused under Article 58 of the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code of organizing a counterrevolutionary party of several thousand fellow engineers for the purpose of conspiring with foreign powers and Russian émigrés to wreck the economy and overthrow the government of the USSR. The eight were convicted and sent to prison after the death sentences initially meted out to five of them had been commuted. For details of this trial, see Andrew Rothstein, Ed., *Wreckers on Trial: A Record of the Trial of the Industrial Party Held in Moscow, Nov.-Dec., 1930,* London, Modern Books, Ltd., 1931. The statement by Krylenko quoted above is on p. 150.

[9] Both the Kronstadt and Tambov uprisings were reactions to Bolshevik policy, especially the harsh food-requisitioning system during the period of War Communism. On the revolt of the Kronstadt naval garrison, see Paul Avrich, *Kronstadt 1921,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970. On the armed peasant revolt in the Tambov region, 250 miles southeast of Moscow, see Seth Singleton, "The Tambov Revolt (1920-21)", *Slavic Review* (Seattle), September 1966, pp. 497-512.

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count for the regime's economic problems created a new stream of "enemies with slide rules" (p. 56). "Wreckers" were found in nearly every industry—even the food industry, where 48 leading officials were tried by an OGPU Judicial Collegium for organizing "hunger" by sabotaging food supplies (p. 59). The 1920's came to an end with the inflow of diverse NEP-men, peaceful Tolstoyites, and the survivors of the suppressed Yakut and Buryat-Mongol uprisings.[10] However, all these streams were dwarfed by the swollen tide of humanity, including entire families, swept into the Gulag Archipelago by the forced collectivization campaign of 1929-30.

Though the tide generated by the "ethnic catastrophe" of collectivization (p. 66) eventually receded, fresh streams continued to flow from the countryside, among them "agronomist-*wreckers*" (p. 68) and collectivized peasants held responsible for harvest losses or for nonfulfillment of compulsory state grain deliveries. Another stream welled up with the promulgation of the special criminal statute of August 7, 1932—soon familiarly known as *"the law of seven/eight"* (p. 69). This authorized the death penalty or a ten-year term for the theft of collective farm property; subsequently, its provisions were extended to encompass theft of state property as well. The better-known "Kirov stream" of 1934-35 (p. 69) may have involved as many as a quarter of Leningrad's inhabitants.[11] However, even this was overshadowed by the "stream of Paragraph Ten" — those who flowed into the Gulag Archipelago in 1937-38, charged with counter-revolutionary or anti-Soviet agitation under Article 58, Paragraph 10, of the criminal law. Solzhenitsyn does not dwell heavily on the well-known stream of 1937-38 except to offer several piquant illustrations of the atmosphere prevalent in those days. He notes, for example, that a minor party official received a 10-year sentence for being the first "to stop clapping" at a local party conference after 11 minutes of sustained applause in honor of Stalin's name (p. 82).

Even after the Great Purges had played themselves out, the arrests persisted, sweeping through the streets and houses "like an epidemic" (p. 86). The German invasion of the USSR gave rise to additional streams, including women who failed to repudiate *convicted husbands*, *panic-sowers* and rumormongers, Volga Germans, Red Armymen who had been encircled by the Germans, Muscovites who had stayed behind when the city was evacuated, traitors to the Motherland, and generals held responsible for the early defeats. The flow built up steadily—in 1943-44, with streams of Kalmyks, Chechen-Ingush, and Crimean Tatars; and after the war, with the Vlasovites"[12]—culminating in the flood tide of liberated Soviet prisoners-of-war, who swarmed into the Gulag Archipelago like "sea herring" (p. 243). More streams sprang up later, but by the late 1940's the prisons and camps had become filled to overflowing as a result of the many previous streams, large and small. Over the years since 1917, the Gulag Archipelago had grown into a "nearly invisible, almost imperceptible country inhabited by a nation of convicts" (p. 6).

FINALLY, WE COME to the fate of the millions of ordinary individuals

[10] The Yakut uprising *(vosstanie)* occurred in 1928, while the Buryat-Mongols rose against the Soviet regime a year later. Solzhenitsyn notes that approximately 35,000 Buryat-Mongols may have been shot, although he adds that he could not verify this (p. 63). Both groups had been subjected to the party's harsh new agricultural policies in the late 1920's. In addition, the regime launched an attack on Yakut "bourgeois nationalism" in 1928, as well as a campaign against Buddhism, the Buryat-Mongols' national religion, in 1929. Yakut party leaders were purged, and leading Yakut intellectuals deported, while among the Buryat-Mongols religious holidays and processions were violently disrupted and Buddhist monasteries closed. On the treatment of both these minorities, see Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, New York, Praeger, 1954, Chaps. 4 and 5.

[11] The "Kirov stream" followed the assassination on December 1, 1934, of S. M. Kirov, a Politburo member, Central Committee Secretary, and First Secretary of the Leningrad *oblast* party organization. On Stalin's possible complicity in this event, see Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite* (edited by Janet D. Zagoria), New York, Praeger, 1965, Chap. 2. Kirov's violent death was used as a pretext to carry out wide-ranging reprisals, first in the Leningrad region, and then elsewhere in the USSR.

[12] The Kalmyks, Chechen-Ingush, and Crimean Tatars lived in areas of the northern Caucasus and the Crimea occupied by the German Army during World War II. After the region was liberated by the Soviet Army, these national minorities, as well as others which had been under German occupation, were suspected of disloyalty to the Soviet regime and deported to remote and inhospitable parts of the country. See Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, 3rd ed., London, G. Philip, 1956, Chaps. III and VII; and Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*, rev. ed., New York, Macmillan, 1970, Chaps. 2-4 and 7. The "Vlasovites" were former Soviet soldiers who, after being taken prisoner by the Germans, had served in an anti-Soviet military force commanded by former Soviet General A. A. Vlasov under the aegis of the German Army. At the end of the war, General Vlasov and most of the "army" were forcibly repatriated to the USSR, where Vlasov and his senior officers were executed for treason and his followers sent to their fate in the Gulag Archipelago. See George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952, Parts I and II.

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caught up in the machinery of political justice and swept into the Gulag Archipelago. Solzhenitsyn reconstructs and documents their experience step by step. The journey to the Gulag Archipelago began with one's arrest. This could happen in various ways—arrests by night or by day; arrests at home, at work, or while traveling; and individual or group arrests (Part I, Chap. 1).

The next step was the investigation. The Civil War technique of placing a revolver on the desk during interrogation set the tone for what followed in ensuing years. Over time, extralegal procedures were developed and applied routinely. Psychological methods included night interrogations, appeals to party loyalty, crude profanity, alternation of harsh and sympathetic interrogators, humiliation, any measure that might cause mental disorientation, intimidation combined with enticing promises, lies, and threats to lock up an arrested person's loved ones if he did not cooperate. Physical pressures, in order of escalation, including shouting; painful tickling *(shchekota);* crushing out a lighted cigarette on the arrested person's body; subjecting him to bright lights or other types of harassing stimuli; forcing him to sit on stools, stand in corridors, kneel at attention, or stand in foxholes under the open sky for hours and days at a time—usually without sleep and often with little or no food or drink; using the "conveyor" system to interrogate him continuously; locking him in nearly airless spaces, in dark, bug-infested closets, in hot or cold punishment cells, or in "standing" cells, normally without food, for various lengths of time; and beating and torturing him with rubber hoses, straitjackets, a sort of medieval "iron boot," and/or a backbreaking way of trussing someone up, developed at the Archangel prison. Many of these methods, especially the physical ones, were frequently applied prior to, as well as during, the investigation in order to soften up the individual. At all times, the burden of proof was on the accused (Part I, Chap. 3).

When the investigation had been completed, the indictment was usually forwarded to an administrative tribunal of the secret police or—in the most serious cases involving the death penalty—to a military court. In the 1920's, the typical case went before a Judicial Collegium of the GPU or OGPU; after 1934, it passed to a Special Board *(Osoboe Soveshchanie)* of the NKVD or MVD. Special Boards—to focus on the later bodies—did not "sentence" one in the juridical sense of the term; rather, they meted out "administrative penalties" for which there was no appeal because the boards did not have to adhere to the rules of criminal procedure and were subordinate only to "the Minister of Internal Affairs, Stalin, and the devil" (pp. 290-91). Initially, the Special Boards were empowered to hand out five-year terms. But their powers of punishment were gradually increased, and they could, and usually did, order longer terms, along with supplementary penalties such as denial of the right of correspondence. The boards normally made their decisions *in camera* and in the absence of the accused. They also worked with great dispatch in playing their appointed role in the continual flow of prisoners into the Gulag Archipelago (Part I, Chap. 7).

For one sentenced to the "supreme measure of social defense," the last stop was in front of a firing squad. Solzhenitsyn estimates that "at first thousands, later hundreds of thousands," of individuals were shot (p. 442). Those sentenced to die sometimes languished in the terrible conditions of the death cells for two to three months awaiting execution. Condemned men frequently suffered so severely from cold, hunger, crowding, the oppressive air in the death cells, and lack of medical attention that by the time death came, many no longer feared it (Part I, Chap. 11).

For a convict destined for a labor camp, the journey into the Gulag Archipelago continued in a prison-car *(vagon-zak)* attached to a regularly-scheduled transcontinental train. The prison-car was inevitably packed to overflowing; one prisoner reported being virtually suspended "between people, his feet not touching the floor, for several days" (p. 492). Going to the toilet was also an ordeal—a prisoner was allowed only a few seconds, with the toilet door always open and the watchful guard hustling him along. The convoy guards, in addition, sometimes cheated the prisoners on their rations, stole their personal effects, or "sold" them part of their authorized rations in return for their possessions. Political prisoners were also at the mercy of the ordinary criminals being transported. Finally, the prison-cars were oppressive in all seasons, stifling hot in summer and bitterly cold in winter (Part II, Chapt. 1).

After a train journey of many days, one arrived at what was usually the first of several transit prisons he would come to know in his Gulag experience. Transit prisons varied greatly. Some were

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worse than others, but they invariably manifested all or some of the traditional conditions of overcrowding, lack of heat in the winter, starvation rations, filth and bedbugs, sickness and occasional epidemics of dysentery, little or no medical care, the smell of the dying and the dead, and the omnipresent common criminals preying on the political prisoners, often with the connivance of the guards (Part II, Chap. 2).

As one descended deeper into the Gulag Archipelago, the only law in force was the "law of the taiga" (p. 557).[13] The prisoner was sent forth from the transit prison in a small convoy, and as his journey progressed the means of his transportation became steadily worse: freight cars, the holds of steamers, river boats, barges, trucks, wagons, and often, ultimately, at a time when he found himself in weakened condition, on foot—sometimes for dozens of miles in a severe climate. During this last stage, he was usually guarded by convoy troops with dogs (Part II, Chap. 3).

Ahead lay the end of the line, so to speak—really only the beginning of a long prison term. But the present portions of Solzhenitsyn's literary odyssey break off here. One can only assume that the forthcoming parts of *Arkhipelag GULag* will pick up on the last line of his description of the preliminary journey: "The camp will be worse" (p. 579).

SOME GENERAL conclusions are in order at this point. From his humanist perspective, with its natural law overtones, Solzhenitsyn has effectively labeled the Soviet experience a period of unrelieved evil and consigned it to moral oblivion. Certainly, the Soviet regime has earned his contempt; yet absolute judgments are luxuries that few but great writers can afford. Regardless of one's personal opinions, it must be conceded that the Soviet Union has played a major role in shaping the 20th century, and that this role must be described, analyzed, and rendered comprehensible if we are to understand our times.

To this end, we can better recognize the greatness of Solzhenitsyn's *Arkhipelag GULag* by placing it *within* the context of the Soviet experience. In trying to do so, it would be useful to conceive of the Soviet system as a "dual state" controlled by the Communist Party as a metajuridical entity, and divided into a "prerogative state" governed by the rule of force and a "normative state" governed through a system of legal norms prescribing the permissible boundaries of interpersonal relations and citizen-state relations.[14] If one looks at *GULag* from such a perspective, it is evident that Solzhenitsyn has written a monumental work on the "prerogative state"—that is, on the Soviet extralegal system and its points of intersection with the "normative state" or legal system. As such, however, Solzhenitsyn's study chronicles only a part—albeit a major part—of the Soviet experience. For, as Harold Berman has observed, "a system of law and a system of force exist side by side in the Soviet Union," and "the evidence tends to show a surprising degree of official compartmentalization of the legal and the extralegal."[15] In the final analysis, *GULag* may serve as a challenge for Soviet legal scholars to accelerate the ongoing "rehabilitation" of Soviet legal history, the other "compartment" that was shaped from 1917 through 1937 by the continual tension between Marxism and law.

[13] In this context, "taiga" is used colloquially to refer generally to the forbidding northern Siberian regions where many of the prison camps are situated. Michael Solomon, himself a former prisoner who survived the journey into the Gulag Archipelago, quotes a Soviet secret police general as telling prisoners, "The law is the taiga, and the public prosecutor is the bear!" (see his *Magadan*, Princeton, N.J., Auerbach Publications, 1971, p. 89).

[14] This concept is borrowed, with modifications, from Ernst Fraenkel, *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*, trans. by E. A. Shils *et al.*, London, Oxford University Press, 1941. For other major sources on Soviet extralegal history in addition to the previously cited works by Dallin and Nicolaevsky, Wolin and Slusser, and Medvedev, see also Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror*, rev. ed., London, Penguin, 1971; and James Bunyon, *The Origin of Forced Labor in the Soviet State, 1917-1921*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.

[15] *Justice in the USSR*, rev. ed. enlarged, New York, Vintage, 1963, p. 8.

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Four Ambassadors, Three Decades, Two Questions

By Jean L. Laloy

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN: *America and Russia in a Changing World.* New York, Doubleday, 1971.
GEORGE F. KENNAN: *Memoirs, 1950-1963.* Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1972.
CHARLES E. BOHLEN: *Witness to History, 1929-1969.* New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1973.
FOY D. KOHLER: *Understanding the Russians.* New York, Harper and Row, 1970.

THESE FOUR BOOKS, all written by former American ambassadors to the Soviet Union, are a gold mine of reflections. In them, one finds records of conversations, excerpts from correspondence, portraits of personalities, narrative accounts, and personal judgments. They also reveal four men, each of whom played an important role in international diplomacy.

Different as they are, all four represent that type of American who has always been liked in Europe. Besides the culture and tradition common to our two continents, they embody a certain freshness and élan that seemed to typify America—or, more especially, the often naive image of America entertained on this side of the Atlantic—from the days of Washington and Franklin to those of Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The foremost symbol of this idealistic and idealized America was General George C. Marshall, whom each of our four authors mentions with respect and admiration tinged with sadness. The times, certainly, have greatly changed.

W. Averell Harriman's book, for the most part, reproduces lectures he delivered in 1969, since supplemented by personal commentaries, enabling the reader to savor both the vivacity of the spoken word and the added depth of retrospection. The volume, which contains a wealth of assorted memories and observations, concludes with an interview given by the author in 1946, in which he asserted that the Soviet Union presented a challenge but not a threat to the Western world. He adds the comment, "I could say much the same today." In discussing American foreign policy, Mr. Harriman warns of the danger of becoming arrogant:

In the present world situation, we have to keep a sufficiently strong military position, but we have to guard against a growing arrogance of power. I don't like to admit it, but the danger exists. (p. 169)

Here we find a reassertion of the American liberal tradition founded on a realistic appraisal of the forces at work but seeking to orient them toward an ideal, if I still dare use such a word.

Foy D. Kohler's book is more didactic but no less astute. It combines recollections of his activities in the USSR with views formed since he has been teaching at the University of Miami. The result is a work both of reference (he often cites little-known Soviet sources) and of actual experience, as well as one which presents a series of highly perceptive judgments concerning US-Soviet relations. Kohler is without doubt more reserved than Harriman in his estimate of the chances for true friendship between the two countries; yet he remains open and confident in the future. His book will enlighten all who read it.

Then there are the two memoirists, George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, two friends who never totally agreed with each other, yet were never really in disagreement. As I write these lines, I recall again the places where I met them for the first time—Bohlen at the Oriental Languages School in Paris in 1932, Kennan at the NATO Defense College in 1951. How many days and how many trials have since gone by!

Their books fit their personalities. Bohlen's reflects a man who

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was (since, alas, one must speak of him in the past) sure, elegant, aristocratic, with a hint of irony in his clear eye, a man with a pragmatic outlook that sometimes bordered on skepticism, but at the same time a person of straightforward character and innate honesty. Kennan's reveals a man "too proud not to be shy," as he himself says—a personality of astonishing subtlety, with a generous and troubled mind and a scrupulous sincerity.

Kennan addresses himself not so much to a critique of the Soviet Union as to a questioning of US actions and policies. In this, he comes the closest of the four authors to the European mentality (and perhaps to the new mentality currently emerging in America.) We are used to criticizing ourselves. We have all known not only alternating triumphs and defeats but also the false vanity of total victories that leave the victors worse off than the vanquished. We doubt ourselves. Kennan seems to share something of this European point of view. He reveals his disappointments and his doubts with extreme frankness.

But in certain other respects Kennan deviates from the European outlook. In him, thought and action are not always reconciled, and the solutions he recommends sometimes appear difficult to apply. That was true of the proposal he made in the Reith Lectures in 1957 for a reciprocal withdrawal of forces from the center of Germany. To a certain extent, it was also true of the policy of "containment," which Kennan tells us was distorted from its intended meaning by the military and the realists. One can imagine that this former diplomat feels more at home in Princeton than he did in Moscow, but one can also be thankful for his contributions to diplomacy as well as to political thought in general.

Bohlen, for his part, looks, reflects, and relates. One finds in his book many evidences of his talents as a raconteur, so much appreciated by his friends. But he also understands. And he understands because he is always at peace with himself. He tells us that he sometimes behaved "like a fool," and he even cites documents proving that he was wrong —for example, about the Cuban crisis and about the acuteness of the Sino-Soviet conflict. (Almost everyone of us has made many mistakes. I certainly have, and especially about the Sino-Soviet conflict.) At the same time, Bohlen's cool and balanced view does not confirm the position of the "realists" who see the USSR as a power like any other. He describes quite accurately the complications caused by Communist ideology as much for the Soviet regime itself as for its adversaries. On the other hand, he does not ascribe everything to ideology. He apportions fairly.

The book also presents a subtle but very revealing portrait of Stalin—a man who, Bohlen notes, stands "high on the list of the world's monsters." Perhaps Bohlen is overinclined to defend the position he always held regarding the truly collegial nature of the Soviet leadership. But, on the whole, he provides much information of great interest. This is true as well of the chapter devoted to his tour of duty as US Ambassador in Paris from 1963 to 1968. Although his observations are circumspect, those who know how to read between the lines will find there much food for thought.

Of the many questions raised by these remarkable works, I shall restrict my comments to just two: the origins of the "cold war," and the problem of communication among governments, then and today.

THE BIG QUESTION that arose in the wake of World War II—a question somewhat forgotten today—was none other than how to stop Stalin (then on the way to dominating Germany) without bringing on an open conflict. This was, in fact, the only real problem. Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, China, even Korea—all these represented challenges of varying but more or less acceptable degree. Yet the crux of what came to be known as the cold war, but what was in fact the struggle for Germany and hence for Europe, was whether or not it was possible to devise and adhere to a proper policy without risking war — neither appeasement, for which so many Europeans were ready, nor open conflict. What then?

Three excerpts are worth citing in this connection. The first is from a memorandum drafted by Bohlen at the end of the Teheran Conference and outlines his estimate of Soviet aims in postwar Europe:

. . . Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federation or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately in their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would

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be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence. (Bohlen, p. 153)

The second is an excerpt from an earlier volume of Kennan's memoirs and recalls his judgment of the Soviet attitude with regard to Europe in the spring of 1945:

. . . The Russians had, as they saw it, little to gain from a real collaboration with us in the reconstruction of Europe; but they had much to gain by dangling before our eyes the prospect of such collaboration and inducing us to defer constructive measures of our own until it could be realized. . . .[1]

The third is Harriman's recollection of a brief but illuminating conversation he had with Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. He writes:

The first time I saw him [*Stalin*] *at the Conference, I went up to him and said that it must be gratifying for him to be in Berlin after all the struggle and the tragedy. He hesitated a moment and then replied, "Czar Alexander got to Paris." It didn't need much of a clairvoyant to guess what was in his mind.* (Harriman, p. 44)

There are several other reasons for believing that in May 1945 Stalin and his colleagues estimated that the fruit of victory for them would be not "world revolution" but supreme authority—the right to a deciding voice—on the European continent. Did not Molotov, Stalin's faithful lieutenant, again define the "socialist camp" in 1955 as extending "from the Pacific almost to the Atlantic"? *Almost!* Some adverbs are quite revealing.

Against this interpretation, some recent historians invoke Stalin's caution, his occasional retreats, the moderation he showed toward Finland, the temporizing tactics he sought to impose on the French and Italian Communists. These are, indeed, known facts. But do they signify that an understanding was possible? Stalin was not a gambler. "A monster of cunning, a monster of spite"—that was how Jean Payart, the counselor and guiding spirit of the French Embassy in Moscow between 1930 and 1940, characterized the Soviet dictator. And up to a certain point, cunning has its virtues. Someone who prefers cold and calculating vengeance is, after all, less likely to set the house on fire than an emotional pyromaniac. Stalin was cunning and therefore deliberate. He accommodated the Finnish Social Democrats, abandoned the Greek Communists, and spared the Yugoslav Communists. Was he, then, liberal? Or moderate? No, he was simply prudent. He weighed the risks; he calculated.

If this was the case, how does one explain the intensity of the crisis? Shouldn't the parties have reached an accommodation?

Many arguments have already been advanced in opposition to those who hold that the misunderstanding was primarily due to Truman's rigidity, to Byrnes' narrowness, or to Hull's "open door" policy.[2] But one answer to the question was given as early as 1946 by no less an authoritative source than Maksim Litvinov. Talking with American news correspondent Richard C. Hottelet on June 18, 1946, Litvinov amazed his interviewer with the frankness of his remarks. According to a cabled report received by the US State Department,

Hottelet asked him [*Litvinov*] *if suspicion, which seems to be large motivating force in Soviet policy, would be mitigated if West were suddenly to give in and grant all Russian demands like Trieste, Italian colonies, etc. . . . whether that would lead to easing of situation.*

He [*Litvinov*] *said it would lead to West being faced after period of time with next series of demands.*[3]

Responsibility for the misunderstanding is shared, as always, but it is unequally shared. A large part of it must be laid at Stalin's door. Let us see why.

Bohlen, supported to a large extent by Harriman, maintains that Stalin's attitude changed after Yalta. He ascribes this change, in part, to Stalin's realization of the risks that a policy of relative tolerance would lead to in Eastern Europe, and in part to the Soviet leader's discovery of tempting prospects not only in Germany but

[1] G. F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950)*, Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1967, p. 257.

[2] G. Kolko, in his *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-45* (New York, Random House, 1968), describes then Secretary of State Cordell Hull's policies as "the classic pursuit of national self-interest in an ill-fitting wrapper of internationalist rhetoric" based on the old doctrine of the "open door."

[3] US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, Vol. 6, Washington, DC., US Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 763. (Litvinov at this time was Deputy Foreign Minister, but two months later Moscow announced that he had been relieved of his official duties.)

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also in France, Italy, and Belgium. In Kennan's opinion, the proper course for the Western allies to take would have been to abandon the idea of maintaining the wartime entente and instead enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union allocating spheres of influence, leaving each party free in its own zone. Foy Fohler sees the USSR's domestic problems as a determining factor behind Soviet policy in this period—*i.e.*, the need to reestablish the revolutionary legitimacy of the Communist Party and the need to control—in order to restrain more effectively—the exhausted Russian masses longing for a respite and for an entente with the Allies.

Personally, I do not believe that Stalin "changed" after Yalta. Nor do I believe that an agreement setting up spheres of influence would have settled the problem. The very notion of spheres of influence implies a preponderance, but not a monopoly, of influence for each party within its own sphere; and it also implies a certain degree of permeability of each sphere by the influence of the other side. When the latter does not exist, it is not a fair contest. For then one sphere is more fragile than the other and cannot resist. That is what happened after 1945 in China, precisely the area where there was an attempt at setting up spheres of influence, probably with the prior approval of Stalin.

My own conviction is that Stalin was a prisoner of the policy he followed after August 23, 1939. Having divided up Poland with Hitler, how could he believe that a reborn Poland would willingly accept alliance and "friendship" with the Soviet Union? The Soviet leader found himself forced either to acknowledge his 1939 mistake or to dominate Poland completely. In order to prevent him from choosing the latter course, the Western leaders would have had to issue an absolute and unreserved *non possumus* from the moment of the Soviet break with the Polish government in London over the Katyn affair in April 1943. But was that possible given the military situation that existed at that time? In any event, seeing that nothing happened, Stalin proceeded to maneuver under cover of the inter-allied agreements to impose his unilateral will in Poland. Thus, he succeeded not only in erecting a military and political bulwark to protect the stronghold of his power in the USSR, but also in establishing the corridor toward Germany which every Bolshevik had considered essential since 1920. Finally, by all this, Stalin justified —both to himself and to all those who had previously criticized him —his claim to be the faithful executor of Lenin's policy. What Lenin had failed to achieve—the extension of Bolshevism beyond the borders of the Soviet Union—Stalin accomplished from 1943 on. He moved forward step by step, assessing at each step the reaction of his allies and playing up to their sensitivities in some areas, but never deviating from the line he had chosen for attaining his essential objective.

In the circumstances that existed at that time, it was extremely difficult to make Stalin change his policy. It was nevertheless important at least to discern what was happening. This the four diplomats did, each in his own way. But who listened to them? The general public goodwill that existed in the West toward the USSR in wartime quickly changed into an undoubtedly overemotional hostility. Even today, Western public opinion wavers between trust in the policy of détente and distrust of Communist "totalitarianism."

The problem that this raises is one of communication between governments and responsible officials, as well as between the publics of different countries. Means of communication exist, but misunderstandings continue.

IT HAS OFTEN been said that present-day ambassadors are reduced to the role of mere postmen. In my view, however, they can better be regarded as intelligent "terminals"—as indispensable channels of communication between governments.

On this point, the four books under review provide much food for thought. They make it quite clear that internal communication within the US governmental system sometimes functions quite badly. In some instances we find the State Department raising hasty and ill-considered questions: one such move prompted Kennan to dispatch his much-publicized "long telegram" to Washington in February 1964.[4] On other occasions, the ambassador does not succeed in getting through to his superiors. And sometimes an internal situation develops that virtually paralyzes all intragovernmental communication: the chapters that Bohlen and Kennan

[4] Kennan's famous "long telegram," divided into five sections totalling 8,000 words, was prompted by an inquiry from the State Department as to the reasons for the USSR's sudden refusal to join the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Annoyed at Washington's lack of response to his earlier warnings about the nature of Soviet postwar policy, Kennan seized the occasion to deliver what he called in his *Memoirs* a "telegraphic dissertation" presenting a comprehensive analysis of Soviet policy and its implications for the United States. Excerpts are reprinted in Annex C of the volume cited in fn. 1 above.

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devote to the McCarthy era are terrifying to read. On occasion, it is the Secretary of State who makes things difficult—*e.g.*, Dean Acheson by only half listening to Kennan, and John Foster Dulles by packing Bohlen off to the Philippines. Such difficulties are multiplied by the proliferation of bureaus, agencies, task forces, and panels. Nor is the US situation in this respect unique: it is just one example of a general phenomenon.

The problem becomes still more serious when it involves communication between governments. As long as there is the bond of a common political idea, such as existed among the Western allies in the early stages of the postwar reconstruction of Europe, misunderstandings work themselves out. But whenever "national interests" become the decisive impulse, discord is the rule. Statesmen believe that they can surmount the difficulty by speaking directly to one another, but most of the time one finds that they accomplish nothing because of a lack of adequate preparation.

In a sense, communication with one's adversaries is more sure than communication with one's partners. Occurring less frequently, it is generally based on prepared texts. It is comparable to putting together an intricate piece of machinery which, by virtue of delicate adjustments (in this case, commas, synonyms, or shifted paragraphs), can sometimes be made to run. Within alliances this is rarely the case, and the results are not always favorable.

There remains one final point. If one relies on the conclusions reached by the authors of these books, one surmises that progress toward an understanding between the Soviet Union and the countries of the West will be slow and difficult, and that in the long period of groping known as détente the United States must continue to play a leading role. On both these points, it is not certain that there is today an implicit and stable understanding among the Western leaders. Since 1969 we have been operating in a new phase. An effort is being made to build a "structure of peace," but does this idea have the same meaning for the responsible leaders on both sides of the Atlantic? There is also talk of moving from confrontation to negotiation, of reestablishing a stable world. But this assumes a whole set of prior conditions. Communication within alliances must be as good if not better than communication between "great partners." An attempt must be made to define the role to be played in today's world by the medium powers which are strong enough to have some pretentions but not strong enough to make them prevail. Lastly, there must be a greater effort to understand the intentions of the adversary or whoever proclaims himself, ideologically, as such.

What formerly went unchallenged today requires reflection, research, exchanges of views, and clarification. Would it be presumptuous to hope that the example of the four American diplomats whose books we have discussed may inspire us to raise, among allies, the questions that must be answered if we are to cope with the challenges, not of the next three decades, but of the present one?

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Superpower Relations in the Postwar Era

By Clifford P. Hackett

ROBERT M. SLUSSER: *The Berlin Crisis of 1961. Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
HOWARD TRIVERS: *Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs and a Continuing Revolution.* Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
ANATOL RAPOPORT: *The Big Two. Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy.* New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH: *Peking, Moscow, and Beyond: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle* (The Washington Papers, No. 6). Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1973.

NOW THAT John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev are gone, some people may ask how much difference they really made in long-range American-Soviet relations. A Carlylean view might treat these two leaders as the definers of their age. While they were not the monumental figures that Carlyle saw in history—men around whom events formed—there was something of that character in the roles they acted out in the short period from the summer of 1961 to the fall of 1962, which has emerged in retrospect as the most critical juncture of the cold war.

Then, as a jittery world watched, these two blunt representatives of the only countries on earth with the power to destroy each other totally, and the rest of the world as well, faced one another down—first in Vienna in person, next in Berlin in the summer of 1961, and finally in Cuba the following year. Perhaps we are now far enough removed from these confrontations to be able to view the two leaders as more heroic—or at least less frail—than they seemed as they took their respective turns backing down during the Berlin and Cuban crises. Each of the books here reviewed can help in this process of evaluation.

Kennedy and Khrushchev were quite alike in several ways, and these similarities seem more striking now than they did ten years ago. Both could be tough and, in fact, liked being tough. Yet both had a fun-loving sense of humor (a quality perhaps appreciated the more today because of its general absence in current US-Soviet relations). As one reads the books under discussion, especially the first two by Messrs. Slusser and Trivers, one is reminded of the uncommon qualities which the two leaders displayed under the enormous burdens they carried during the crucial months in question. Kennedy showed great patience during the Berlin crisis in 1961, a quality not usually associated with the newly-elected, dynamic young President of the US. More surprising still was the measured prudence of the Soviet leader the following year when he was pressed by Kennedy (whom Khrushchev certainly had underestimated at Vienna) to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba.

There are difficulties for the historian or the political scientist who attempts to assess American-Soviet relations in this period. A major problem is the lack of hard documentation on the Soviet side; filling in the gaps requires ingenuity and perseverance on the part of the careful scholar who wants to reassemble the elements behind Soviet decisions. On the other hand, scholars studying American events often find the opposite problem, having to cope with a profusion of frequently conflicting accounts by minor and major actors on a particular scene.

THE FIRST OF THE books under review, Robert M. Slusser's *The Berlin Crisis of 1961,* is an excel-

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lent example of the kind of micro-analysis that is necessary to arrive at an understanding of Soviet, particularly Khrushchevian, foreign policy postures. The Berlin Wall, t will be remembered, was erected in August 1961, precipitating a crucial clash in Soviet-American —and more broadly East-West— relations. A sure-footed historian, Slusser knows the dangers of isolating a single crisis from its antecedents and consequences, and in fact describes the present volume as part of his larger, ongoing study of Soviet foreign policymaking. In this work, he has assigned himself the specific task of identifying the influences on Moscow's foreign policy during and immediately after the Berlin crisis in terms of the dynamics of power in the Soviet regime. Toward this end, he has undertaken a meticulous study of the 22nd CPSU Congress of October 1961, devoting some 100 pages to the deliberations and maneuvers within the Kremlin that preceded the Congress and another 200 pages to a day-by-day and session-by-session analysis of its proceedings.

These 300 pages (of a total of 471) constitute the heart of Slusser's book. The fruits of his intensive analysis were surprising even to the author. Noting that Western students have been basically divided between those who thought the Soviet leader was another Stalin or Lenin and those who judged him to be under restraints imposed by others in the Soviet leadership, Slusser says:

What emerged from the study . . . was the discovery that neither of the two opposing schools of interpretation of recent Soviet political history had found a completely satisfactory answer to the problem of policy-formation, though both had grasped part of the complex reality. What I found was evidence of a power struggle more intense, more violent and more divisive than had previously been suspected, a situation in which power lay at times in the hands of a single leader, at times was shared by a collective leadership, and at times seemed to be up for grabs, with whoever could grasp the levers of power entitled to operate them. (p. ix)

Slusser's book is fascinating in its depiction of these inner dynamics of Soviet power. However, when he relates his findings to the broader area of Soviet-American relations in this period, he is less persuasive. The author echoes the general view that President Kennedy exercised necessary caution during the unfolding of the Berlin drama. On this basis, he goes on to protest against the maligning of Kennedy "as a dogmatic anti-Communist, a Cold-War monger whose actions helped create the very crises with which his administration tried to cope." The trouble is that the criticisms which have been made of Kennedy's foreign policymaking (and Slusser cites only two) do not depend solely or even importantly, as the author implies, on the President's behavior in the 1961 Berlin crisis but rather on other episodes suggesting the administration's disposition toward robust action as opposed to the less heady virtue of restraint. The abortive invasion of Cuba and the Kennedy commitment to "counterinsurgency" in Vietnam are what the critics have faulted in the Kennedy years of foreign policy, amid much else that was praiseworthy. Slusser's defense would have been more plausible had he argued that Kennedy was at his best in the Berlin crisis but that, unfortunately, the patience he showed in that episode did not always and everywhere prevail.

WHILE SLUSSER looks at the Berlin crisis in the larger context of Kremlin politics and US-Soviet relations, Howard Trivers' volume begins with a very personal account of the trauma of Berlin in 1961. The account is the first of four essays of reflections on the author's foreign service career, all based on lectures Trivers delivered in 1969-71 at Southern Illinois University (where he served as visiting professor and diplomat-in-residence after his retirement).

Watching the Berlin Wall go up in that August of 1961 was both a maddening and a chilling experience, reports Rivers, who had spent five years as a *"Berliner"* and who—as a foreign service officer—was sensitive to the grave cold-war implications of the Wall. Before August, Berlin was the great gap in the Iron Curtain: if would-be defectors could reach it from the East, they could get into the West with relatively little trouble. Most of the people who climbed through this "show window of the West" were East Germans, with bitter memories of life under what was (and still is, largely) the most doctrinaire and dull of all the Communist regimes surrounding the Soviet Union. Closing off this escape hatch— through which 22,000 refugees passed in the first 12 days of August 1961 alone—was a brutal act in Western eyes; but viewed from the East, it was an absolutely necessary measure.

In terms of cold-war tactics, Trivers thinks that Khrushchev ordered the Berlin Wall built because he judged the new American President too weak to resist such

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a move. The introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba the following year—the subject of Trivers' second essay—was a further reflection of the Soviet assessment of Kennedy. Based on his success in Berlin, Khrushchev calculated that he could put further pressure on the Americans by establishing a missile base in Cuba. How wrong he was in this calculation is now a matter of history.

As in the case of the Berlin crisis, Trivers was close to the events in Cuba, since by 1962 he was serving as head of the State Department's intelligence research section on Soviet policy. His judgments on those crises reflect a short-range perspective which is at once their merit and their limitation.

His third essay—an assessment of the long Vietnam war—is different and, in the reviewer's opinion, more durable, perhaps because the author had no direct role in America's Vietnam policy and could therefore appraise it from a distance, relying on his quarter-century of experience in foreign affairs. Trivers' concern is to determine how the Kennedy-Johnson policymakers became involved in an obscure corner of Asia, thinking it to be in the American national interest. His basic assessment is that the top-level strategists spun a web of abstractions around Vietnam and then refused to consider the mounting evidence of their error, even after ample signs of the United States' growing isolation from its allies and of the alienation of US citizens at home.

Trivers' final essay—entitled "The Continuing Revolution: Science, Technology and Foreign Affairs"—summarizes the interdependence of the scientific efforts of all nations with respect to space, natural resources, population and other common concerns. It is probably the most informative, if least exciting, of his chapters.

In summary, Trivers reflects with insight on his experiences, and his judgments reflect well on the foreign service. The book represents a personal distillation of a career which closely paralleled the span of the cold war. It thus affords the reader a useful perspective for following the events of the postwar years over the shoulder of a middle-level participant.

ANATOL RAPOPORT's book offers an interesting contrast to the works of the professional historian and the professional diplomat. Born in Russia and educated in the United States and Europe, Mr. Rapoport is a biologist and a mathematician who steps into the field of international affairs with an awareness of his limitations as well as his advantages. He offers more than just novel opinions in his work. As a scientist he is deeply aware of the potential for good and evil his colleagues have contributed to a world in which, he writes, "both Americans and Russians are living under governments that have absolute power of life and death over them."

Despite its subtitle, this book has less to do with Moscow's and Washington's perceptions of their own and each other's foreign policies than it does with Mr. Rapoport's own perception of the roots of conflict between the two powers. He does examine the cold-war era—with special reference at the outset to the early Truman years and in later chapters to the Berlin and Cuban crises of 1961-62—in an effort to define the "frameworks of thought" which determined how American and Soviet policymakers reacted to each other in these encounters. But in the intervening chapters, his main concern is to identify the underlying "issue" between the United States and the Soviet Union, which in his view is economic. In brief, his argument is that economic motivations have driven the United States to an expansionist global policy, while the Soviet Union—owing to its inherently weaker economic position — has been forced into an essentially defensive role. With seeming ease, he dismisses Soviet ideological ambitions of worldwide expansion as a passing vision of the early postwar period.

This description of an expanding (if benevolent) American capitalism and an encircled, weak Soviet Union is simple enough to have some truth in it. However, what it ignores—especially on the American side—vastly complicates its superficial logic. For one thing, Mr. Rapoport neglects the consistent attraction of the United States toward (and its occasional indulgence in) isolationism. He also fails to note the minor role that exports play in the trillion-dollar American economy (amounting to about 5 percent of the GNP). While US overseas investments and American multinational corporate interests are factors that to some extent influence US policy, it is perfectly clear that the United States is not a country driven to overseas expansion for the sake of market development. Finally, Mr. Rapoport fails to mention—let alone account for—the common perception of US citizens and policymakers alike that the United States has in general lost influence in the quarter-century since World War II, a perception that is hard to reconcile with the author's attribution of a vigorously

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expansionist outlook to Americans.

Rapoport seems to be on sounder ground in his assessment of Soviet perceptions. It may well be, as he maintains, that the Kremlin leaders recognize their country has lost what opportunities existed in 1945 for worldwide expansion. There is also justification for believing that the Soviet leaders really do view the USSR as surrounded by either military enemies (*i.e.,* the US and its allies) or perverted ideological forces (China, Yugoslavia) and in consequence conceive of Soviet policy as defensive.

A better argument than Mr. Rapoport's thesis might be that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union feels secure today, that superpowerism is inherently unstable, and that both of these military giants must adjust their respective aspirations—whether "defensive" or "offensive"—to a more realistic level.

THE FOURTH WORK under review, William E. Griffith's *Peking, Moscow and Beyond,* is an excellent antidote to whatever remains of cold-war fever. This slim paperback (60 pages) brings the world of 1973 into clear focus by showing the implications, region by region, of Sino-Soviet-American relations. Spun out in two parts, Mr. Griffith's analysis starts with a cogent account, in big-power terms, of where the United States stands today in relation to the other two major military powers. He then shows how the rest of the world (two-thirds of which, after all, is non-American, non-Soviet and non-Chinese) is buffeted by the big three and responds to them—as some hundred middle- and small-sized states seek to control their own destinies and attain their national interests in varying relationships to the big powers.

Mr. Griffith writes in a colloquial style that pleasantly coats a highly concentrated dosage of comprehensive and detailed political analysis. The defects of his overview are minor: there is certainly an American-centered quality to the analysis, and the author's discussion of US policy alternatives (the last six pages) is weaker than his description of the problems the country faces. But these small flaws detract little from his excellent summary, which should be the first item on a required reading list for students, of any age and experience, who want a fresh look at where the world stands today.

Looking at "today" is not, of course, enough. As Mr. Griffith suggests in his title, we must look "beyond" such varied analyses of the past and present as have here been reviewed to determine the broad outlines of—and guidelines for—the future.

In one way or another, all four works reviewed suggest that the cold-war policies of the US and USSR have mirrored their respective strengths and weaknesses as human societies, and at least two of the authors—Messrs. Griffith and Rapoport—stress that the major powers must refine (or redefine) their foreign policy goals in the years ahead. Focusing on the United States, Mr. Griffith proposes some priority objectives for the future: to intensify détente, to aid the ill and the hungry everywhere—and at the same time to improve the reality and the image of American society through domestic reforms. If the Soviet Communists were to match the Americans in this kind of an approach (and if both stayed faithful to it), genuine and lasting détente might be that much more attainable for everyone.

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Moscow's Alignments in the Third World

By Roger E. Kanet

EDWARD TABORSKY: *Communist Penetration of the Third World.* New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1973.
HELEN DESFOSSES COHN: *Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa: The Focus on National Integration.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
GEOFFREY JUKES: *The Soviet Union in Asia.* Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1973.

ONE OF THE most important developments in international politics over the past two decades has been the growth of Soviet interest in and relations with the developing countries of the Third World. At the time of Stalin's death in 1953, contacts between the USSR and the newly-independent states of Asia and Africa were virtually nonexistent in spite of the fact that a common antagonism toward the Western "imperialist" powers would seem to have provided a promising basis for cooperative relations. Within the next few years, however, the post-Stalin Soviet leadership revised its attitudes and policies toward these states, which it now came to view as part of an anti-imperialist "peace zone" along with the countries of the Communist camp and Communist parties in the capitalist world. Since then, Moscow's Third World policies and strategies have evolved through various phases as Soviet perceptions of the developing countries and of their potentialities from the standpoint of furthering the USSR's strategic objectives have tended to become more sophisticated and realistic.

Initially, in the period from the mid-1950's through the early 1960's, the primary goal of Soviet policy in the Third World, especially in former colonial areas, was to reduce Western influence. Accordingly, the USSR initiated major programs of economic and military assistance to a sizable number of Third World countries on the assumption that such assistance would tend to weaken their ties with the West and enable Moscow to influence the policy decisions of the indigenous leaderships. This Soviet policy also appeared to reflect an exaggerated optimism—apparent in Soviet analytical writing of the period—that the emerging Third World nations could not only be mobilized in support of Soviet foreign policy goals but also could be successfully guided along the road to "scientific socialism." In this period, for example, the USSR extended assistance to India in South Asia; to the more revolutionary Arab regimes of the Middle East involved in conflicts with the Western ex-colonial powers (and with Israel, seen as an outpost of Western influence); to a series of newborn states in sub-Saharan Africa, starting with Guinea; and to Castro's Cuba in the Latin American area.

From the early 1960's on, Moscow's Third World policies gradually tended to become more selective and less doctrinaire, focusing primarily on enhancing Soviet influence in regions of special strategic importance to the USSR and, to an increasing extent, on deriving not just political but also practical economic benefits for the Soviet Union and its East European client states from relations with certain developing countries. Especially since the political demise of Nikita Khrushchev in November 1964, this tendency toward greater selectivity has become more pronounced, with the attention of the Soviet leadership centering much more heavily on the Middle East and South Asia than in the preceding decade. These areas still continue to be looked upon by Moscow as of prime strategic value to the USSR, and in recent years regional conflicts there have afforded the USSR new opportunities to expand both its contacts and its influence.

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(At this time of writing, strong Soviet support—both diplomatic and military—of the Arab states in the current Middle East crisis touched off by the "Yom Kippur war" seems to suggest that the Brezhnev leadership is even willing to risk endangering the détente it has so carefully nurtured with the United States over the last two years, apparently for the sake of recouping the loss of prestige and influence the USSR suffered in the Middle East with the ouster of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972.)

THE THREE BOOKS under review all deal, albeit in different ways and with differing area focuses, with Soviet attitudes and policies toward the developing countries of the Third World, and to a certain extent they complement one another. Edward Taborsky's volume is primarily a general survey of Communist, especially Soviet, views and analyses of the developing countries, although it does provide some supplementary information concerning actual Soviet and Communist policies toward these states. Helen D. Cohn focuses more specifically on Soviet writing concerning the problem of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, although much of the material she provides is also applicable to developing countries in other geographical areas of the world. Geoffrey Jukes surveys Soviet policy and behavior in Asia generally, including the Asiatic portions of the USSR, but with particular attention to India, Indonesia, and China.

Unfortunately, Mr. Taborsky's study shares the defect of much of past Western analysis of Soviet Third World policies, which has tended to overemphasize the subversive aspect of those policies and to view the expansion of Soviet contacts and activities in the Third World as something "unnatural." For one thing, analysts of this school have generally ignored the long history of Tsarist expansionist efforts in the areas to the south of the Russian Empire. For another, in their preoccupation with the subversive element in Soviet policy, they have tended to overlook or play down some of the reasons why the leaders of many developing countries have found the idea of expanding relations with the Soviet Union appealing—notably, for example, that these leaders see the USSR as a welcome alternative source of developmental capital and as a possible market both for traditional agricultural and raw material exports and for the products of new industries being established in their countries with Soviet economic and technical assistance. One finds virtually no discussion of such factors in the Taborsky study, which views Soviet Third World policies for the most part in terms of a calculated effort to subvert and control the local regimes. In this respect, the book seems to fall in William Welch's category of "hard-image" interpretations of Soviet foreign policy.[1]

Mr. Taborsky does provide the reader with a broad survey of Soviet and other Communist analytical writing setting forth the official view of the developing countries and their prospects. Such matters as the path by which these countries may advance toward scientific socialism, the importance of industrialization in the developmental process, and the role of the Communist states in assisting this process are covered *in extenso.* The author, however, devotes scant attention to the divergence that has appeared in Soviet analyses of the Third World since about 1963, the year before Khrushchev's downfall. Prior to that time, as noted earlier, the official view as set forth in relevant Soviet analyses was characterized by extreme optimism regarding the prospects for leading the emergent countries on the Soviet developmental path to socialism. Since 1963, however, this view has come under increasing challenge from a group of Soviet analysts who are far less sanguine in their estimate of the possibilities for development (especially socialist development) in these countries. These disputes, which continue to be a feature of Soviet writing on the Third World, are dealt with far more effectively in Ms. Cohn's study of Soviet attitudes with respect to national integration prospects in Black Africa than in Mr. Taborsky's more generalized treatment.

The plain fact is that in the past decade Soviet policy toward the developing countries has become a great deal more complex than one would imagine from reading *Communist Penetration of the Third World.* It is, indeed, difficult today to speak of *a* Soviet policy in this area; rather, the Soviet Union has a host of policies toward different countries and regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, Soviet activities have been scaled down significantly compared to what they were under Khrushchev, when the USSR actively sought to build up contacts and influence in such countries as Guinea, Ghana, and Mali—and even in Emperor Haile Selassie's Ethiopia. Not only the overthrow of pro-Soviet leaders in Ghana and Mali but also

[1] William Welch, *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 100 ff.

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a more realistic Soviet appraisal of the prospects for fostering "progressive" indigenous regimes (as defined by Moscow) appear to have been the determining factors behind the scaling-down of Soviet commitments in this region. In addition, the reduced Soviet involvement there seems to reflect a downgrading of the relative importance of sub-Saharan Africa in terms of Moscow's global strategic priorities.

In other parts of the Third World as well, the Soviet Union has increasingly tailored its policies to the particularities of specific regions and their relative importance in the framework of overall Soviet strategy. In South Asia, for example, the USSR has supported India in the latter's conflicts with both Pakistan and China, while at the same time assisting the Indian government to deal with developmental problems at home. In the Middle East, it continues to strive to maintain its position of influence in the Arab world, while also extending aid, at least indirectly, to rebel groups in certain parts of the Arabian peninsula. In Latin America, it has sought to take advantage of such fortuitous developments as the emergence of the short-lived Allende regime in Chile to expand its Third World connections. Outside these specific places, however, most parts of the Third World are now beyond the primary focus of Soviet strategic interest and have become the objects of an apparent policy of "benign neglect." Unfortunately, readers are not likely to grasp this fact from Mr. Taborsky's study, which gives the misleading impression that the Soviet Union is still pressing ahead with active programs of penetration and subversion on all fronts.

MS. COHN'S STUDY, by comparison, provides what this reviewer considers to be a more balanced introduction to Soviet conceptions of development and nation-building and to the stated goals of Soviet policy in the developing countries. She points up the divergence of opinion that has surfaced in the Soviet Union in the last decade on the question of the capacities of the emerging nations for rapid political, economic, and social progress, and she duly emphasizes the increased realism —and pessimism—of recent Soviet commentary on this issue. She also notes the decrease that has taken place in Soviet interest and involvement in sub-Saharan Africa since the fall of Khrushchev, as the Brezhnev leadership has increasingly concentrated its attention and initiatives on the areas of primary strategic importance immediately to the south—*i.e.,* the Middle East and South Asia.

This is not to say that Ms. Cohn's volume is without some minor flaws. For one thing, contrary to the implications of the title, it does not really provide much information concerning the actual application of Soviet policy in sub-Saharan Africa. For another, the author's historical review of pre-1953 Soviet attitudes regarding the area is too brief and sketchy. In discussing the period from 1928 to 1935, for example, she fails to mention the attempt made by the CPSU to impose on the South African Communist Party a nationalities policy modeled after one that had originally been developed in the context of Tsarist Russia—a policy which the South African party insisted was not at all relevant to local conditions.

On the whole, however, Ms. Cohn deserves credit for an excellent book, perhaps the most lucid treatment thus far published—in English, at least—of Soviet views concerning the processes of development in the Third World.

In contrast to Ms. Cohn's preoccupation with Soviet perceptions and analyses of the Third World, Mr. Jukes focuses almost exclusively on the actual policies followed by the Soviet Union in Asia, including—as noted earlier—Soviet Central Asia. Although the book provides no information not already available elsewhere, it does perform a valuable service in presenting a general survey of Soviet Asian policy within the covers of a single volume. The author observes that, contrary to pessimistic Western predictions in the mid-1950's when the Soviet Union began displaying an active interest in the developing nations, Soviet policies in non-Communist Asia have not resulted in the creation of a new Soviet sphere of influence there, and he is careful to point out that on various issues governments that are recipients of Soviet largess have continued to disagree with, or even oppose, Moscow's wishes. Obviously, Mr. Jukes views Soviet involvement in Asia in a far different light than does Mr. Taborsky. In the former's opinion,

To view as desirable and natural, or worse still to attempt to base policies upon, an American presence on the mainland of Asia, while at the same time raising cries of alarm at the presence of the Soviet Union is unrealistic.

IN SUM, the best judgment would seem to be that overall Soviet policy toward the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America does not fit into a single

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mold but, on the contrary, is a complex mix of policies for individual regions or countries—policies that at times appear contradictory. This complexity reflects the impact of Soviet experience. As the USSR has expanded its contacts in the Third World, the Soviet leaders have discovered that it is extremely difficult to maintain friendly relations with two countries in conflict with each other—as in the case of Somalia and Ethiopia in the mid-1960's, and Pakistan and India in the late 1960's and early 1970's. They have further learned that internal political instability can disastrously affect Soviet efforts to build up local influence—as in Ghana, Mali, Indonesia and other countries which were the targets of such efforts in the Khrushchev era. All these experiences have tended to produce the greater selectivity and variety that now seem to characterize Soviet Third World policies.

To the extent that one can generalize about these policies, it can be said that they appear to have shifted increasingly toward support of the local political status quo as the Soviet leaders have apparently come to realize that their short-term political purposes—in particular, the reduction of Western influence—can be much more effectively promoted by supporting existing governments than by encouraging indigenous revolutionary movements. In non-Communist Asia, Soviet policy toward India is a good example. That policy has been based on support of the ruling Congress regime in the field of external relations as well as in that of internal development, while virtually no Soviet support has been given since Stalin's death to Indian revolutionaries—indeed, Moscow has strongly condemned the revolutionary, Maoist-oriented wing of the Indian Communist movement.

It is encouraging that these changes in Moscow's attitudes and strategy toward the Third World are receiving more balanced and objectitve scrutiny by Western analysts. This new approach is fortunately becoming more widespread among Western scholars and is likely to produce a much more accurate assessment of Soviet policies and activities in the Third World—their successes as well as their failures—than the approach that sought to portray these policies and activities largely, if not wholly, in terms of subversion.

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Poland: The Pangs of Progress

By George Kolankiewicz

PAUL BARTON: *Misère et Révolte de l'Ouvrier Polonais* (The Misery and Revolt of the Polish Worker). Confédération Force Ouvrière, Paris, 1971.
DENIS CLARK PIRAGES: *Modernization and Political-Tension Management: A Socialist Society in Perspective, Case Study of Poland.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
JOSEPH R. FISZMAN: *Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland: Education and Socialization.* Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1972.
Z. A. KRUSZEWSKI: *The Oder-Neisse Boundary and Poland's Modernization: The Socio-economic and Political Impact.* New York, Praeger, 1972.

PERHAPS IN no other country have the nerve ends of a society undergoing a fundamental transformation been so starkly exposed as in Poland. The head-on clash between Catholicism and Marxism-Leninism, between Church and state, between the claims of nationalism and internationalism, and between traditional and modern value systems has reverberated through every area of public and private life. Clearly, the task of any national leader in such a situation is to strive for unity based upon tangible cooperation toward some definite goal. In Poland, there appears to be a consensus that the goal can only be "socialism," but the questions of what kind of socialism it shall be and how to go about achieving it are seriously complicated by the polarities just mentioned.

Several identifiable "forms" of socialism readily spring to mind. "Technocratic" socialism, for example, implies that the good society will emerge from an efficient husbanding of available resources. Then there is the "leveling" *(urawnilowka)* type of socialism, which requires that equality in the present on no account be sacrificed on the altar of future benefit. By contrast, "meritocratic" socialism predicates that "socialist equality is first and foremost equality of life chances," and that it also entails "equality of rights and obligations." [1] Finally, there are other variations on the socialist theme that are sponsored by a suspicious peasantry, by an autonomy-seeking intelligentsia, by a more or less defiant Catholic Church, and most recently by a now vigorous industrial proletariat.

Seen in this perspective, the significance of the "explosion of proletarian consciousness" [2] that occurred along Poland's northern seaboard in December 1970—an event that came as a profound shock to the party leadership, as indeed it did to much of the nation—was that it signified the determination of the working class to assume in fact that class's theoretical role as primary guardian of the Polish "road to socialism." The upheaval served notice that the criteria of productivity, efficiency, and abstract budget balancing, if they entailed decisions at the expense of the industrial workers, would henceforth be unacceptable to them. At the same time, it exposed the distorted nature of popular stereotypes of the Polish worker, prevalent both at home and abroad, which pictured him as lazy, lacking in motivation, hopelessly conservative, and opposed to progress. Finally, the December "explosion" had the effect, ideologically, of raising anew the questions of what form the working class would take under conditions of socialization of the means of production and what the manner of its transition from a class "in itself" to a class "for itself" would be. Old values and traditions heavily laced with new ideologies make a heady brew, and nowhere is this more true than in Poland, where a modern industrial ethos has been slow in forming. Indeed, many of the values associated with the development of industrial society in the West

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[1] E. Gierek, "Materials of the Krakow Party Conference," *Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), November 1973, p. 15.

[2] This term, originally coined to characterize the May 1968 events in Paris and the Belgian general strike of 1960-61, appears particularly appropriate to the Polish events. See M. Mann, *Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class*, New York, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 45-54.

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have been, and still remain, alien to the Polish worker.

Because of this interaction of tradition and ideology, a full understanding of the significance of the events of December 1970 requires a broader historical perspective than that provided in Paul Barton's otherwise admirable monograph. There is a rich tradition of both economic and political militancy in the history of the Polish industrial working class over the last hundred years. Factory occupation and control, though not necessarily anarcho-syndicalist in inspiration, was a common feature of worker action in Poland after both world wars. However intangible the influence of "tradition" may be, the astonishing political maturity displayed by the shipyard workers of Szczecin—who were, after all, primarily first-generation industrial workers[3]—is difficult to explain without reference to the record of proletarian militancy in Lódz, Kraków, and Warsaw during the early 1930's, if only to ascertain the historical origins of the Polish "occupation" strike. Similarly, the reasons why the miners of Katowice hesitated to support the workers' councils movement in 1956 and were relatively nonmilitant in 1970 can be understood only in the sociohistorical context of the Polish mining industry from the start of the 20th century.

POLAND TODAY is a society striving—rather successfully, it seems from the evidence available—to achieve a satisfactory level of economic growth. The common problems confronting growth-oriented economies in both Comecon and the Common Market countries will be solved largely in accordance with policies rooted deep in the political and cultural subsystems of these societies. Consequently, it is essential that social scientists investigating the modernization attendant upon economic growth in any particular society make themselves thoroughly familiar with the unique features defining that society.

This requirement, unfortunately, does not appear to have been met by Dennis Pirages in undertaking his analysis of Poland as a case study of "modernization and political-tension management" in socialist societies. The author's central thesis is that because of the "old coercive and hierarchical models of control in these societies, the political tensions generated are that much greater than they are in more democratic systems; and that the political leaders or "managers" therefore have to invest proportionately greater energy in trying to manage these tensions (p. 22). Pirages then proceeds to outline the modes of tension management used in Poland and the means available for implementing them. Unhappily, it would be overly kind to suggest that the author sacrifices detail for the sake of raising his work to a higher level of theoretical generalization, for such a judgment is belied by his failure to demonstrate either a factual competence in the subject area or even a basic awareness of the specific kinds of questions that need to be addressed.

A case in point is the conspicuous omission of the role and functioning of the legal-judicial superstructure in Poland and its part not only in maintaining social discipline during the critical years of transition and disruption in the social order, but also in defining the socialist morality of the future.[4]

Political-tension management in a socialist society is inextricably tied in with law and the judicial system, especially since legal norms are underpinned by the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. As a result, law is infused with a *moral* content to a far greater extent than in Western capitalist societies. A concrete example will help to clarify this point. One problem that is frequently aired in the popular and professional press of socialist states is that of "social parasitism." Recently the Penal Department of the Polish Supreme Court handed down a ruling which defined parasitism in these terms:

A person leading a parasitic style of life is that miscreant who, despite available possibilities, did not continue his schooling or—being capable of work—avoided the same and obtained the means of his existence in a manner contrary to the fundamental principles of social cooperation.[5]

What is important here is the ruling's invocation of the broad "fundamental principles of social cooperation" as the criterion of

[3] For useful demographic data concerning the ages, territorial origins, and concentration of these workers, see E. Brzosko, *Problemy zatrudnienia w przemysle woyewodztwa szczecinskiego w latach 1945-65* (Employment Problems in the Industry of the Szczecin Wojewodztwo, 1945-65), Poznan, UAM, 1971.

[4] Professor Harold J. Berman has drawn attention to other functions of the legal order in the USSR, such as the "educational" function. See his article, "What Makes 'Socialist Law' Socialist?" *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1971, pp. 24-30.

[5] This ruling was dated October 18, 1973. Quoted in Wanda Falkowska, "The Parasitic Life-Style—A Burdensome Circumstance," *Polityka* (Warsaw) Oct. 10, 1973; also in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Jan. 11, 1974.

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proper behavior.[6] It is true, of course, that what does or does not constitute "social cooperation" is open to varied interpretation. The shipyard workers of Szczecin, for example, may well regard "exploitation" by enterprise directors and engineers in the form of excessively high salaries and bonuses for themselves as just as much a violation of the principles of "social cooperation" as the activities of the black marketeers and private entrepreneurs who operate in the interstices of planned societies. And by the same token, manual workers may view the existence of overpopulated administrative apparatuses in enterprises as no less contrary to the same principles than the "parasitic" life-style of middle-class "hippies".

From the party's viewpoint, however, "social cooperation" implies a duty on the worker's part to practice social discipline, especially strong work discipline, based on recogniton of his obligations to society. Party theoreticians argue that under conditions of capitalism, there is no reason to stress the responsibilities of workers since the laws of private property and conservative legal and moral traditions support the employers, enabling them to impose labor discipline on their own. Consequently, in capitalist societies, progressive social thought has accentuated the rights of workers vis-à-vis their employers, rather than their obligations. On the other hand, since socialism eliminates employer exploitation, it requires a more rational approach to the "obligations and responsibilities" of workers—an approach which, for obvious reasons, should not take its lead from capitalist legal formulations.[7] Under this approach, all the social organizations that exist in the factory or workplace, such as trade union councils, work inspection organs, worker's courts, and arbitration commissions, represent the law and act as agencies for enforcing work discipline. But at the same time they serve to define and maintain the rules of "socialist morality" as well as to keep watch on activities that are on the borderline between legality and illegality, such as pilfering, drunkenness, and absenteeism, or wrongful dismissal of workers. In theory at least, these organs do not simply serve the cause of industrial efficiency but seek to ensure that cooperation and discipline are not all one-sided, although in this respect they were all judged sadly wanting in Poland in 1970.

In any case, the foregoing discussion is enough to point up the normative aspects of the role of the legal-judicial structure in socialist societies. Pirages, however, particularly in his examination of the Polish educational system and its relationship to state power, places inordinate stress upon the manipulative and compliance practices of the state at the expense of those which highlight its attempts to inculcate normative rules of social behavior. Certainly, neither popular misconceptions of "socialist legality" nor the appalling complexity of this concept should deter social scientists from probing more deeply into its real—or even its purported—function in socialist society.

SOCIAL COOPERATION, however, does not rest exclusively upon social discipline; it also rests upon the twin pillars of socialization and integration, which form the respective themes of the highly impressive studies of Joseph R. Fiszman and Z.A. Kruszewski. The main thrust of Professor Fiszman's book, an outstanding example of scholarly research and regard for one's data, is that the key to the emergence and eventual survival of the socialist order in Poland lies in the character of the teaching profession. The author outlines the tremendous challenge facing those who have sought to construct a new socialist personality in a society as steeped in tradition as the Poland of the immediate post-war period. The all-pervasive power of the Catholic Church and its teachings, the hold of strict sexual mores, a reverence for the family rooted in the country's peasant past, and the singular absence of a technical-industrial culture among the population at large have all combined to make the inculcation of Marxism-Leninism in the teacher, let alone the pupil, extremely difficult. The romantic traditions that enabled Poland to survive occupation and partition hardly provide a basis for the transition to industrialism, but they may explain why appeals to nationalism punctuate every major exhortation for productivity and discipline on the part of workers and for greater innovation, responsibility and initiative on the part of management.[8]

[6] Legal experts in Poland are all too aware of how such broad rulings can be misused to neutralize troublemakers.

[7] J. Jonczyk, "Concerning Obligations, Rights, and Responsibilities," *Nowe drogi*, December 1973.

[8] The resurgence of all forms of nationalism in both Eastern and Western Europe reflects the inability of the respective ideologies, whether socialist or neo-capitalist, to bring about national unity, although in the reviewer's opinion the crisis is currently greater in the West European countries. See, e.g., T. Nairn, *The Left Against Europe*, Baltimore, Penguin, 1973.

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Despite exhibiting the highest economic growth rate among the bloc countries, Poland, Professor Fiszman points out (p. 241), is still characterized by rural and traditional attitudes "toward time, work and leisure." Indeed, the persistence of such attitudes impelled the First Secretary of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR), Edward Gierek, to remark, at the recent First National Party Conference, on the excessive amount of time wasted at work (8 percent)[9] and the "irrational" employment profiles in certain sectors. Clearly, however, respect for the value of time and a rational industrial structure are attributes that cannot simply be introduced by political fiat. All in all, Fiszman leaves one with the impression that there are deep forces at work in Polish society which point not simply toward an accommodation between the competing value systems but to the evolution of a socialist society uniquely buttressed by the force of tradition.

While Professor Fiszman focuses on education as an instrument of socialization, Professor Kruszewski addresses himself to the problems of integration and modernization in the context of Poland's "Western Territories" acquired from Germany at the end of World War II. These problems were extremely complex because all the major conflicts referred to at the outset of this review were magnified many times by the impact of the resettlement of over two million persons of heterogeneous backgrounds—not only migrants from other parts of Poland but also Polish repatriates from France, Romania, Belgium and the Soviet Union. The social and moral disorganization that accompanied the resettlement process was such that it resulted in a higher incidence of criminality in these regions than anywhere else in Poland; and with 54 percent of the present inhabitants born since the war, Wroclaw province still has the highest rate of juvenile crime in the entire country.[10]

Yet, Professor Kruszewski holds that the modernization process has forged ahead in the face of these difficulties to a point where these territories "have become the model for society in other parts of the country" (p. 136). There is evidence also to suggest that the problems of integration generated by the "melting pot" crisis are finally being overcome. While the workers of Szczecin, Gdansk, Olsztyn and Koszalin (all in the Western Territories) were prime movers in the events of December 1970, the party can find a crumb of sociological comfort in the fact that they displayed a political and social solidarity rivaling that of the workers of "red" Lódz, Warsaw and Katowice.

In Professor Kruszewski's study, too, we encounter the theme of the creation of a new type of Pole, "reared in industrial society and amalgamating the best elements of a traditional heritage, but geared to the tasks of a modern society" (p. 168). Yet it is difficult to believe that some of the deeply-rooted antagonisms and tensions —*e.g.*, between peasant and industrial worker, and between urban and rural areas—will be easily overcome. It is likewise hard to envisage the passing of traditional Polish attitudes of hostility toward Germany, whether unified or divided, especially since keeping the "German issue" alive has a certain political usefulness for Polish leaderships. Kruszewski treats this subject with the sensitivity that it clearly warrants, and one can readily agree with him that the issue will not easily be removed from the Polish political arena.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that Poland, more than any other socialist state, has opened the door to sociological research, thus providing outside observers with the necessary materials for making scholarly evaluations of the developments and transformations going on in Polish society today. It is therefore nothing short of exciting when scholars like Professors Fiszman and Kruszewski make full use of the available materials in order to give us balanced portraits of Polish society showing both the blemishes and the beauty spots. These authors' careful examination of the concrete problems of Polish national life in the light of *all* the various forms of data now available is indicative of a long overdue renaissance of informed and responsible research in this field.

[9] This figure was at least an improvement over the 12-percent figure for 1965 cited by Pirages (p. 126).

[10] *Rocznik statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, GUS, 1973, pp. 599-602.

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